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IMPLICATIONS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE FOR THE
DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS

Richard B. Foster, et al

Stanford Research Institute

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
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SSC-TN-8974-61

May 1972

IMPLICATIONS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE
FOR THE DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS

By: Richard B. Foster Wynfred Joshua
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Prepared for:

Office, Chief of Research and Development
United States Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

Under direction of:

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

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13. ABSTRACT <p>This study was undertaken to provide for the defense planning system broad examination of the implications of the President's foreign policy for the U.S. defense posture in the decade ahead. The Nixon Doctrine addresses the problems of a world undergoing the uncertainties of change. The balance of power is becoming more complex; the bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union continues, but new power centers—Japan, China, Western Europe—must be reckoned with in the new international milieu. The Nixon Doctrine is thus a guideline for a time of transition, as the United States redefines its role in the world, taking a lower profile in world affairs, calling on friends and allies to bear a greater share of the security burden, and attempting to lower international tension by a demonstrated willingness to negotiate with adversaries. In the military sphere, deterrence of conflict at all levels is the objective. The Nixon Doctrine recognizes that U.S. strategic nuclear sufficiency cannot be allowed to erode into strategic inferiority, lest the Soviet Union be given a politically usable margin of strategic nuclear power. Below the strategic nuclear level, smaller but better U.S. forces will join with those of allies and friends to form a total force for peace; i. e., by the selective application of mobile, versatile, technologically advanced (including tactical nuclear capable) military forces, when and where needed to resolve situations affecting vital U.S. interests.</p>		
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PREFACE

This study, Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for the Defense Planning Process, was undertaken to fill a need within the defense planning system for a broad examination of the implications for the U.S. defense posture of the President's new foreign policy. The President's guidelines for worldwide security, more popularly known as the Nixon Doctrine, are much more than a declaratory policy orientation. They provide a set of parameters to guide U.S. defense planning. This study seeks, therefore, to delineate key military concepts compatible with the Nixon Doctrine.

Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for the Defense Planning Process was performed in compliance with the requirements of Contract DAHC19-71-C-0001 with the U.S. Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

This study is part of a broader research program of the Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, dealing with the problems of defense and force postures. Just as this study will contribute to ongoing and projected research, notably the Integrated Force Analysis study for the U.S. Army, DCSOPS, it benefited greatly from previous projects, including Nuclear Weapons in NATO Strategy for the Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense, and the STRATOP studies performed by the U.S. Army, DCSOPS. Closely related to the present study was the symposium, "National Strategy in a Decade of Change," sponsored by Stanford Research Institute and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, held at Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia, in February 1972. This symposium brought together a group of experts to explore alternative strategic concepts for coping with the great challenges of the 1970s.

This project was conducted under the direction of Richard B. Foster, Senior Director, Strategic Studies Center. The members of the project team were William M. Carpenter, Wynfred Joshua, and Leon W. Johnson, consultant, with the support of Jon L. Lellenberg and Albert Ferri, Jr.

The study owes a special debt to Dr. Alvin J. Cottrell, Director of Research, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, and Dr. Stephen P. Gibert, Associate Professor of Government, Georgetown University, who made important contributions to the report. Other consultants, who prepared background papers for the study were: Dr. Laurence W. Martin, Chairman, Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London; Dr. Frank N. Trager, Professor of International Affairs and Director, National Security Program, New York University; Dr. Yuan-Li Wu, Professor of Economics, University of San Francisco; and Dr. William R. Kintner and Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Director and Deputy Director, respectively, of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia. The encouragement and cooperation from the Office of the Directorate of Plans, DCSOPS, is gratefully acknowledged.

Richard B. Foster
Senior Director
Strategic Studies Center

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I THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF THE SEVENTIES

The decade of the seventies has brought a new kind of world. The bipolarity of the years after World War II has gradually eroded, even though in the strategic nuclear realm the strength of the two super-powers can be expected to remain unequalled in the coming decade. But among the factors that are shaping the new international environment and with which the United States will have to cope is the emergence of additional power centers based on criteria other than their nuclear strength.

China, with its huge population, its geographic expanse across the Asian mainland, and its developing nuclear capability, is moving toward major power status. Japan, as the world's third ranking economic nation, is gaining greater political influence, and may very well acquire a significant military capability, including perhaps nuclear weapons. While not a political entity, Western Europe, because of its economic cohesion, its highly skilled manpower reservoir, its rich industrial base, and its military forces, has already been a major component in the international constellation of power.

Another factor of profound influence in shaping the world of the seventies is the impressive growth of Soviet military capabilities and particularly Soviet strategic nuclear forces. As Table 1 indicates, Moscow has overcome the American lead in the number of ICBMs and is close to surpassing the United States in SLBMs. To be sure, the USSR is still behind in the number of deliverable nuclear warheads but ahead in missile throwweight and ballistic missile defense. In other areas, moreover, such as in air defenses and civil defense, it has, unlike the United States, continued to make improvements and additions. In short, the USSR has attained rough strategic nuclear parity with the United States. There is, moreover, no indication whether Moscow is prepared to accept this status or whether it seeks to go beyond this and gain at least a margin of strategic superiority which it could then seek to exploit for political ends. But the emergence of parity has already cast some doubts

Table 1

STRATEGIC FORCE STRENGTHS--THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

	<u>November 1, 1971</u>	<u>Mid-1972</u>	
	<u>USSR</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
<u>ICBM Launchers</u>	1520 ¹	1054	1550 ¹
<u>SLBM Launch Tubes</u>	475	656	580
<u>Heavy Bombers</u>	140 ²	565	140 ²
<u>Total Offensive Force Loadings</u> ^{1, 3, 4}			
Weapons	2100	4700	2500
Air Defenses			
Fighter-Interceptors	3200	612	3100
SAM Launchers	10000	895	10000
ABM Launchers	64	0	64
			0

¹ Includes SS-11s at MR/IRBM complexes.

² Excludes about 50 Soviet tanker and several reconnaissance aircraft.

³ Data not available for November 1971. Figures are as of mid-year.

⁴ Figures for USSR are presented as computed. They should not create an impression of precise intelligence.

Source: Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 15, 1972), p. 40. Hereinafter cited as Defense Department Report FY 1973.

on the credibility of the United States to defend its allies with nuclear weapons and has helped to undermine the cohesion in the NATO alliance.

The Soviets have not only improved their strategic forces; they have also upgraded their conventional military systems. Indeed, the continued modernization of Soviet forces facing Western Europe combined with the 600 plus Soviet IR/MREMs, appears to reflect the abiding Soviet objective of establishing clear military superiority in that theater. The USSR has further markedly upgraded and expanded its navy. A rapidly growing naval and airlift capability permits Moscow to project its power and influence in areas of the world in which Western hegemony had heretofore gone unchallenged. In the Mediterranean the presence of a Soviet naval squadron has largely neutralized the political effect of the Sixth Fleet. Soviet warships have been introduced in waters where they were rarely seen before, as in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. In addition, the USSR has significantly increased its military aid program in the developing areas, notably in the Middle East. Thousands of Soviet military advisors are attached to Arab armed forces and some 14,000 Russian air defense troops help protect Egyptian air space. The Soviet Union can be expected to harness its enhanced military capabilities in Europe and its more visible presence in areas of the developing world to a campaign of blandishments and political coercion against the countries of Western Europe and the Third World. As a result the decade of the seventies presents the United States not only with the challenge of strategic parity and increased Soviet military power, but with bold Soviet diplomatic initiatives throughout the world as well.

Another major element affecting the international environment of the seventies is the changing American role in the world. President Nixon's call for a lower profile abroad reflects the changing domestic environment in the United States. The fundamental assumptions that have guided U.S. foreign and defense policies for a generation are being challenged as is the necessity for the scope and size of the military

establishment which was created to support those policies. Congressional bipartisanship which once assured support for American commitments abroad has broken down. Large segments of the academic community no longer regard questions of national security as relevant. The popular attitudes in the United States toward military power and the American mission abroad are in a state of ferment. Disillusionment with the American experience in Vietnam and domestic pressures to reorder national priorities and limit defense spending are creating important constraints on U.S. foreign and military policies.

The changing international and national environment call for a new American foreign policy. President Nixon, beginning with his 1969 Guam speech, and subsequently in his foreign policy reports to the Congress of 1970, 1971, and 1972, set forth a new approach to meet the challenges of the future. These guidelines, generally called The Nixon Doctrine, are broad and flexible, designed as they are to lead an America in its search for a different but still responsible role in the world. To avoid jeopardizing stability in international relationships, the Nixon Doctrine cautiously combines continuity with change. It is, however, much more than a declaratory policy orientation; it provides a set of parameters for U.S. force structure planning to support the emerging new policy. While the Nixon Doctrine clearly accepts the need for the United States to reduce to some extent its presence abroad, different strategic concepts and derivative force postures appear to be compatible with the new American doctrine.

The basic purpose of this study is, therefore, to analyze such alternative strategic concepts. Based on this analysis, the study seeks to derive the principal characteristics for the total U.S. force posture. In so doing, this study hopes to provide guidelines for use in U.S. force structure planning.

As has been indicated, the range of the main alternative strategic concepts will be analyzed against the background of (1) emerging multipolarity in the world arena, (2) increasing Soviet military capabilities, notably

strategic nuclear parity, and (3) the changing domestic environment in the United States with its pressures to reassess national priorities and curb military expenditures. This study begins by analyzing alternative concepts for the U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Subsequently, the defense implications of the Nixon Doctrine for the major regional theaters in the world are explored. Three related issues of particular relevance to theater problems are then highlighted: the implications of the Nixon Doctrine for coping with the threat of wars of national liberation, for U.S. military aid programs, and for U.S. overseas bases. The concluding chapter integrates the findings and presents the guidelines for force structure planning.

II THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND U.S. STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

A. INTRODUCTION

The course of international political-military interactions in the 1970s and thereafter will continue to be greatly influenced, directly and indirectly, by the on-going development of nuclear military power and the alignment of power blocs. As the basic conditioning factor, the Soviet-American strategic equation continues to be dominant. Other national nuclear forces, those of Great Britain and France, and increasingly that of China, will continue to have their own impact upon the nuclear balance, and the possibility of further proliferation, notably in such cases as Israel, India, and Japan, still exists. But it is the Soviet-American relationship, based upon strategic offensive and defensive forces of magnitude greater than any others, which will remain predominant in determining the structure of that balance for the foreseeable future.

As early as the mid-1960s, the Soviet-American strategic equation, hitherto based upon American superiority, appeared to be changing. By the early 1970s, it had become clear that the long-standing American position of overall quantitative and qualitative superiority in strategic nuclear weaponry was being effectively degraded by large-scale Soviet weapons deployments. The nature of the Soviet-American strategic equation has now evolved into a state of approximate parity.

This development has given rise to serious concern about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantees. It has cast doubt upon the United States' continuing will to come to the aid of allied nations confronted with nuclear coercion or external aggression. The full effect of the changing nuclear balance upon Soviet-American interaction in various areas where their interests may clash has not yet become apparent, but it seems certain that current American nuclear strategy will have to be modified to meet changing conditions and future situations.

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Uncertainty about the state of the Soviet-American strategic equation in the 1970s derives principally from two factors: first, the continuing development and deployment of large numbers of advanced strategic weapons by the Soviet Union, and second, the continuing Soviet-American negotiations on strategic arms limitations. In both cases Soviet motivations and objectives are still ambiguous, and a wide range of possible alternatives exists.

The improving Soviet technology is a factor which poses serious questions about the future of the U.S./USSR relative capabilities. Throughout the 1960s, strategic weapons technology -- at least on the American side -- was oriented towards reliability, readiness, penetrability and accuracy. Yet, once the limited degree of accuracy necessary to strike countervalue targets was attained the United States elected to remain there, reasoning that in an era of no ballistic missile defense, the mutuality of destructive capability should be adequate to prevent nuclear war. The Soviet Union followed the same general pattern of development, but, apparently, did not arrive at the same conclusion because it did not opt for the doctrine of assured destruction. Now, in the early 1970s, qualitative technological development is making possible major changes in strategy and force design for both sides. Innovations and improvements in offensive weapons capability, such as multiple warhead systems with high accuracy, can enhance counterforce capabilities even against hardened targets. A throwweight advantage could be significant in such innovative improvements. At the same time, new possibilities in defensive technology are making active defense of the population and urban/industrial centers an increasingly feasible proposition. Advanced means of electronic reconnaissance and surveillance are being combined with near real-time data transmission and processing. The result is a considerable expansion of the range of strategic options open to a nation with the resources of either the United States or the Soviet Union.

A wide range of possible outcomes exists for SALT. Moreover the possible disparity between Soviet and American motivations and objectives, as well as more certain disparities in strategic concepts and bargaining styles, make it hazardous to predict the ultimate effect of these talks. The first-stage

agreements are expected to be on ABM limitations and interim quantitative limitations on some offensive weapons systems. These could lead to an acceleration of qualitative competition; and it is possible that no subsequent agreement at all might be attained through SALT. Whatever the outcome may turn out to be, however, Soviet weapons development and deployment has proceeded apace throughout the negotiations, and the apprehension that the Soviet Union may be employing SALT as a delaying tactic to restrain the United States while it gains an advantage in both quantities and in certain critical areas of strategic technology causes serious concern.

While many of these ambiguities and uncertainties created by technology and by political interactions should be reduced with the passage of time, the degree of military effort being expended in the USSR does not allow any confidence that time is on the American side. True, there is relative confidence concerning the basic integrity of American deterrence capability throughout the first half of the 1970s. But uncertainties as to Soviet intentions, complicated by the interplay between lead-time periods for weapons development and deployment and questions regarding limitations in intelligence capability to monitor Soviet activity, raise serious questions about the character of the Soviet-American strategic equation in the mid and late 1970s.

As the Soviet nuclear arsenal continued to grow, it began to appear quite possible that current American strategy and force posture could prove insufficient to support with high confidence the continuing integrity of American national interests and security. Recognition by the end of the 1960s of this possibility resulted in the beginning of a major reexamination of American strategy, directed along certain guidelines laid down by President Nixon: that American strategic posture is fundamentally "political and defensive" and thus should be designed to deny opponents the ability to attain a position of strategic superiority that might enable them to impose their will upon the United States and/or its allies; and

that American national interests call for a non-provocative strategy that would not negate the possibility of arriving at a mutually acceptable agreement in SALT.¹ Within these general guidelines, a first basic step toward re-evaluation of American strategy and force posture was accomplished with the formulation of the "strategic sufficiency criteria."

Taking the Presidential guidelines and the sufficiency criteria into consideration, an examination of alternative strategic concepts and force postures has therefore been undertaken in the analysis which follows. This involves four principal steps: an examination of the implications of the sufficiency criteria postulated by the Administration; the formulation and drawing of the implications of supplemental criteria for strategic forces; the delineation of alternative American strategies in terms of their concepts, implications, and general requirements; and the evaluation of the strategies against both sets of criteria.

¹ U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, February 18, 1970, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970) pp. 121-124. Hereinafter cited as Nixon, Foreign Policy 1970.

B. THE CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF STRATEGIC SUFFICIENCY

1. The Four Criteria Announced by the Secretary of Defense. In order to provide for the determination of the sufficiency of the American strategic forces, certain criteria have been announced by the Secretary of Defense:

THE "SUFFICIENCY" CRITERIA¹

1. MAINTAINING A SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY ADEQUATE TO DETER ALL-OUT SURPRISE ATTACK UPON THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES.
2. PROVIDING NO INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO STRIKE THE UNITED STATES FIRST IN A CRISIS.
3. PREVENTING THE SOVIET UNION FROM GAINING THE ABILITY TO CAUSE CONSIDERABLY GREATER URBAN/INDUSTRIAL DAMAGE THAN THE UNITED STATES COULD INFILCT UPON THE SOVIET UNION IN A NUCLEAR WAR.
4. DEFENDING AGAINST DAMAGE FROM SMALL ATTACKS OR ACCIDENTAL LAUNCHES.

These criteria are intended to provide a measure for determining whether current and proposed strategic forces will meet the general implications and specific requirements of strategic sufficiency. In meeting these criteria, moreover, the goal of realistic deterrence, foreclosing nuclear attacks upon the United States, will be achieved. An examination of the Secretary's criteria, furthermore, reveals that the first item is basic, one without which the others would be meaningless.

Based upon the President's report to Congress in 1970, it can be assumed that the sufficiency of forces is also intended to:

- Provide the necessary link between broad national and strategic nuclear objectives and policies, and the detailed requirements and criteria for planning strategic forces..
- Be sufficiently general that the search for effective programs to meet the criteria not be limited.
- Be formulated to apply over a wide range of technological developments, Soviet threat projections, and federal budgets to provide direction for long-range force planning.

¹ Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Annual Defense Department Report FY 1972, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, March 9, 1971) p. 62. Hereinafter cited as DOD Report FY 1972.

It should be noted that the sufficiency criteria are primarily directed toward deterrence, and implicit in them is the assumption that the United States knows what the Soviet Union would consider as "unacceptable damage." A corollary assumption is that the Soviet Union will realize that there is no known, determined, and agreed American reaction to any Soviet action against either the United States or its allies, and that the response to a major Soviet aggression could entail escalation to strategic nuclear exchange.

Because American strategic forces must have the capability to meet the conditions of the criteria following a surprise disarming attack, it would appear to be unacceptably dangerous to depend upon the capability of any single element of the U.S. strategic forces to produce all, or even a disproportionately large share, of the damage upon the Soviet Union. In the event of a Soviet-perceived capability to cause a catastrophic failure or defeat of that single element, the deterrent effect of the total American strategic force structure might be satisfactorily negated so far as the Soviet Union were concerned. Under the conditions of the criteria, the actual capability of an element of the force to fulfill its portion of the retaliatory task is less important than the Soviet perception of such a capability. In a primarily non-wartfighting force, the principal reason that an effective capability is required is that it would almost certainly be recognized if such a capability did not in fact exist.

The criteria provided specify that the retaliatory capability must still exist after receiving a pre-emptive counterforce strike. For a retaliatory countervalue strike there appear to be no targets in the Soviet Union which are time urgent; and therefore each element of the deterrent force should be assessed upon its capability to survive and to retaliate against the Soviet Union in a countervalue role.

MAINTAINING A SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY ADEQUATE TO DETER ALL-OUT SURPRISE ATTACK UPON THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES

The key element of force sufficiency under this criterion rests upon the capability of the strategic force to inflict unacceptable damage (the degree not defined) upon the Soviet Union following a

Soviet attempt at a disarming counterforce attack. The main elements of the American strategic forces are (a) the offensive forces; that is, the ICBM force, the SLBM force, and the bomber force, (b) the defensive forces; that is, air defenses and the BMD system, which, if constructed, provide some protection for land-based elements of the offensive forces, and (c) the National Command Authority (NCA) which controls the forces.

PROVIDING NO INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO STRIKE THE UNITED STATES FIRST IN A CRISIS

This criterion makes more demanding the requirement for survivable offensive forces and their controlling communications. The stability implication is that, at least at the level of a major strategic exchange, the American force is a defensive one and not aggressive.

PREVENTING THE SOVIET UNION FROM GAINING THE ABILITY TO CAUSE CONSIDERABLY GREATER URBAN/INDUSTRIAL DAMAGE THAN THE UNITED STATES COULD INFILCT UPON THE SOVIET UNION IN A NUCLEAR WAR

This equal damage criterion for a strategic nuclear exchange could create requirements for American forces far in excess of those now programmed.

Since the United States has adopted a second-strike retaliatory capability as its basic posture, this criterion means that it must be prepared to absorb or blunt (with defense systems) the worst that the Soviet Union can inflict upon it in a first strike, and then use its surviving forces to inflict equivalent urban/industrial damage upon the Soviet Union. There appears to be only one way to meet this requirement: the maintenance of a force structure of such tremendous numbers and such high survival characteristics that sufficient forces would be able to survive a high-intensity counterforce attack and thereafter penetrate Soviet defenses and accomplish their assignments.

Under most circumstances this would presuppose effective defenses against Soviet aircraft and ballistic missiles; if so, the requirements

of this criterion go considerably further than those of the fourth criterion, which only specified that there be defenses against small attacks or accidental launches.

If the American defenses were sufficient to ensure the ability to fulfill the requirement, there would be a much greater possibility for use of offensive forces in limited strategic operations. A known intended use of these forces in limited operations would tend to extend their deterrent credibility to lower levels of conflict.

Implementation of this criterion would certainly reinforce the need for a more effective civil defense program than is now in effect and a more extensive BMD program.

DEFENDING AGAINST DAMAGE FROM SMALL ATTACKS OR ACCIDENTAL LAUNCHES

This is a criterion for a limited purpose. Yet even such a limited defensive capability could have far-reaching implications: it could reduce the possibility of war resulting from accidental launches, one from attacks of concealed origin undertaken by nations with limited numbers of nuclear weapons systems. It also implies a requirement for a light area BMD for the United States.

It could make defense against the Chinese threat manageable for a number of years, as well as protect against limited use of strategic weapons by the Soviet Union.

It should make the United States more responsive in supporting its guarantees to allies faced with attempted Chinese nuclear blackmail.

Even limited American BMD deployment would introduce further uncertainty into Soviet war planning, thereby decreasing the chance of surprise attack.

Limited deployment of such defenses would serve as a laboratory to determine the feasibility of BMD systems and provide research and development information upon which future systems could be based.

2. Four Additional "Deduced" Criteria

In addition to the four criteria presented by the Secretary of

Defense, four others have been deduced from the 1970, 1971, and 1972 Presidential foreign policy reports to Congress:

5. MAINTAINING AMERICAN RESPONSE FLEXIBILITY AND UNCERTAINTY FOR LEVELS OF RESPONSE BELOW MAJOR NUCLEAR ATTACK UPON THE UNITED STATES.
6. MAINTAINING A MIX OF FORCES WHICH WILL PROVIDE HEDGES AGAINST A SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGH IN ANY SPECIFIC CATEGORY OF OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE FORCES, AND WHICH WILL COMPLICATE THE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE POSTURE PLANNING PROBLEM.
7. MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO EVALUATE QUICKLY DAMAGE SUFFERED BY THE UNITED STATES FROM DIRECT ATTACKS AND TO DETERMINE DAMAGE INFILCTED UPON THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES, AS WELL AS THE NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS OF REMAINING SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES.
8. MAINTAINING A POSTURE WHICH DENIES THE SOVIET UNION A PERCEPTION THAT IT CAN GAIN NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY.

To list all of the many conditions and requirements which the American military posture should be designed to meet is not possible. However, the four listed above, when added to those given by the Secretary of Defense, should be sufficient to determine the military requirements for American strategic forces. It is realized that, due to political and financial constraints, as well as differences of opinion as to actual requirements, a strategic posture which would be effective in deterrence at all levels and simultaneously be fully capable of war-fighting will not always be maintained. The difference between the forces provided by the President and the Congress, when it is decided to provide forces lesser than those required to satisfy the criteria, establishes the level of risk the government is willing to accept.

Even if requirements and funds for forces which would fully satisfy the criteria be provided, it is possible that the resulting posture would not be the ideal by the time it came into being, because of the long lead-time of new weapons systems and the uncertainty of the forecast of the Soviet posture they would be expected to counterbalance.

MAINTAINING AMERICAN RESPONSE FLEXIBILITY AND UNCERTAINTY FOR LEVELS OF RESPONSE BELOW MAJOR NUCLEAR ATTACK UPON THE UNITED STATES

The United States, constrained by the interaction of its strategic posture with that of the Soviet Union, finds itself at the present time

restricted essentially to a retaliatory attack inflicting unacceptable damage as a strategic response to all-out Soviet aggression against the United States or its vital interests.

With such a capability as the basis of American strategy, the Soviet Union would be forced to conclude that there is a possibility of its use, if Soviet behavior goes beyond the limits of American tolerance. Even if Soviet perception of the probability of an American retaliatory attack is replaced by uncertainty regarding the nature of American responses, that ultimate capability combined with the danger of escalation to its use should have significant deterrence value where vital American interests are involved.

However, this view has begun to appear to American planners of dubious deterrent value against a wide range of unacceptable Soviet actions, especially where the aggression moves from an attack against the United States to, for example, a limited nuclear attack against an ally. The United States has too much at stake to depend exclusively upon its strategic offensive forces to deter this latter kind of action. Indeed, a deliberate "unacceptable-damage" strike against the Soviet Union in response to limited attacks does not seem to be a prudent U.S. response. The wide gap between the kind of response and the type of aggression also erodes the credibility of using strategic deterrents at lesser levels of conflict and might actually encourage such actions. To prevent this, credible deterrents must be provided which will leave no ambiguity as to the level for which they are designed.

Lower levels of aggression should be deterred by having sufficient forces to meet such attacks and make it clear that the improbability of success outweighs the potential gain to the aggressor. Forces for such missions could be assigned to combat units directly or held in reserve for use as they are needed.

This concept might be most effectively accomplished by adding options to the American strategic forces, thereby introducing flexibility to the present relatively rigid posture. This should increase

the credibility of the use of such forces, and simultaneously include an element of uncertainty as to the ability to limit their use below the level of major nuclear exchange.

For the purpose of extended deterrence, capabilities for limited strategic operations would enhance American response flexibility to actions at levels below the outbreak of war. But should war actually occur, it would be advantageous to confine the conflict to the theater forces. To do this requires various types of tactical nuclear weapons available to augment conventional capabilities. Here, too, the uncertainty of the level and type of response should be maintained, with the actual application of tactical nuclear weapons to be determined by the political-military situation that would exist once a conflict had begun.

MAINTAINING A MIX OF FORCES WHICH WILL PROVIDE HEDGES AGAINST A SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGH IN ANY SPECIFIC CATEGORY OF OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE FORCES, AND WHICH WILL COMPLICATE THE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE POSTURE PLANNING PROBLEM

The requirement for a mix of strategic forces does not specify the number of force components; the United States has chosen the triad. It has two basic values. First, it constitutes a prudent hedge against the possibility that the opponent may seriously degrade the American deterrent by making a technological breakthrough in defense against a single American system. Second, it creates doubt in the Soviet planner's mind that a military action he is contemplating can succeed without the risk of triggering unacceptable retaliation.

None of the components of the strategic triad is perfect, yet each makes a contribution to the quality of deterrence. Each component has its weaknesses, and each its own strengths in its deterrent role. Time has a way, however, of seeing a counterforce developed for each force. The rate at which the counterforce is developed is difficult to predict, although it is generally related to the degree of effort devoted to the force and its counter.

The land-based ICBM appeared to be the ultimate weapon when first introduced. But in a very few years protective silos and hardening were needed. Indeed, the requirement for the latter constantly increased as the accuracy of Soviet missiles improved. The point has been reached where hardening alone is of dubious value, and specific ABM defenses have had to be programmed. As to the penetration problem: first there was the single warhead with the main concern that it would burn up in re-entering the atmosphere. Soon hardening, decoys, and other penetration aids were considered essential to protect against man-made interference. These were shortly thereafter followed by multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV) and multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV), to provide a hedge against loss of portions of the force either before launch or enroute to target. The time lapse of these progressions has been exceptionally short in comparison with the normal action-reaction of offensive versus defensive weaponry in the arsenals. As this process continues, it will make essential more survival methods and improved penetration techniques, if American weapons systems are to be effective in their deterrent or actual-use roles.

The strength of the ICBM is that it is a known, available, ready, and controllable system, until the moment of launch, and which is accepted by both the United States and the Soviet Union as capable of being launched should that be decided upon by the United States.

Its weaknesses are that should the Soviet Union launch a counter-force attack in an effort to destroy it before launch, considerable damage would be done to the American ICBM force, with collateral damage as well. Also, as the Soviet Union increases the number of its ICBMs and moves toward MRVs and MIRVs, there is a danger that it might conclude that it has sufficient force, offensively and defensively, to negate or make acceptable the damage expected from the surviving American force, even if launched in a counter-value mode.

The submarine-launched ballistic missile force has vast areas of the oceans in which to roam. This in itself appears to make them significantly less vulnerable to attack than land-based systems, at least up to the point of weapons launch. But the dangers of Soviet breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare and the requirement for additional target coverage inland from the Soviet shores have led to the necessity for increases in the range of SLBMs. The threat of Soviet ABM defenses, in combination with defenses against the submarine itself, has produced the requirements for MIRVs deployed on the Poseidon missile. This force continues to have a high probability of survival for the seaborne portion; its known reliability with its ability to launch quickly gives a high probability of successful launch. It has the accuracy sufficient for its countervalue role. The problems center on the possibilities that (1) a counter could exist without being known until it was used against the force in a crisis situation, and (2) communications between the vessels and the national command authority could be disrupted.

The bomber component of the triad, even the alert portion of the force, is subject to the danger of destruction before launch due to lessening warning time as the threat from Soviet missile-submarines increases. This danger may be reduced, but not eliminated, by moving to inland bases, by ABM defenses associated with the bases, or by speed-up of the fly-out procedure. Once launched, the bombers will face the problems of refueling from tankers and the difficulty of penetration to target through increasing anti-aircraft defenses, including airborne control of Soviet off-shore interceptors. The B-1 type of aircraft, incorporating many improvements to assist in the penetration problem, including stand-off missiles, is designed to have an acceptable capability to perform its missions. The value of the bomber is its ability to deliver heavy loads to a number of targets, to report the damage inflicted, and its recallability and controllability enroute to target. In addition, bombers complicate the Soviet defensive problem.

The vulnerability of each of the triad's components makes them interdependent in guaranteeing the technical credibility of the American deterrent. While a technological breakthrough against a single component might render it at least temporarily impotent, the presence of multiple components makes the prospect of the combined deterrent force being rendered ineffective extremely unlikely. Moreover, the presence of multiple components requires effort to nullify them to be spread rather than concentrated upon a single one, thereby further diminishing the likelihood of across-the-board breakthroughs. In addition, the effort required to prepare and maintain defenses against a variety of weapons systems decreases the amount of resources and effort which could otherwise be devoted to offensive systems.

MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO EVALUATE QUICKLY DAMAGE SUFFERED BY THE UNITED STATES FROM DIRECT ATTACKS AND TO DETERMINE DAMAGE INFILCTED UPON THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES, AS WELL AS THE NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS OF REMAINING SOVIET NUCLEAR FORCES.

Should the United States ever find itself the object of a nuclear attack, whether it be a single explosion or an attempted disarming attack, the confusion which is likely to prevail could lead to very unrealistic evaluations of the damage suffered, and interfere with its capability to continue functioning as a nation. In such a situation it would be more important than ever that national capabilities be under cool scrutiny in order to determine the appropriate U.S. response and actions.

The scale of the problem can be recalled in the absolute maze of rumors which immediately followed Pearl Harbor: the West Coast braced itself for a Japanese invasion, while the East Coast prepared to repel a German task force allegedly approaching the coast; in the middle of the country, authorities were dispersing aircraft, reinforcing buildings with sandbags, and digging trenches as precautions against Japanese or German air raids. However unbelievable in retrospect, considering that it took almost three years to launch an attack some twenty miles across the English Channel, the potential danger of major confusion is clear.

Consequently, there is a requirement, in case of attack, for an information system which will survive and have the capability to determine promptly: (1) the number and types of weapons which have been employed in the attack; (2) the types of vehicles used in delivery, and their original location; (3) the scale of damage and casualties inflicted upon the United States; (4) the potential fallout with its forecast patterns; (5) the ability of officials to cope with local situations; (6) the numbers, types, location and control mechanism of surviving American forces; and (7) the ability to retarget surviving offensive forces if necessary. Such an information system would be necessary to determine the actual national condition and to evaluate remaining military capabilities.

It will also be necessary to have the capability to evaluate as completely as possible the remaining Soviet military capability: for example, which missile silos are empty and which have not yet been fired; and which air bases are occupied and how they are equipped. In addition, the condition of American allies needs to be evaluated. These comprise essential elements which may determine the retargeting of the American forces.

MAINTAINING A POSTURE WHICH DENIES THE SOVIET UNION A PERCEPTION THAT IT CAN GAIN NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY

President Nixon outlined this criterion when he stated to Congress that:

"Our strategic forces must be numerous enough, efficient enough and deployed in such a way that an aggressor will always know that the sure result of a nuclear attack against us is unacceptable damage from our retaliation. That makes it imperative that our strategic power not be inferior to that of any other state. Thus,¹ I am committed to my pledge to keep our strategic forces strong."

It may be difficult to define superiority, because in this period of exceedingly limited defensive forces coupled with massively destructive offensive forces, it can be argued that there is questionable military or political advantage in limited margins of megatonnage or numbers of

¹ U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, Building for Peace: a Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, February 25, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971) p. 167. Hereinafter cited as Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1971.

weapons held by one adversary relative to the other, so long as the conditions of the unacceptable damage criterion are observed. Nuclear inferiority, however, should be less difficult to define. The condition of U.S. inferiority would presumably be met if the United States and the Soviet Union would perceive that the Soviet Union held such a margin of military capability that it could deny the United States the capability to inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviet homeland.

Such a perceived relative capability would quickly reduce the United States to second power level, with all its implications, not only for the United States, but for the U.S. allies as well. The problem, as President Nixon has stated, "is political and defensive: to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority."¹ In order to prevent such coercion, the Soviet Union should not reach a stage in which it believes that it has this kind of capability. The United States needs, therefore, communications which cannot be targeted with sufficient assurance that the Soviet planner believes he could destroy America's control over its offensive forces. The United States also needs to ensure the viability of its strategic offensive forces against the threat of accurate counterforce strike. The U.S. strategic posture must be such that the President will never have to face the decision whether he needs to launch the retaliatory force.

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1970, p. 122

C. THE STRATEGIES

The range of possible strategies which could be distinguished both conceptually and in terms of technical characteristics is too broad to be adequately analyzed in this study. Within this range, however, a smaller and more practical number can be chosen, if certain constraints are accepted: (1) the strategies should be largely dependent upon the kinds of strategic weaponry that are currently available; (2) the technology of those weapons systems which might further be required to support a particular strategy should be in hand or under development; (3) the force postures required by the strategies should be such that they could be attained and maintained by a reasonable effort of the American economic and industrial capability; (4) and each strategy should be politically acceptable to at least a significant portion of the governmental and intellectual community concerned with national defense.

With these factors taken into consideration, four strategies will be analyzed against the criteria:

- Assured Destruction (Land/Sea Option)
- Assured Destruction (Bluewater Option)
- Denial Strategy
- Assured Survival Strategy

The concept, implications, and general requirements of each strategy are set forth below. Rather than presenting a detailed version of each strategy, their more general framework is discussed.

1. Assured Destruction (Land/Sea Option)

a. Concept

- The United States will maintain a second-strike force adequate to deter an all-out surprise attack upon its strategic forces. This will require sufficient forces that can render unacceptable damage upon the Soviet Union in a retaliatory attack.
- The dangers inherent in the use of strategic nuclear weapons should be sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from resort to such weapons in all first-use circumstances.

b. Implications

- The American posture is basically designed for the capability to deter, rather than wage, strategic nuclear war.
- The United States must maintain the credibility of a survivable retaliatory force able to inflict an unacceptable level of urban/industrial damage upon the Soviet Union.
- No appreciable American national entity damage-limiting capability is involved.
- There need not be a parity of damage capability between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- An American second-strike urban/industrial damage capability against the Soviet Union is maintained.
- Restraint in situations which may lead to confrontation with the Soviet Union should guide American policy.
- The United States will not attempt to achieve a first-strike counterforce capability against the Soviet Union.

c. Requirements

- Known and recognized survivability of American strategic offensive forces, with the communications required to assure launch upon decision.
- Various types of weapons systems as insurance that the vulnerability of one system will not negate the deterrent (at least a triad).
- Offensive forces which can deliver (launch, penetrate, and impact) nuclear weapons upon the aggressor's urban/industrial centers, even if operating within a degraded environment.

2. Assured Destruction (Blue-Water Option)

a. Concept

- The United States would transfer all of its strategic offensive forces to seaborne systems: the ballistic missiles would be

deployed in either submarines or on surface vessels, or both, possibly to be complemented by carrier-borne aircraft.

- If strategic defensive forces were desired, they would be primarily at sea (e.g., SADMIS), although point defenses of command, control and communications would be required on land.
- The United States would maintain a second-strike capability adequate to deter an all-out surprise attack upon its strategic force posture.

b. Implications

- This posture is basically one of deterrence without a war-fighting capability.
- This posture would tend to keep the effects of an enemy counterforce strike away from American territory.
- This posture would reduce the incentive for the Soviet Union to attack military targets in the United States.
- This posture greatly reduces at the present stage of technology, force vulnerability and would therefore provide a highly secure second-strike force.
- A strategic second-strike capability, in conjunction with American capabilities at lower levels, should deter Soviet military adventurism.
- A second-strike capability implies a countervalue rather than a counterforce capability.
- The second-strike capability also implies the ability to deliver various predetermined levels of damage upon the Soviet Union, up to the level of "unacceptable damage."
- No appreciable national entity damage-limiting capability is involved.

- Parity of damage capability between the United States and the Soviet Union is not necessarily a requirement.
- c. Requirements
 - Known and accepted survivability of American seaborne strategic offensive forces, with the communications required to assure launch on decision.
 - Offensive forces which can deliver (launch, penetrate, and impact) nuclear weapons upon the aggressor's urban/industrial centers, even if operating from a degraded environment.

3. The Strategic Concept of Denial

a. Concept

- To deny other nations the ability to impose their will upon the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority.¹ This denial capability should extend to any level of confrontation which may arise.
- The Soviet Union must be denied the perception or conclusion that the United States is operating from a position of weakness or that it is surrendering its preminence as the leader of the free world.
- A mix of forces (e.g., the triad) would appear to be an essential element of this strategy.
- A declared intention for limited use of strategic weaponry might improve the effectiveness of this strategy to deter Soviet aggression.

b. Implications

- The Soviet Union must be denied any hope that it can develop the capability for delivery of a first strike against the United States without incurring the risk of receiving unacceptable damage in retaliation.

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1970, p. 122

- Where vital American interests would be irreparably damaged by successful aggression, the opponent should recognize that the United States and its allies would have the will and determination to resist.
- The Soviet Union must be denied the belief that it could quantitatively or qualitatively improve its strategic forces to the point of achieving acknowledged superiority over the United States.
- The posture should be designed to force the Soviet Union to allocate more for defensive weaponry in order to limit its resources for offensive forces.
- Even in the early stage of U.S. weapons systems development, there should be selective disclosure to erode Soviet confidence that the USSR can achieve strategic superiority.
- Frustration of Soviet attempts to achieve superiority should hopefully move the USSR toward perceiving advantages in negotiating a survival strategy.
- The Soviet Union should be denied the opportunity to use its increasing strategic capability for blackmail purposes against American allies.

c. Requirements

- Maximum strength and cohesiveness of national and alliance power to project a perception of will to use the forces, if necessary.
- Survivable offensive forces which can deliver (launch, penetrate, and impact) unacceptable damage upon an aggressor after suffering an attempted disarming strike.
- Forces to negate attempted Soviet aggression against vital American interests at the levels at which it occurs, including below the level of a major nuclear strike.

- The provision of sufficient military capabilities to serve as hedges against Soviet advantages gained through secrecy.
- An active and comprehensive American research and development program in the field of strategic weaponry.
- A rapidly convertible or standby production capability which could quickly be put into operation if and when required.

4. The Strategic Concept of Assured Survival

a. Concept

- The United States must maintain a defensive capability sufficient to assure that should deterrence fail, the war outcome would favor the United States to the extent that as a minimum it would survive as a national entity.
- The United States must also maintain strategic offensive forces sufficient to deter a strategic attack.
- The United States should maintain both the forces and the command and control systems necessary to permit wide options for nuclear use in crisis or limited war situations.

b. Implications

- There should be a war fighting capability.
- The American offensive forces should maintain a damage-limiting counterforce capability against Soviet strategic offensive forces.
- The United States should maintain sufficient strategic offensive forces to employ them as necessary--an assured destruction capability against the Soviet Union would not necessarily be required because national survival would not be based on deterrence alone.

- The United States should maintain active and passive strategic defensive forces sufficient to assure national entity survival. This would decrease the possibility of massive loss of life on both sides. It would deter the political threat of attacks by small nuclear powers.
 - There should be no sharp distinction between strategic and other forces. The degree of force necessary would be applied as required.
 - This strategy would require a high-investment in R&D and a deployment competition in which American technological qualitative superiority would be the goal; however, this competition could be controlled through arms control agreements that could lead to mutual assured survival postures.
 - A mutual assured survival posture arranged through negotiations could constrain each side in the international arena to political leverage below the degree which a superiority posture is believed to permit.
- c. Requirements
- Advanced defensive systems to defend the national entity as well as military forces, including an effective civil defense program designed for protection against both blast and fallout.
 - Strategic forces with war fighting capabilities, from limited to major operations.
 - Secure command, control, and communications systems for both the conduct of war and damage determination.
 - Conventional and tactical nuclear forces, to be used in conjunction with limited strategic operations, adequate for persuading the opponent to terminate his aggression.
 - American national budgets sufficient to build and maintain qualitatively superior strategic forces.

D. EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGIES

Having examined the implications of the four sufficiency criteria announced by the Secretary of Defense, and the four additional "deduced criteria" postulated for the purpose of this analysis, the next step is to use these criteria to make a comparative evaluation of alternative strategies. In the following pages, the four selected strategies--Assured Destruction (Land/Sea Option), Assured Destruction (Blue Water Option), Denial Strategy, and Assured Survival Strategy--are in turn judged for the degree to which each meets the sufficiency criteria. Many of these judgments are of course not absolute because they are based upon contingencies which have never occurred in real life. Rather, the judgments made here are based upon a consensual evaluation by analysts with extended experience and knowledge of the subject.

STRATEGY -- ASSURED DESTRUCTION (LAND/SEA OPTION)

Criteria

1. Maintain second-strike capability for deterring attack
2. Provide no incentive for Soviet first strike in a crisis
3. Prevent considerably greater American urban/industrial damage in a strategic exchange
4. Defend against damage from small attacks and accidental launches
5. Retain flexibility and uncertainty of response
6. Maintain a mix of strategic forces
7. Maintain capability for rapid evaluation of Soviet and American damage and remaining military capabilities
8. Deny a Soviet perception that superiority is possible

The strategic posture implied in this strategy should assure a second-strike retaliatory capability against urban/industrial targets.

The assured destruction posture should satisfy this criterion by definition of the second-strike orientation and because of the limited-accuracy/non-counterforce role of the offensive forces.

This strategy may be unlikely to satisfy this criterion for several reasons: the Soviet Union's inherent advantages in urban/industrial dispersion, the second-strike posture of the American offensive forces, and the disparity in warhead yields to the disadvantage of the United States.

A strict assured-destruction posture would fail to satisfy this criterion, even with BMD protection for the ICBM force. The addition of an area BMD system would provide the desired capability.

An assured destruction posture does little to provide flexibility of use, though a certain degree of uncertainty is always present when the use of nuclear weapons is a possibility.

This criterion is satisfied by retention of the present triad force structure for an assured destruction strategy and posture.

Assured destruction strategy does not require a fineness of capability and technique in this area due to its deterrent orientation and retaliatory nature.

An assured destruction posture hedges against this eventuality because of the mix forces, but is less effective in the case of specific elements of Soviet capability against American weapons systems.

STRATEGY -- ASSURED DESTRUCTION (BLUE-WATER OPTION)

Criteria

1. Maintain second-strike capability for deterring attack

High confidence cannot be assured for an extended period of time, since the second-strike capability could be negated by a breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare.
2. Provide no incentive for Soviet first strike in a crisis

This criterion should be satisfied (unless a breakthrough in ASW takes place) because of the dispersion and mobility of seaborne forces and because of the more limited accuracy of these second-strike countervalue forces.
3. Prevent considerably greater American urban/industrial damage in a strategic exchange

The blue-water option tends not to satisfy this criterion for the same reasons as in the land/sea option of assured destruction strategy.
4. Defend against damage from small attacks and accidental launches

This criterion would not necessarily be satisfied, though seaborne BMD systems (e.g., SABMIS) could be deployed to deal with part of the problem.
5. Retain flexibility and uncertainty of response

The blue-water option's force structure could provide a degree of flexibility, depending upon the concept of operations and the security of the communications systems. It should satisfy the conditions of response uncertainty.
6. Maintain a mix of strategic forces

By definition, this criterion would not be satisfied.
7. Maintain capability for rapid evaluation of Soviet and American damage and remaining military capabilities

As a force structure variant of assured destruction strategy, the blue-water option does not require high-confidence capability in this area.
8. Deny a Soviet perception that superiority is possible

Because all offensive power is in one type of weapon system, the prospect of a single breakthrough which could negate the American offensive forces could be perceived by the Soviet Union as an opportunity to achieve superiority.

STRATEGY -- STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF DENIAL

Criteria

1. Maintain second-strike capability for deterring attack

A second-strike capability against urban/industrial targets that is adequate for deterrence should be assured.
2. Provide no incentive for Soviet first strike in a crisis

This criterion should be satisfied, though an argument could be made that the increased accuracy envisioned for portions of the offensive forces could have some degree of a destabilizing effect.
3. Prevent considerably greater American urban/industrial damage in a strategic exchange

The denial strategy does not specifically establish a requirement for this capability, though such a capability is not ruled out by any inherent constraints upon the force posture.
4. Defend against damage from small attacks and accidental launches

A requirement for such a capability is not specifically established in the strategy, but such a capability would be subsumed into the need for defense against demonstrative attacks.
5. Retain flexibility and uncertainty of response

The denial strategy is particularly well designed for both flexibility of use of strategic weapons and uncertainty of American response.
6. Maintain a mix of strategic forces

This criterion should be satisfied.
7. Maintain capability for rapid evaluation of Soviet and American damage and remaining military capabilities

The denial strategy implies that this capability, as applied not only to the United States and the Soviet Union, but to American allies as well, would be a necessity.
8. Deny a Soviet perception that superiority is possible

The capability necessary to satisfy this criterion is the central purpose of the denial strategy.

STRATEGY -- STRATEGIC CONCEPT OF ASSURED SURVIVAL

Criteria

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Maintain second-strike capability for deterring attack | Satisfaction of this criterion is inherent in the strategy, with the degree of damage inflicted upon the adversary to be limited to that required to close out his aggression. Total destruction of the adversary should not be required if the U.S. retains a survival posture under the worst conditions. |
| 2. Provide no incentive for Soviet first strike in a crisis | The force posture could promote elements of further Soviet-American strategic arms competition, but should discourage a Soviet first-strike attempt. |
| 3. Prevent considerably greater American urban/industrial damage in a strategic exchange | This criterion would be satisfied, and the relative condition could possibly be changed in favor of the United States. |
| 4. Defend against damage from small attacks and accidental launches | The large-scale defensive capability of the force posture would satisfy this criterion. |
| 5. Retain flexibility and uncertainty of response | The ability to apply the amount of response required by a situation is a basic feature of this strategy. |
| 6. Maintain a mix of strategic forces | This criterion would be satisfied by having multiple types of forces for a high-confidence posture. |
| 7. Maintain capability for rapid evaluation of Soviet and American damage and remaining military capabilities | The command, control, and communications capability of assured survival strategy should satisfy this criterion. |
| 8. Deny a Soviet perception that superiority is possible | This criterion should be satisfied by the strategy. |

Table 2
STRATEGIES COMPARED TO THE SUFFICIENCY CRITERIA

CRITERIA \ STRATEGIES	ASSURED DESTRUCTION (LAND/SEA)	ASSURED DESTRUCTION (BLUE WATER)	DENIAL	ASSURED SURVIVAL
1. Second Strike	Yes, by Definition	Yes, by definition, but lacks safety factor of mix	Yes	Maybe. As defined this strategy does not stress retaliation
2. No Soviet Incentive to Strike First	Yes, by definition as a reactive strategy	Yes, by definition as a reactive strategy	Yes, by definition to "deny" value of first strike	Yes. Defenses will prevent success of first strike
3. No Greater Damage by Soviets	Maybe. Not necessary per definition. U.S. cities vulnerable	Maybe. U.S. cities vulnerable	Generally, Yes	Yes, by definition
4. Defend Against Accidental Launch	No, at least not required as the strategy is defined	No. Even with SABMIS, coverage of CONUS incomplete	Partly. Some strategic defense is implied	Generally, Yes, by definition
5. Flexibility for lesser Response	No. Generally poor flexibility of response, by definition	No, but this strategy has greater numbers of weapons available for flexible response	Generally, Yes. Forces would be designed for more flexibility	Generally, Yes. High defense level gives more chance for flexible response
6. Mix of Nuclear Forces	Yes	No	Yes	Generally, Yes, although high defense level reduces need for mix
7 Quick Evaluation of Damage	Partly. This requirement not at high level as strategy is defined	Partly, by definition, high degree not required	Yes. Necessary for success of this strategy	Generally, Yes, but not to same degree as Denial Strategy
8 Deny Soviet Belief can be Superior	Uncertain. U.S. would not necessarily retain quantitative parity	Uncertain. Breakthrough in ASW could shift advantage to Soviets	Yes, by definition	Generally, Yes. U.S. would maintain not less than qualitative equality

E. RESULTS OF STRATEGY EVALUATION

The results of the evaluation of the strategies against the sufficiency criteria are shown in brief in Table 2. As can be seen, the two assured destruction strategies compare unfavorably with the denial and assured survival strategies. One could, as is often done in analyses of this kind, assign numerical values to each of the evaluations, and add the column for comparison. This method has a generally accepted validity, in that the aggregates of the judgment values tend to cancel out the effect of possible errors in the individual values. By this method (if equal weight were given to each criterion) the denial and assured survival strategies would rank highest, with scores approximately equal, assured destruction (land/sea option) would rank next, and the blue water option last. However, this refinement is not necessary; the purpose of the analysis is served by ascertaining the relative degree to which each strategy meets the sufficiency test.

1. Assured Destruction (Land/Sea)

Evaluated against these measurements, the "land/sea" assured destruction strategy appears to be comparatively unsatisfactory. A significant number of the criteria are incompletely satisfied at best, and some throw grave doubt upon the efficacy of the strategy for the future.

This may be particularly so in the case of the eighth criterion, that of denying a Soviet perception that attainment of a position of relative strategic superiority is possible: "assured destruction" would be a stable posture only if it were mutually accepted and pursued by both nations. If it is not, and one side expands its forces both quantitatively and/or qualitatively in order to create a perception of superiority, then the other side would risk finding itself eventually in a position of actual or presumed inferiority.

2. Assured Destruction (Blue Water)

The blue-water option of assured destruction strategy appears comparatively unsatisfactory for many of the same reasons as the land/sea option. It does have the virtue of making the whole of the offensive forces as relatively survivable

as possible for the short term future; but in so doing, it also increases the likelihood that a single major technological breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare could negate the survivability of those forces. As in the land/sea option, the question as to the efficacy of this strategy depends in large part upon whether or not assured destruction is mutually accepted by both nations. Another important weakness is that it would permit the Soviets to concentrate their resources and energies upon one type of defensive problem, or upon their own offensive forces.

A major point to be considered in regard to these first two options is that both of them, since they are force posture variants of the assured destruction strategy, are oriented almost entirely toward the deterrence of nuclear war through fear of disastrous consequences. While the latter doubtless makes calculated initiation of general war improbable, neither option does anything of significance, in the event deterrence should fail, to provide for actual defense of the population and the national entity.

3. Denial Strategy

The denial strategy, on the other hand, is attractive because it appears to satisfy the criteria to a much greater extent than the previous two. Nonetheless, the strategic concept of denial is not wholly self-defining, in that it is generally a reactive strategy which may be based upon insufficient evidence. A principal reason for this is the present uncertainty as to the precise nature of the Soviet Union's strategic objectives, intentions, or capabilities for the late 1970s, an area of inadequate understanding not yet resolved either by the on-going dialogue of SALT or by the continuing course of Soviet strategic weapons development.

A denial strategy has been conceived as an appropriate response to a Soviet attempt to achieve superiority. Since it is therefore contingency-oriented--that is, since force structure elements are designed to nullify Soviet actions that could otherwise permit unacceptable advantages to accrue to the Soviet Union--it is difficult to say except in general terms just what the implementation of a denial strategy would entail, at least until a determination of Soviet intentions is reached and the purpose of Soviet strategic weapons developments becomes clear.

4. Assured Survival

According to the evaluation of the strategies against the criteria, assured survival strategy would be the most attractive of the four, since it appears to satisfy the criteria most fully. However, it presents its own set of difficulties. One is that it may not be wholly attainable in view of the advancing technological capability of the Soviet Union; another is the possibility that American action to implement this strategy could prompt renewed and accelerated arms competition, with no relative gain. There is also the technical question as to whether or not BMD technology, now or in the future, is or will be adequate for high-confidence population defense. Related to this are the doubts of success associated with the presumed capability for a disarming first strike by strategic weapons used in a defensive role.

F. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The strategies analyzed in this chapter have been selected and defined to illustrate a range of feasible strategy alternatives. Each strategy is feasible of implementation, in that each would start with the existing strategic posture and, without a radical and destabilizing shift of U.S. policy, evolve into the new strategy.

National security strategy is much more than a military concept; especially in light of the changing national and international milieu. National security policy is political, in the sense that "political" encompasses the span of military, economic, psychological, technological and diplomatic factors affecting the choices in national security policy. It is the nature of things political to seek the best position or the greatest gain from whatever issues are at stake. This analogy can be applied to the selection of the most "useful" strategic concept; i.e., to take the best of each individual strategy.

A simple assured destruction strategy has been judged unsatisfactory. However, as long as the type of strategic forces required to

support a more appropriate strategy do not exist, a strategic countervalue capability needs to be maintained. The blue water strategy has serious shortcomings, but in the face of growing Soviet threat from the sea to U.S. land-based strategic forces, it appears advisable to strengthen the U.S. sea-based strategic capability by proceeding with the development of ULMS.

The denial strategy seeks to confound the enemy by making counter-moves to his strategy. If he achieves a numerical superiority in currently known weapons, one way to reduce his confidence in the advantage he hopes to gain thereby, may be to develop a new weapons system; the enemy will be forced to consider very carefully how such a breakthrough will affect his relative position. Negotiation to limit arms buildup is a part of the denial strategy. Or the United States may concentrate on seeking a defensive breakthrough that will neutralize one or more of the enemy's systems. Therefore, one of the elements (besides arms limitation talks) of the denial strategy which the United States may usefully choose is to emphasize and increase military R&D programs.

Finally, out of the assured survival strategy one may implement the age-old principle that it is prudent to balance offense with defense. One need not strive for an impenetrable umbrella of strategic defense, but rather choose to build at least some defenses (e.g., SAFEGUARD). The enemy cannot be sure just how effective these defenses will be, and must therefore give pause before attacking.

There may be other useful features to be selected from the individual strategies, but considering just the examples cited above, a strategy that very closely resembles the strategic nuclear element of the Nixon Doctrine National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence seems indicated. The development of MIRV, ULMS, stepped-up weapons research, and SAFEGUARD, in effect takes a page out of each of the strategies which might be separately implemented. It is further necessary to keep a flexible approach, to take the most useful feature of any future valid strategic concept, and anticipate the need for new changes. It is especially important to be aware of the need to change the criteria for strategic decisions; the Secretary of Defense made this point in his most recent posture statement:

I want to note, however, that these criteria are under intensive review in light of the changing strategic conditions, including the momentum of Soviet and Chinese nuclear capabilities, and potential outcomes in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).¹

The ideal strategic concept of today is tomorrow's obsolete strategy, unless it evolves to meet tomorrow's challenges.

¹DOD Report FY 1973, p. 65

III THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE FOR U.S. DEFENSE POSTURE

A. INTRODUCTION

Different national and regional circumstances dictate variations in style, speed and substance in implementing the Nixon Doctrine.¹

It is when one comes to the specifics of a particular region of the world that military policy guidelines take on real meaning. The soundness of the doctrine and the adequacy of the instruments for implementing it will then be tested. When weighing the means for carrying out military policy, every nation--even a great and powerful nation like the United States--faces the problem of limitation of resources. Therefore the allocation of its resources must be on the basis of establishing priorities.

The Nixon Doctrine is applicable, at least in a declaratory sense, to the whole world. In translating this Doctrine into a strategy which requires force allocations and deployments, the limitation on forces available makes it necessary to establish regional priorities. In the main, over the post-World War II period, U.S. foreign and military policy have been applied on the basis of regional priorities. Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific Basin, have been the places where the vital issues affecting the United States and the Free World were at stake.

In the late fifties and early sixties, however, the United States tended to take a universalist approach to its role as guarantor of freedom among the world's peoples. The peak of U.S. confidence in its ability to influence the world was reached during the administration of John F. Kennedy. Zbigniew Brzezinski's comment in retrospect in 1970 is pertinent: "With Kennedy came a sense that every continent and every people had the right to

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1971

expect leadership and inspiration from America, and that America owed an almost equal involvement to every continent and every people."¹

The Nixon Doctrine seeks to return U.S. foreign and military policy to a more pragmatic and traditional position. The Vietnam War accelerated the process of reassessing these policies. But even before the advent of that frustrating involvement, the gap between what America was trying to do overseas and what the American people at home would support had begun to widen. It was time for America to reassess its priorities, at home and abroad. The United States has come to face the reality that it neither can nor desires to be in as many places nor attempt to influence events in as many nations as it has in the recent past. Application of American military power, moreover, would be selective and limited to those places where U.S. commitments and interests are at stake.

The area which has always been assigned the highest priority in American foreign policy since World War II is certainly Western Europe. This naturally has led to strong military commitments in this area. It was the conviction of the architects of post-war strategy that Western Europe was the natural and indispensable political, military and economic associate of the United States in undergirding a system of security for the Free World. It was the assumption, particularly of Dean Acheson, Secretary of State in those critical early years after World War II, that if Europe were lost, almost certainly the other areas of the world would be lost--not only the Middle East and Asia, but also the underdeveloped countries of Africa and Latin America. This belief was shared by the man who is the architect of much of American foreign policy today, Henry Kissinger, who wrote: "If Eurasia were to be dominated by a hostile power or a group of powers, we would confront an overwhelming threat, and the key to Eurasia is Western Europe, because its loss would bring with it the loss of the Middle East and the upheaval of Africa."²

¹ Z. Brzezinski, Between Two Ages (New York: The Viking Press, 1970), p.307

² Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1957) pp. 269-270

Western Europe still remains the cornerstone of American foreign policy. Much of what the United States does or does not do elsewhere in the world is related to U.S. ties with Western Europe. Despite domestic pressures, notably from the United States Senate, to limit American military effort in the Atlantic Alliance, NATO remains by far the most significant alliance of which the United States is a member. This is in no small measure due to the social, political, economic, and cultural underpinnings that endow the alliance as a whole with a vitality that has never been possible in CENTO and SEATO. Thus it is quite appropriate that in planning the future of American international security policy the United States continue to look first toward Western Europe as the anchor-point of American strategy abroad. It is still the only region where the United States is likely to maintain a fairly large military presence on the ground.

After Europe, the Nixon Doctrine's thrust gives the next priorities in American foreign and military policy to the Pacific Basin and the Middle East. These two regions will continue to assume increasing importance for the United States in the 1970s, and require a significant share of the available resource allocations in order to safeguard American interests against the expanding challenges presented by China and the Soviet Union. Each of these regions must each be treated on a separate basis because of the differing conditions and requirements involved. One strategic attribute, however, which is held in common by all of these forward areas, stretching from Europe through the Middle East to the Indian Ocean and thence to the Pacific, is the desirability for some forward-based American military presence.

Latin America, particularly the Caribbean area, has a special kind of priority, because of proximity to the United States and in view of the Soviet presence in Cuba. It will continue to be important to maintain a military presence in the Caribbean, to counter the Soviet naval presence, to protect the Panama Canal and the southern flank of the CONUS, and to support the concept of the Nuclear Free Zone. In addition to the U.S. Caribbean deployment, the program of military assistance to Latin America as a whole should be continued to enhance the internal security capabilities of nations in this region.

Sub-Saharan Africa has considerably less priority in American military policy. In this area there are almost no grounds for American military intervention or involvement beyond the extension of military aid programs on a selective and limited basis.

Each region which does have high priority will continue to have a strategy and pattern of force deployments geared to that region's security requirements. In Europe, the basic combination required for deterrence and defense has been the presence of American conventional and tactical nuclear power. In the Middle East, naval and air power around the Mediterranean have been the primary military instruments for supporting American policy there. And in the Pacific Basin, a combination of naval and air power frequently supplemented by the presence of large-scale ground forces has been the response to both potential and actual threats to allied nations in the area.

Meeting these military requirements in the future involves a balancing of domestic and foreign policies, because the very concept of forward-based deployments, particularly of ground forces, has come into question in the United States. This is reflected in the Nixon Doctrine's call for a lower military profile abroad; the new profile is being implemented through recent reductions of American forces in such places as Korea and Taiwan. Under the terms of the Nixon Doctrine's Total Force concept, allied forces in the various regions will assume many of the responsibilities formerly borne by the United States. However, the Nixon Doctrine also justifies the continued maintenance of an American military presence in the high-priority regions. While it is probable that further reductions in American military forces deployed overseas will take place during the next several years, continuity should be preserved by a carefully phased adjustment of direct American military participation in regional security arrangements.

B. EUROPE

The Nixon Doctrine, in calling for partnership, recognizes that the strategic views of the European NATO allies are critical considerations in the selection of an appropriate strategy for NATO. A viable strategy and supporting force posture should have political acceptability to the European members of the Alliance. Given the disparity of security needs and perceptions among the allies, no single strategic concept can be expected to win full approval of all members. Such a concept must, however, be in general consonance with the strategic preference of NATO's most powerful states.

1. The Views of the NATO Allies

The European allies continue to be deeply concerned with the increasingly formidable array of forces confronting them. The most serious political-military problems that preoccupy them, however, are not a massive attack, but (a) the possibility that a crisis might escalate, either deliberately or through miscalculation into an armed conflict; and (b) the efforts of the USSR to exploit its military power in a campaign of political coercion against Europe--a contingency that has been popularized in Europe with the term Finlandization. The profound concern with the issue of Soviet nuclear coercion has been accentuated by the specter of American troop withdrawals from Europe. The presence of U.S. forces has, for the allies, primarily played the role of visibly demonstrating the American strategic commitment, and only secondarily that of a direct defensive bulwark against conventional aggression.

European views regarding the American military presence in Europe reflect their overwhelming emphasis on the strategic deterrent as a basic and indispensable safeguard of the security of Western Europe. The emphasis on deterrence rather than defense is the result of a number of considerations among which two stand out: the fear of another devastating conventional conflict sweeping over Western Europe, and the notion that in the final analysis the USSR will be deterred from aggression only by the palpable risk of direct damage to its homeland.

Strategic nuclear parity has not changed the preference of the allies for deterrence. But the advent of parity between the superpowers has forced the NATO allies to look more closely at the elements of deterrence, including the need for direct defense.

In contemplating the requirements of local defense and deterrence the West Europeans are confronted with dilemmas with which they have struggled since the inception of NATO. One of these reflects their persistently low regard for the viability of a purely conventional defense against large scale Warsaw Pact conventional aggression. This view has been shaped partly by a sense of futility vis-a-vis the stark superiority of the Warsaw Pact in conventional forces, partly by complex motives related to deterrence. Few Europeans in official positions believe that a major Warsaw Pact invasion could be contained by the now available conventional means for more than several days. At the same time, the West Europeans have resisted American exhortations to build up NATO's conventional forces. They feel that their own forces as a substitute for U.S. forces would not provide a real credibility of deterrence. The West Germans add, moreover, that American withdrawals cannot be compensated for by increases in the Bundeswehr, because of the political penalties that would accrue to an expanded and more conspicuous West German military establishment from both east and west. Furthermore, budgetary constraints and problems of recruitment would render an expansion of West European conventional forces impracticable in any event. In spite of their official embrace of flexible response, West Europeans continue to have little, if any enthusiasm for a NATO strategy that places primary reliance on the conventional option beyond the initial phase of combat.

If European views regarding the role of conventional forces have undergone at best marginal change, there seems to be a reassessment in European thinking about the role of tactical and theater nuclear weapons.

When the United States in the 1950s introduced growing number of tactical nuclear weapons into the NATO arsenal, the European allies shared a general understanding of the role of these weapons in NATO strategy. In the views of the American allies, the tactical nuclear weapons served to

redress the imbalance in conventional forces favoring the USSR and its allies; they were to deter a large-scale Warsaw Pact attack by preventing the enemy from massing its forces; they were to help defeat aggression in the event deterrence broke down; but above all, they performed the indispensable role of a direct and explicit link in the chain of escalation leading from conventional combat to the strategic nuclear exchange.

With the development of Soviet nuclear capabilities and, particularly in the 1960s with the emergence of new American strategic thought, this generally agreed position began to erode. In European eyes, the changing American strategy seemed to place increasing stress on containing conflict in Europe and on the primacy of conventional forces in waging a limited war--an emphasis which was implicit in the growing American preoccupation with such concepts as "pause" and "firebreak."

The perceived American shift, combined with the awareness of a rapidly expanding Soviet nuclear arsenal, impacted on official European views in two ways. First, it signalled a lower credibility of the American strategic deterrent. Second, and worse from the European vantage point, it portended a conflict scenario in which Western Europe could be overrun by conventional forces or become an exclusive battlefield. This dual prospect induced the European allies to take a harder look at the implications flowing from the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The impact was most pronounced on the West Germans who continued to have the greatest initial stake in the maintenance of NATO's overall deterrent, in which tactical nuclear weapons retained a crucial role. On the other hand, Bonn was forced to face more seriously the prospect that a failure of deterrence would victimize primarily German territory in the west and east. The dilemma was accentuated by early experiences in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in which the Germans learned more about targeting and the collateral damage effects of tactical nuclear weapons. To these misgivings in Bonn have been added, since the advent of the Brandt Administration, some sharpening political constraints, particularly those imposed by the Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). As a result, there is some ambiguity in German attitudes.

At the official level in Bonn, at the Ministry of Defense and in the Brandt Government in general, the tendency has been to downplay the role of tactical nuclear weapons. Political expediency suggests, moreover, that public discussion of the issue of tactical nuclear warfare or weapons be avoided. But there are also some more prominent raisons d'etat. There is the eagerness to project a more acceptable West German image eastward in order to promote Ostpolitik. There is also the fear that undue emphasis on the nuclear components of NATO strategy might restore a "tripwire" alternative to the present posture and thus hasten the withdrawal of American ground forces.

Among the West German military, attitudes toward tactical nuclear weapons tend to hew partly to traditional lines of West German military thinking, especially where it concerns their deterrent value as a trigger to the threat of strategic escalation. Deeper insights into the nature of tactical nuclear warfare gained in the NPG and from exchanges with their American counterparts, however, have yielded greater appreciation of the role of tactical nuclear weapons, if deterrence were to break down. Thinking in the military echelons of the FRG, against the background of possible American force withdrawals and growing difficulties in the Bundeswehr, is turning grudgingly but realistically to the defense and war-fighting role of tactical nuclear weapons. They are beginning to view tactical nuclear weapons as a complement to conventional firepower and are prepared to use them to halt penetrations, show determination to defend Europe, and, at the same time, threaten the use of the strategic nuclear weapons.

Exposure to nuclear information through the activities and studies of the NPG has gradually influenced attitudes in the other participating countries as well. The British appear to have modified their earlier emphasis on the trigger function of NATO's tactical nuclear components. Indeed, both West Germany and British political leaders have called for the early use of tactical nuclear weapons and have stressed the option of demonstrative use--if demonstrative is defined broadly as the selective use of a limited number of weapons primarily to convey a political message:

to convince the attacker of NATO's capability and firmness to resist, and to invoke the threat of the strategic forces. The Germans use the word "demonstrate;" the British have spoken of "sample use."¹ In the NPG, the British apparently came around to the West German view in accepting some follow-on use of tactical nuclear weapons beyond an initial demonstrative strike, but the delegates of both countries have clearly favored a rapid escalation to the strategic exchange over the alternative of a sustained nuclear engagement on European soil. Moreover, their national defense programs and planning reflect their unwillingness to strengthen deterrence by preparing for the contingency of a prolonged conflict in Europe, nuclear or otherwise.

As far as French views are concerned, General Ailleret, the late Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, used to be the major exponent of the faction that rejected the use of tactical nuclear weapons as leading to the destruction of Europe and that emphasized massive strategic retaliation for deterrence. Other key senior officers, however, have stressed the military mission of the tactical nuclear weapons to halt an enemy thrust. Their view, which also includes a preference for the early use of tactical nuclear weapons, now appears to become increasingly more pronounced in the French military establishment. Moreover, as General Fourquet, French Armed Forces Chief of Staff, implied, France apparently believes that not only would France be more likely to use these arms than SACEUR, but if the military situation required it, at an earlier stage as well.²

In consonance with the deterrent emphasis on the use of tactical and theater nuclear weapons has been the insistence of the European allies on having a capability in the theater to strike targets in Warsaw Pact territory, if necessary in Soviet territory. There seems to be virtually unanimous agreement, among West European political leaders as well as military commanders, on the indispensable role of nuclear capable strike aircraft, and in particular the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA), in the NATO defense concept. Not only do QRA aircraft present visible evidence of

¹ L. W. Martin, The Nixon Doctrine in Europe, SSC-IN-71-105, 18 October 1971, p. 19

² M. Fourquet, Emploi des Differents Systemes de Forces dans le Cadre de la Strategie de Dissuasion, "Revue de Defense Nationale", May 1969, pp. 757-767

the U.S. commitment to defend Europe, but they constitute the only nuclear systems in whose operation the allies, notably the non-nuclear allies, participate. They are valued by the allies as the only systems in the theater that can threaten the Soviet homeland.

These preferences are underscored in the German case by the intractable predicaments of geography and possible battlefield evolution. True, the West German representatives in NATO have shown a greater predisposition to consider a direct battlefield and support role for tactical nuclear weapons than the British. But a concept that restricts the use of tactical nuclear weapons to its own territory alone, even though such use would clearly show NATO's defensive intent, would not be acceptable to the FRG. On the other hand, because of the increasing sensitivity of the European allies to the issue of collateral damage, neither would any strategy that would call for massive across-the-board use of tactical nuclear weapons.

In short, then, the European allies have begun to consider more seriously than in the past the need for a defensive capability in order to strengthen deterrence. Within the constraint of the need to limit collateral damage, the tactical nuclear weapons are assuming an increasingly critical role. In addition, West European recognition of the implications of strategic parity has also spurred new interest in the role of French and British nuclear forces.

In the past, the significance of French and British nuclear capabilities was seen, beyond their role of national protection, primarily in terms of their enhancement of the NATO (i.e., U.S.) strategic deterrent. The existence of additional nuclear power centers compounds both the targeting problems of a Soviet planner, as well as his uncertainties in calculating the responses to a contemplated attack. Furthermore, a basic rationale underpinning these forces was that even a modest retaliatory capability in the hands of potential victims of direct attack would prove a more credible deterrent in the eyes of an aggressor than would the more "remote" American nuclear guarantee.

To these traditional beliefs have been added some new incentives:

- (1) The growing feeling in France and Britain as well as elsewhere in

Western Europe that the Nixon Doctrine augurs some retreat from America's forward strategy. The European allies feel more urgently than before that they need a nuclear insurance policy against the possibility of American troop withdrawals and decoupling. (2) The specific fear that in the event of the decoupling of the American strategic forces from the defense of Western Europe, they would be at the strategic and political mercy of the more than 600 Soviet IR/MRBMs and Warsaw Pact conventional superiority.

The French and British nuclear programs are proceeding apace. The requirements of creating and maintaining credible retaliatory forces in an age of rapid technological advance have, however, sponsored the hope of bilateral cooperation between Paris and London or of a tripartite arrangement involving the United States. The West Europeans recognize the obstacles from the U.S. side that would impede meaningful arrangements of this nature. It would require a major change in America's past priority on non-proliferation as well as Congressional approval. Yet such a shift in U.S. policy would appear to be compatible with the Nixon Doctrine's emphasis on partnership and burdensharing.

2. A Balanced Force Concept for NATO

It has become fashionable to assert that NATO, in its twenty-third year of existence, is in a period of profound transition. In many ways, transition is a euphemism for crisis, reflected partly in growing Soviet military power on the Continent, partly in the centrifugal forces within NATO that undermine the ties of mutual confidence and cohesion. The alliance faces basically two tasks. First, it needs to make those improvements and changes in the NATO posture which will provide the alliance with the necessary options for meeting the formidable military challenge confronting it. The NATO members in Europe, however, are primarily interested in deterrence and care little for having to fight a war, long or short. Their concern is in making deterrence as strong as possible, and if deterrence were to fail, to force the enemy to terminate the war on terms acceptable to NATO, in the shortest time and with as little damage to Western Europe as possible. The second task the Alliance has to cope with is the need to restore the mutual confidence and cohesion indispensable to NATO.

The Nixon Doctrine implicitly recognizes that the domestic environment in the United States may force some reductions in U.S. troops stationed in Europe, reductions which are not likely to be compensated for by U.S. allies. On the other hand, however, given European concerns that the Nixon Doctrine may be a cover for retreat, American efforts to improve the posture and strategy in order to permit eventually some limited reduction in troops, must be staged gradually and with circumspection.

With these constraints in mind, the importance of maintaining a balanced NATO force of strategic nuclear, theater and tactical nuclear and conventional forces should be stressed. A number of guidelines for U.S. defense policies are applicable. The following guidelines and requirements stand out.

First, the United States needs to develop and maintain immunity for its strategic offensive forces, with their associated defenses, against actions which could destroy their effectiveness and prevent their use against an aggressor.

A second requirement is to maintain in Europe the U.S. forward-based nuclear systems, and in particular the QRA and other nuclear strike aircraft as a major means of demonstrating the continued linkage of U.S. strategic forces to the defense of Western Europe.

A third requirement is to improve the tactical or battlefield nuclear components of the force. Their posture should be such that both ally and aggressor would be convinced that a massive conventional attack against Western Europe would be met with early use of tactical nuclear weapons in order to demonstrate NATO's resolve to put up a determined defense. To provide a credible deterrent against such aggression, it must be possible to use tactical nuclear weapons in the battlefield without devastating the countries in which the action would be fought and without foreclosing to the enemy his option to withdraw and terminate the aggression. The design and employment of the tactical nuclear weapons should, therefore, be directed toward the minimization of collateral damage and toward the necessary accuracy for target acquisition to render the militarily meaningful use of the weapons possible.

A fourth requirement is to retain in Europe a sufficient number of American and allied conventional forces to cope with incursions too small to warrant the activation of nuclear defense. Adequate conventional forces are further required to canalize the enemy's formations into nuclear targets and to participate in the nuclear defense, if it does become necessary.

A final guideline for U.S. defense policy with regard to Western Europe derives from the issue of West European nuclear capabilities. British and French nuclear forces exist. The choice for the United States, therefore, appears to be between laissez faire and active assistance, within the constraints of domestic and international treaty obligations, to Britain and France in their efforts to create viable nuclear capabilities. The choice seems preempted, however, by the need to strengthen the overall nuclear posture in Europe and to restore the bonds of mutual trust between the United States and its major allies. Moreover, the Nixon Doctrine envisages American-Western European partnership in a multipower world. Partnership, along with Washington's recognition that it has the means to support its strategy, requires greater West European self-reliance. Given the weight of nuclear weapons in the scales of power, self-reliance implies that the West European allies obtain and control a credible measure of that power. To be sure, there is already a significant degree of American-British cooperation in the nuclear field. But a relationship of the United States to the French nuclear program or to an Anglo-French effort would meet impressive obstacles. At the very least, however, Washington can stimulate the solution by conveying its readiness to explore the road to cooperation, either within the NATO framework or through bilateral or trilateral arrangements.

In summary, then, although NATO is beset with the problems of diminishing allied cohesion and increasing Soviet military capability, a viable strategy for NATO can still be derived. In light of allied political constraints and given the framework of the Nixon Doctrine, a number of key guidelines and requirements for the U.S. defense policies have been discussed. Their implementation would provide the NATO posture with a credible deterrent against a wide range of armed attacks and against political coercion based on military power.

C. THE MEDITERRANEAN/MIDDLE EASTERN AREA

Naval and air forces have been the principal military instruments of the American policy around the Mediterranean littoral, and until the mid 1960s were predominant throughout the area. Since then, however, the American power position has been rapidly on the decline, while that of the Soviet Union has steadily risen. The Soviet Union has succeeded in establishing itself as a major power in the region. This has been a remarkable development, if it is considered that until 1956 the Soviet Union was not a power to be reckoned with in the Middle East at all, and that until 1967 its military presence in the area was limited. Even to maintain what remains of American influence will not be easy: the Soviet momentum has been so great that it will be difficult to halt or reverse,¹ precisely because many of the local governments believe that the Soviet Union does represent the "wave of the future" in the area, and are thus hesitant, even if so inclined, to support the United States openly, for fear of antagonizing the Soviet Union.

There are several reasons for the decline of American power and influence in the region. American relationships with most of the Middle Eastern nations have suffered as a result of the polarization arising from the Arab-Israeli conflict, and have been further eroded by the anti-American attitudes of the increasing number of radical Arab governments in the region. Among its remaining allies the United States has allowed the reliability of its commitment to their security to come into question. Directly affecting these losses of confidence in American commitments has been the increasing presence of Soviet armed forces in the area. The widespread activities of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, which varies in strength from thirty to its high point of seventy vessels during the 1970 Jordanian crisis, have largely neutralized the influence of the Sixth Fleet, and downgraded the political influence and military credibility of the United States in this region, even though American naval strength is still superior.²

¹ See Wynfred Joshua, Soviet Penetration into the Middle East (New York: National Strategic Information Center, October 1971), pp. 43-52

² Foreign Policy Research Institute, The Soviet Threat, SSC/SRI, IN-71-105, October 1971, pp. 16-19

The deterioration of the American position in the Mediterranean is indicated by the increasingly unwelcome reception accorded to the Sixth Fleet in many of the area's ports, while the Soviet squadron is able to make visits anywhere along the triangle from Syria to Yugoslavia to Morocco. The only places in which the United States is still assured of flag-showing visits are Spain, France, Italy, and Greece. Elements of the Sixth Fleet do visit ports in other nations, but these visits are not widely advertised. And there are signs of changing attitudes even in some of these friendly nations. In Spain, where the United States maintains major air and naval bases, there is concern about American willingness to remain in the Mediterranean. The overall American political-military posture in the Mediterranean will affect the question as to whether American base rights will be renewed when the present agreement expires. Malta's recent negotiating position vis-a-vis the West over NATO port rights indicates its adoption of a more independent posture. Even Greece is adopting a stance increasingly independent of the United States: it is taking a strong bargaining position over the question of American port rights, and has been hinting at the possibility of improving its relations with the Soviet Union, in order to reinsure itself against the future.

Turkey symbolizes most starkly the decline of American influence, since it has changed from a staunchly pro-American ally, when it joined NATO in 1952, to a very disaffected member of NATO today. Turkey probably does not believe that NATO would support it in the event of hostilities, and is not much more certain of American commitment. As a result, it is moving toward a measure of rapprochement with its long-standing historic enemy, the Soviet Union. For example, it has applied a liberal interpretation of the Montreux Convention on the right of transit of Soviet ships through the Turkish Narrows. It also has allowed Soviet combat aircraft en route to Egypt to refuel at Turkish bases.¹

¹ Hanson W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 173-175

The Soviet Union is now firmly established as the principal external power in the central and eastern part of the Middle East, through its large-scale military presence in Egypt and its extensive political, economic, and military support of Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Southern Yemen. The United States and Great Britain have been expelled from Libya, which, while somewhat anti-Soviet, remains sharply anti-Western as well. In the Maghreb to the west, there is a question whether Western influence will survive through the 1970s. There is a serious succession problem in Tunisia, where the ill and aging President Bourguiba will soon have to be replaced; and it is possible that Tunisia will thereafter turn, if not to an anti-Western policy, at least to one more neutral.

Algeria is already strongly oriented toward the Soviet Union through its dependence upon Soviet military assistance. Soviet naval visits to the port of Mers-el-Kebir are common, and Soviet military influence as a whole is extensive. Should Soviet aircraft eventually be permitted to operate from Algerian bases, military operations throughout the entire Mediterranean could be covered, and the Soviet position in the region would be markedly enhanced. Despite the current lack of carriers, the Soviet airbases in Egypt already confer considerable coverage in the eastern basin.¹

As the nations around the Mediterranean see the United States continuing to be outdistanced, they may increasingly accommodate the Soviet Union in other ways, as insurance against the possibility of eventual American withdrawal from the region. The Soviet Union's minimum objective of ending the Western monopoly in this region has already been achieved; and its maximum objective of replacing Western hegemony with its own appears to be within reach.

If the United States is to suffer no further degradation of its position in this region, the fundamental military requirement is retention of the Sixth Fleet at approximately its present level in the Mediterranean. Modernization of its current aging elements is vital,

¹ Ibid., pp. 165, 166

because the Soviet ships are new and technologically sophisticated. A corollary requirement is the retention of American air capability in the area, which is necessary not only for fleet support, but is also in itself a significant portion of the overall American military presence. These forces are needed not only to convince Middle Eastern and European littoral nations of the American commitment in the area, but their presence is also directed at Soviet perceptions of American interest and will. For the United States significantly to reduce its military power in this region would have grave consequences not only in the Middle East, but for European confidence and NATO security as well.

The United States should also retain its present military basing structure in the area; rights for retention of the bases in Spain should be renewed when the present agreement expires. These Mediterranean bases are important as much for political and psychological reasons as for actual support of the corresponding military forces.¹ Homeporting of ships in Greece, to include dependents as well as military facilities, should be actively sought despite the issue's current political sensitivity in the United States. In addition to providing badly needed support facilities, such a move would tangibly reflect the American intention of remaining and overseeing its interests in the area.

In the remainder of the Middle Eastern area, the United States must continue to counter any further accretion of political influence by the Soviet Union. In terms of military policy, the United States can employ military assistance programs as a means of maintaining regional equilibrium. Nations such as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel have acted in such a way as to be the principal local stabilizing forces, but will require continuing American assistance if they are to remain so. Such assistance, including sales of high-technology weaponry, will act to prevent nations like Iran and Turkey from moving toward a more cooperative rapprochement with the Soviet Union, out of fear of American inaction or lack of commitment.

¹ William M. Carpenter, The Role of U.S. Overseas Bases Under the Nixon Doctrine, SSC/SRI, IN-72-3, February 1972, pp. 23-24

Such military assistance is also highly likely to be necessary if a reasonable balance of power is to be maintained between Israel and its opponents, particularly Egypt and Syria, which are themselves recipients of large-scale Soviet military assistance in the form of training and equipment. If Israel is given the means which it requires to defend itself and which it cannot at present produce at home, American combat intervention in the likely event of further Arab-Israeli conflict probably will not be necessary; but without such assistance, American military intervention might be required to prevent either an Israeli defeat or Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons.

D. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Africa does not pose a major problem for American military policy in the 1970s. The United States does have certain interests in the area: many African nations are valuable sources of raw materials, which curtailment would cause at least temporary difficulties. There is a U.S. interest in adjacent sealanes; the importance of the Cape route to the United States will grow with the increasing need to draw upon the great oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. American military involvement on the continent itself is not significant. Military assistance programs with African nations are very limited in number and size, and the only commitment of any importance relates to the agreement with Ethiopia for the communications and spacetracking facility at the Kagnew Station, Asmara.¹ Even at Kagnew, facilities are being reduced.

The major external threat to the region's stability is in the revolutionary movements in and south of the Horn of Africa supported by China and the Soviet Union. The level of this threat might increase in the 1970s, especially if the Suez Canal is reopened: the Soviet Union has lent support to revolutionary efforts in such places as Somalia and Eritrea, but has been hampered by the Canal's closure. However, this is not a problem for which the United States has primary responsibility. Most of the independent nations in sub-Saharan Africa are members of either the French Community or the British Commonwealth, and the United States has followed a policy of acknowledging the primary responsibility

¹ Roy L. Thompson, "Africa South of the Sahara," The Nixon Doctrine and Military Strategy (Maxwell AFB: Air University, 1971), pp. 58, 59

of its European allies for their former colonial possessions. The Nixon Doctrine does not appear to alter this policy. While the United States might give support to a limited military intervention undertaken by its allies or under United Nations auspices, American interests in the region are not such as to make any unilateral intervention likely.¹ Instead, the United States can contribute best to the peace and stability of the region by continuing military assistance programs designed to enhance internal security capabilities, programs which could be expanded on a carefully selective basis to include more than the current few.²

As to America's interest in the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope, the route's security in peacetime is essentially assured by the traditional freedom of the seas, supported by international law. It is reassuring, especially because of the critical importance of this route in the event of a war at sea, to have the pro-Western nation of South Africa in control of the adjacent land mass. Under peacetime conditions, a permanent American naval deployment in this area is unnecessary, but the considerable political and economic pressure being exerted against the South African regime raises doubts about the future. Both China and the Soviet Union take the side of black Africa in what may eventually become an all-out struggle against the large southern, white-dominated part of Africa. American interests could be seriously damaged if such a conflict were to result in control of the South African littoral and its naval bases (notably Simonstown) by a power hostile to the United States. Thus far the United States has refused any military contact with the South African regime; but at some point in the future, American policy might be faced with a difficult choice between the dictates of strategy and the constraints of domestic and international political attitudes on race and apartheid.³

¹ Ibid., pp. 61, 62; Foreign Policy Research Institute, The Nixon Doctrine and Sub-Saharan Africa, SSC/SRI, IN-71-107, October 1971, pp. 23-35

² Ibid., pp. 39, 40

³ Ibid., pp. 28, 29; and Alvin J. Cottrell, The Nixon Doctrine and the Indian Ocean, SSC/SRI, IN-71-102, September 1971, p. 29

E. THE INDIAN OCEAN

Neither now nor in the past, has the Indian Ocean been considered a separate strategic entity. During the long period of British domination, it was not a necessity to conceive of and extend military control over the entire water area and its littoral, but rather the Indian Ocean was valued essentially for the sake of the route to India and other colonial possessions in Asia. Today the Soviet Union seems to have a larger vision of the area. After 150 years of unchallenged hegemony in this region east of Suez, Great Britain has withdrawn all but token military forces. As a result, a tempting vacuum was created into which an expansionary power could move. The Soviet Union promptly began to do so. Since early 1968, shortly after the British withdrawal announcement, the Soviets have been apparently pursuing a maritime strategy toward the region as a whole, implementing this strategy with a naval force on permanent station in the Indian Ocean. This task force has so far been of only nominal size, but has effectively made its presence known throughout the region. In combination with other elements (e.g., the merchant marine, fishing fleet, oceanographic ships, etc.) of the integrated Soviet maritime structure, the Soviet force is an effective instrument in the development of a new framework of political relations with such nations as Mauritius, Tanzania, South Yemen, Iraq, and India.

The Soviet Union's ability to fill the military vacuum in this region seems so far to have been limited only by the logistics problem created by the closure of the Suez Canal. The reopening of the Canal would enable the Soviet Union to triple or quadruple its naval strength in the Indian Ocean, giving them a margin of superiority of three or four to one over any possible American deployment, even in the absence of any residual naval commitments to Vietnam. Such a potent military force would serve as a valuable instrument of Soviet political-military policy. Even without it, the Soviet Union has been able to aid forces dedicated to the overthrow of traditionally-ruled governments east and south of Suez. Now the Soviet Union is the principal ally of India, and it appears that this former foothold of British power is in the Soviet orbit.¹

¹ B. J. Toohey, "The Indian Ocean," in The Nixon Doctrine and Military Strategy (Maxwell AFB: Air University, 1971), pp. 71, 72

Thus the Soviet Union has initiated a process that may well lead, if the United States declines to counter its activities in the Indian Ocean, to an established position of predominance within the next decade. In such an event, many of the nations in the region would increasingly orient their policies to either a neutral or a pro-Soviet position. Many of these nations, for instance Iran, are already extremely concerned about the Soviet naval presence, but in the absence of effective American counteraction are reluctant to express this concern openly, for fear of Soviet displeasure. Such nations as Iran, Ethiopia, South Africa, Pakistan, and Australia view Soviet predominance, and possible Chinese penetration, in the region as a grave threat to their future development; but in many cases these nations will feel constrained to seek a detente with the Soviet Union, unless they are given meaningful indication of significant American interest in and commitment to the security of the Indian Ocean area.¹

The Nixon Doctrine does not treat the Indian Ocean as a strategic entity, and therefore offers no specific guidelines to the military planner. However, it would appear consistent with the general thrust of the Nixon Doctrine for the United States to provide visible evidence of concern about this strategic area: to modernize its ship units operating out of Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, and to maintain a limited naval task force in the Indian Ocean for political purposes. The number of ships deployed should be flexible, according to need; their number is less significant than the fact of the presence itself.² Such a permanent military presence would also encourage other Free World nations on the littoral to make a contribution of their own toward countering the political-military influence of the Soviet Union. Principal among these nations are South Africa, Iran (particularly in the Persian Gulf), and Australia, which can provide a substantial naval and air capability of its own.

¹ Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 228-232

² Cottrell, op. cit., pp. 1-7, 22-26

In consonance with the Nixon Doctrine Total Force concept, the American task force should operate on a multilateral basis with other powers in the region. The new base facility at Diego Garcia (if expanded to provide fleet support), and Australia's Indian Ocean base at Cockburn Sound, could support such operations. A U.S. proposal to conduct joint operations should encourage Australia to assume a greater role in regional security. U.S. cooperation in naval operations is less feasible, however, with South Africa, whose internal policies run counter to the direction of American domestic and international politics. If there is an American naval presence in the Indian Ocean itself, in peacetime it should not be necessary for U.S. naval forces to operate with South African forces, nor to deploy permanently around the Cape route, whose security is not now in actual jeopardy. But because the security of this route in wartime would be endangered if the southern area of Africa were to be under the control of a power hostile to the United States, it is in the U.S. interest to ensure that the Cape remains under the control of a pro-western regime.

F. THE PACIFIC BASIN

Much of what has been said about the Indian Ocean is applicable to Asia and the Pacific Basin. These regions have in common the disadvantage that the American relationship has not been based upon deep-rooted cultural, political, and economic affinities. Even though both wars which the United States has fought since the end of World War II have been in Asia, there has never been a military policy and strategy developed for the regions lying from the Middle East to the Western Pacific with any of the sophistication of the strategic concepts developed for NATO Europe.

The most serious threat to the nations of this region, and hence to American interests in maintaining the rimlands of the Pacific Basin under Western influence, is the kind of aggression that has already occurred in Korea and Indochina, and which could occur again in these places, and in such other places as Indonesia and the Philippines. Yet the experience of American action in Vietnam during the 1960s has raised serious doubt about the ability and intention of the United States to maintain a military commitment which would have the necessary credibility in the eyes of both the potential aggressor and the threatened nation. Most of the governments in this region, as they watch the United States withdraw from Vietnam, are to some degree skeptical about its willingness to support them militarily.¹

In Asia, the Nixon Doctrine security posture--besides assuring the continuance of the U.S. nuclear shield over its allies--rests on two key points of strategy: (1) to provide U.S. security assistance for the purpose of enhancing indigenous capabilities for coping with the threat of internal or external aggression; and (2) to continue to deploy sufficient U.S. land, sea and air forces to meet U.S. commitments to the security of Asian allies.² These two elements of the strategy are interdependent.

¹ An extended discussion of Asian perceptions of the Nixon Doctrine and American policy is included in Yuan-li Wu, Military Implications of the Nixon Doctrine, SSC/SRI, IN-71-101, September 1971, pp. 24-27.

² U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1970's, The Emerging Structure of Peace. A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, February 9, 1972 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972), p. 165. Hereinafter cited as Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1972.

Neither is sufficient by itself. Security assistance without an accompanying force deployment will not ensure the national survival of allies between the present and the day when the assistance achieves its goal of indigenous military self-sufficiency. Continued deployment of U.S. forces, without security assistance, will only perpetuate allied dependence upon U.S. protection. Another element of the Nixon Doctrine is the concept of transition: as security assistance takes effect, deployment is to be adjusted accordingly; i.e., downward. Thus the Nixon Doctrine Asian posture seems designed to combine provision for the realities of the present with the hopes of the future.

The perceptions of the Nixon Doctrine and its impact on local security situations varies considerably from country to country. As noted above, the general attitude is one of skepticism, but there are exceptions, as in Indonesia and the Philippines.

Japan's situation is a special one in the matter of Asian security, by reason of her wealth, geographic position and close politico-military-economic relationship to the United States. Japan has in effect been living on borrowed time, postponing the decision on how to balance her economic and military strength so as to take her proper share of the responsibilities that inevitably accompany her rise to major power status. Having relied so long on the security shield of the United States while she performed an economic miracle, Japan seems to entertain the wistful desire to preserve this happy arrangement. In a speech to the Diet in November 1970, Prime Minister Sato explained that whereas it was historically "the pattern for countries with great economic power to spend a sizable portion of their wealth for military power, Japan would not do so; he called this "a completely new experiment in world history."¹ Some experiments, however, do not succeed. In the light of the dramatic developments in world affairs, especially in the area of relations between the United States, the Soviet Union and China since the Prime Minister made that statement, the risk involved in such a policy may now be more apparent to Japanese leadership.

¹ Quoted by Hedley Bull, "New Balance of Power in Asia," Foreign Affairs, July 1971, p. 675

Japan faces an awkward dilemma: to continue to rely on the protection of the United States means an extended presence of "foreign" bases in the homeland and in the new prefecture of Okinawa--a situation somewhat irritating and demeaning to a nation becoming a major power; but to foreswear heavy reliance on U.S. protection raises the issue of rearmament, creating concern at home and abroad about a resurgence of Japanese militarism. The critical complication to this dilemma is the fear that the Nixon Doctrine means that the United States is backing away from its former strong security role, in spite of the repeated U.S. pledge to keep its commitments. Japan can (correctly) perceive in such Nixon Doctrine statements as, "There has...been steady progress in recent years in the assumption by Japan of a role in world affairs more consistent with its power,"¹ a push towards Japan's taking over some of America's Asian security responsibilities. The success of the Nixon Doctrine does demand, it seems, a new role for Japan.

If Japan perceives that the United States intends to maintain a nuclear shield over her Asian allies, and to make credible the stated intention to maintain "peacetime land, sea, and air deployments in Asia at a level which provides assurance...of continuing U.S. support,"² then it should be possible for Japan to make an orderly and gradual transition to a new security role that is perceived within and without Japan as stable and contributory to peace in Asia. This would entail some increase in armed strength, without abandoning entirely her "new experiment." But if America's actions, or poorly communicated intentions, lead Japan to perceive of the Nixon Doctrine as a plan "to teach Asians to fight Asians" so that America can withdraw, Japan's reaction may be more precipitate. She may, at one extreme, move towards rapid rearmament--probably including tactical nuclear weapons and/or strategic defensive weapons--and a strong resurgence of militant nationalism. On the other hand, Japan could take up a serious pursuit of neutralism, hoping to

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy 1972, p. 55

² Ibid., p. 165

play the role of "unarmed world merchant," and perhaps a "peace broker" in the style of Nehru's India. In both cases, ties with the United States would be weakened or broken entirely, and the result in Asia probably destabilizing. To avoid these extremes, carefully thought-out bilateral and multilateral consultations involving Japan will be necessary. In the interim, America must preserve its credibility for concern about regional security. Japan is obviously concerned about the visible U.S. reductions of forces in Korea, Taiwan and other key places, and about the increasing Soviet naval activities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Japan's lifelines of imports--especially oil--and exports lie across these waters now frequented by Soviet ships. Such conditions make it natural for her to observe closely how America will act.

Thailand is the pivotal nation in southeast Asia. Thailand has already begun to fear that it may have over-committed itself to the United States. It regards what has happened in Vietnam as a defeat for the United States, and is apparently beginning to consider alternatives to its present course. Thailand's attitude is somewhat similar to the attitudes of such nations as Turkey and Iran: hedging against the future by moving toward a policy of reinsurance against the change in this region's balance of power brought on by declining U.S. forces and growing Soviet and Chinese involvement there. This would inevitably lead to a more neutral stance. Such attitudes in Thailand may also have a certain chain-reaction effect upon adjacent nations, such as Malaysia and Singapore, which view an increase of Chinese influence in the area as their major threat.¹

The Republic of Korea is in a similar situation. It views the military threat from the North far more critically than does the United States, and has serious reservations about American capability to provide effective assistance in an emergency. Recent events, such as the partial withdrawal of American troops from Korea, and the new American approach to China, tend to strengthen movement toward reinsurance against the potential emergence of a new power balance. One result of this tendency so far has been the attempt to establish limited contacts with its North Korean counterpart.²

¹ Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 269-272

² Ibid., pp. 246-253

The insular position of the Philippines minimizes the threat of external aggression. However, several groups of insurgents are active within the Philippines. There is believed to be at least one group that is Soviet-oriented, and another with Maoist sympathies and possible Chinese support--this group has been active in urban guerrilla warfare. Since the government is not unduly concerned, there is a possible argument for a continued U.S. military presence, to prevent the government's inertia and inaction from allowing a situation to develop that would jeopardize the security of the important U.S. bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay. Moreover President Marcos has endorsed the Nixon Doctrine, including the opening of U.S. contacts with China; Marcos has himself made overtures for accommodation with China. The Philippines also welcomes, and badly needs, U.S. security assistance under the Nixon Doctrine to bolster its present inadequate military capability.

Australia, in addition to its concern over the increase of Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean, has permanent interests in the Pacific Basin proper. It sees one threat to its security in a possible exacerbation of relations between Malaysia and Singapore, and has a somewhat more remote concern about a possible military buildup by Indonesia. There is a small but still growing fear in Australia that the Nixon Doctrine, as applied to Asia and the Pacific Basin, reflects a tacit acceptance of a Chinese sphere of influence in the region, at least in areas closely adjacent to mainland China. However, because Australia has unique status and characteristics as an Asian power, it can play an important role in the security of the Pacific Basin. It is the only major nation in the area whose relationship with the United States is based upon many common political, social, and cultural attributes. Australia also occupies a strategic geographic position facing both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Its foreign and military policies diverge little from those of the United States, and a considerable degree of military cooperation already exists; but it would be in the interests of the United States to encourage through military means a greater Australian role in regional security: by common use of certain installations and facilities (for example, Diego Garcia and Cockburn Sound), by joint naval and other military exercises, and perhaps by joint U.S.-Australian

military assistance and training missions in other nations. While Australia maintains only a very small standing army, it has substantial air and naval capabilities, and can and should employ them in the interests of regional stability and security. The credibility of U.S. interest and support is the key to Australia's accepting the role it is capable of playing in this area.

Indonesia, like the Philippines, is notable among Southeast Asian nations for its receptive attitude toward the Nixon Doctrine, and perceives a major role for itself in regional affairs. Since the Suharto regime acceded to power in 1965, it has concentrated upon solving internal political and economic problems, and has built up a substantial record of success. While economic progress will be a continuing concern, Indonesian attention has begun to turn outward once more, and its large population, great natural resources, and important geographical location will ensure considerable impact upon regional development. So far its international activities have been channeled primarily through regional organizations, a direction which should be encouraged in order to avoid a renewal of independent Indonesian policies pursued at the expense of other local nations. Within a viable multilateral framework, however, the contribution which a stable and economically sound Indonesia can make to regional security will be considerable.¹

The impact of the Nixon Doctrine in Malaysia and Singapore is indirect, because their security has been linked with the United Kingdom rather than the United States. The 1971 Five-Power Defense Arrangement (Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore and the UK) was designed to replace the former strong British security commitment to the area. However, the two nations whose security depends most upon this arrangement--Malaysia and Singapore--have some reservations about its effectiveness. The basis for this lack of confidence is in what Malaysia and Singapore perceive to be a lack of firm commitment by Australia--the strongest local member--to past obligations. In turn, Australia's indecisiveness derives at least partly

¹ Wu, op. cit., pp. 42-44, and William E. Griffith, The Great Globe Transformed: East and Southeast Asia, (Cambridge: MIT/Center for International Studies, C/71-16, October 1971), pp. 10-14.

from the concern that the Nixon Doctrine means a lessening of U.S. interest in and responsibility for the security of the area. It is not surprising then, that the Prime Minister of Malaysia, both before and after President Nixon announced that he would go to China, has called for the neutralization of Southeast Asia, i.e., Malaysia seeks an accommodation with Peking.¹ Singapore's situation is more complicated; this small city-state has had an uneasy relationship with Malaysia since its withdrawal from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, and fears a possible future Malaysia-Indonesia alliance directed against Singapore. Racial antagonisms underlie this situation; Singapore's predominantly Chinese people are sympathetic to their kinsmen in neighboring Malaysia, where the Malays preside over a split society. Singapore lacks confidence in the Malaysian Government's ability to maintain racial peace; if strife breaks out, it would undoubtedly involve the Singapore Chinese. Indonesia might then take the side of Malaysia in confrontation between Singapore and Malaysia. Singapore also fears that if Thailand accommodates too closely with the Chinese, a route could be opened for Chinese support of communist insurgents on the Thai-Malaysia border, and that a new outbreak of insurgency in Malaysia could affect Singapore's security.

The United States does not have any specific security commitments in this potentially unstable area, but is indirectly involved through its ANZUS ties with Australia and New Zealand, and its overall concern for the stability of the Southeast Asia region. Singapore will always be of strategic interest, sitting at the gateway to the Strait of Malacca. It is a useful sea-support point. The U.S. Navy currently has rights to utilize ship repair facilities in Singapore.

Of the two essential elements of Nixon Doctrine strategy in Asia--deployment of U.S. forces, and provision of security assistance--the one which has first priority and which must not be allowed to lapse, is deployment of U.S. forces.

¹ Wu, op. cit., pp. 38-39

Especially because of the impact on Japan, and on the other Asian nations as well, the credibility of U.S. policy requires a military presence both at certain key points in southeast and northeast Asia, and in the Pacific Basin as a whole. Yet it is obvious, given both the political temper at home and the call for a lower American military profile which is embodied in the Nixon Doctrine, that the United States can only do so at force levels lower than those of the past. The level of air and naval forces to be required for the residual support of Vietnam is not yet firm, but American forces in Korea, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand are already undergoing reductions, and future closure of the training and logistic bases on Taiwan has been announced.

According to the Nixon Doctrine, primary responsibility for ground force manpower in future conflicts is to be borne by the local powers themselves. In such conflicts, the principal role of American armed forces will be to provide, when needed and when compatible with American interests and policy, such contributions as occasional high-intensity firepower support in aid of the indigenous forces. The combination of high technology and the necessity for mobility implies that American military forces in the Pacific Basin will be largely afloat, vested in the air and naval units of the Seventh Fleet, and supplemented by the combat aircraft of the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces.¹ Afloat-based forces alone, however, will not maintain credibility of the U.S. role in Asia. For the foreseeable future, American national interests and the commitment to its allies will also require the availability of a quick-reaction mobile ground force that can be rapidly deployed to a crisis spot, to assist indigenous forces under conditions in which the U.S. operation would make a meaningful difference towards success. While the use of such an intervention force would not be automatic, the option requires pre-deployment of a ground force, possibly a division, preferably in Okinawa for rapid staging to a crisis situation wherever it may occur in the region.

¹ See Arleigh A. Burke, "China Sea to the Caribbean," New York Times, 2 March 1971, p. 35

Advance bases are necessary for crisis-deployment of ground forces within the area. Retention of the Okinawan base complex as a tactical and logistic staging point and other key bases in the Pacific Basin will depend largely upon relations with the host governments. A minimum network of bases, including air and naval bases in Japan and the Philippines, should be retained, as much for political reasons as for the staging and logistics structure they afford. Retention of bases in Japan is important during the period of necessary close cooperation with the United States as Japan begins to accept a greater share of regional security responsibilities. This objective could be promoted by placing the present American bases in Japan under joint management.¹

Beyond the need for offshore basing of U.S. ground troops, however, maintenance of some American combat forces on the Asian mainland will be not only desirable, but very probably necessary if the United States is to maintain the credibility fundamental to regional security. Whatever the evolution of the American presence in Vietnam, the two principal anchor-points on the Asian rimland will be Thailand and South Korea. In Thailand retention of the right to use the present airbase will be necessary for the continuation of American air capability in Southeast Asia, complementing the capacity of the Seventh Fleet's air arm. Retention of the base will also serve as visible evidence of continuing American interest in and commitment to the security of the area. Moreover, American interests and credibility would be served by the presence of a ground force of sufficient size and flexibility of organization to serve the dual purpose of both training and combat operations.² The terrain is such that such a force should probably be airmobile, of at least brigade strength.

In Korea, where there is a tense and potentially explosive relationship between North and South, the South Korean armed forces are numerous and well-trained, and with completion of the modernization program should

¹ For commentary on American military basing in the Pacific Basin, see William M. Carpenter, op. cit., especially pp. 9, 12-14.

² Wu, op. cit., p. 73, and Carpenter, Ibid., pp. 28-29.

certainly be a match for the forces of its northern opponent. Even so, these forces could not be expected to withstand single-handedly a determined and combined North Korean and Chinese assault. There is consequently an important political and psychological function, not only in regard to North and South Korea, but to China and Japan as well, that can best be served by the continued presence of an American combat force. A force large enough to be visible and capable of organizational self-sufficiency--probably at brigade strength as a minimum--would work to reassure American allies and deter American opponents by demonstrating the commitment of the United States to the national integrity of South Korea. Despite the move toward a new relationship with China, for the foreseeable future a permanent American combat presence in Korea will be an essential stabilizing factor in the northeast Asian regional power balance.¹

The Nixon Doctrine clearly implies that when the general international environment and specific regional situations will permit, U.S. force deployments should be reduced. America's allies and friends are expected to do more to help themselves, and each other, so that the overall Free World security burden may be brought into better balance. The principle vehicle for making this adjustment possible will be the provision of security assistance by the United States and other Free World developed nations to those countries which by themselves cannot achieve the capability for national security. Much of the Pacific Basin is in the Third World category, the places where conflict has been occurring and probably will continue. Security assistance is an essential mechanism for deterring the insurgency and guerrilla warfare--often externally fomented and/or supported--which characterizes this sub-theater or localized conflict, by building up indigenous military capabilities. In Thailand, for example, there is an opportunity to avoid repeating the experiences of Vietnam by continuing, and improving upon, current efforts to enable the Thais to contain insurgent threats before they develop into crisis situations.

¹ Carpenter, op. cit., pp. 29-29

In Korea, where the threat is primarily from the opposing regime in North Korea, security assistance takes the form of further modernization of the already strong South Korean armed forces.¹ Chapter IV of this study takes up in greater detail the threat of wars of national liberation, and the role of security assistance in coping with this threat.

Besides the evident need for America to maintain a presence in Asia, and to collaborate with its Asian friends and allies in the maintenance of regional security, there is a need, as President Nixon has stated, "to encourage and sustain Asian regionalism, Asian self-reliance, and Asian initiatives."² There is a continuing role for the older treaties: the bilateral ones with the United States, ANZUS, and SEATO--although the latter has been seriously weakened by the non-participation of France, the U.S. and Pakistan, and it suffered from its inception by being composed mainly of non-Asian members. But Asia has not had until recently any purely Asian grouping comparable to the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in other areas, which would provide a mechanism for taking up the issues upon which peaceful relations depend. Within the last three years, however, the nine-member Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) and the five-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) "have demonstrated the utility of periodic consultations on regional issues and have served as a forum for the resolution of differences between participants."³ These are political associations and not necessarily military security groupings, but their existence is at least a start towards a mutual and regionally oriented effort for the benefit of those nations within the region. Significantly, Japan, heretofore wary of involvement in regional groups, is a member of ASPAC. Through this mechanism, not involving any military ties at present, Japan may be able to enhance regional security through contributions of economic and technical--and perhaps even some form of military--assistance. The five Power arrangement for the defense of Malaysia and Singapore is, of course, a more straightforward type of security arrangement, and regional in

¹ DOD Report FY 1973, p. 125

² Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1972, p. 82

³ Ibid., p. 85

character except for the inclusion of the UK. This arrangement was created as a substitute for the former stronger British presence "East of Suez," but its effectiveness has not yet been established. Some concern has been expressed by Singapore about Australia's depth of commitment. According to one writer, the reason for Australia's seeming reluctance is "the nagging fear among Australians--in the absence of some firm United States guarantee--that they will be left alone on a limb in the region."¹

Thus the preservation of security in the Pacific Basin--whether by unilateral action, bilateral cooperation, or regional association--always comes back to the question of the credibility of the United States' will to maintain strength for peace.

G. LATIN AMERICA

The United States no longer has either the monopoly of military power or the predominant political and economic influence that it enjoyed in Latin America prior to the advent of Castro and the Soviet-Cuba alliance. Instead, American power to direct the course of events in Latin America has become sharply circumscribed, but the United States must still determine feasible responses to a number of factors which threaten to undermine the stability and developmental progress of this region.

One obvious factor which threatens American interests in Latin America is the Soviet military tie with Cuba, and the related danger of increased Soviet political influence through expansion of its growing naval forces into a permanent regional military presence. A second major and inter-related factor is the unification of left-wing parties, including pro-Soviet elements, into Chilean-style electoral alliances in such nations as Uruguay, Venezuela, and Colombia. The actual durability of such governments in power may eventually prove to be transitory, but over the next few years the effort to establish popular-front regimes will nonetheless be made in a number of places, to the detriment of American interests and position. Finally, although insurgency in the countryside appears to be ebbing as a major threat to local stability because of the failures of Cuban-supported revolutionaries against the enhanced internal security capabilities of most

¹ Bernard K. Gordon, "Open Options: Australia's Foreign Policy in the Seventies," Current History, March 1972, p. 164

Latin American nations, there is a growing trend towards urban terrorism of the kind practiced by the Uruguayan Tupamaros which poses new problems with which local authorities are finding it difficult to cope. The most serious threat to the American position in Latin America would be a combination of the first two factors.

An orchestrated Soviet policy which successfully coupled a permanent military presence in the area with new diplomatic and economic approaches to the governments of that region could substantially affect U.S. interests. It is quite possible, if the United States does not take sufficient action to protect these interests and its position, such a forfeiture of initiative to the Soviet Union would begin to reorient the thinking of South American governments toward neutral or even pro-Soviet attitudes, as has already occurred in the Middle Eastern/Mediterranean region. The United States would already be at a disadvantage with anti-American popular-front regimes, which would be inclined to look upon the Soviet Union as a viable alternative source of political, economic, and perhaps military assistance.¹

In South America proper, the American responses appropriate to the threat are primarily political and economic. The principal American concern should be to ensure that Soviet presence and activity does not become so one-sided that American influence is overshadowed and eventually supplanted throughout the area. The major contribution of American military policy to the stability of South America should take the form of continuing military assistance programs. Not only is there a requirement for further development of South American internal security capabilities, but it is also important for the United States to maintain close contacts with the local military leaderships, which will remain the final arbiters of political power in South America for the foreseeable future. Military assistance programs, then, will serve a number of American interests, and should be implemented on a selective basis as local needs, and the furtherance of U.S. policies require.²

¹ For the background of the interests of the United States in Latin America, and the corresponding threats, see Foreign Policy Research Institute, The Nixon Doctrine and Latin America, SSC/SRI, IN-71-108, especially pp. 2-9.

² See David C. Jordan, U.S. Latin American Policy in a Decade of Change, paper presented to the symposium on National Strategy in a Decade of Change, at Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia, February 1972, pp. 28-38.

The United States has a more direct security problem in the Caribbean, because of the immediate nature of its interests there, the military and logistic advantages afforded to the Soviet Union by its alliance with Cuba, and the volatility of many of the Caribbean nations. The local supremacy of American military power, especially important for the security of the Panama Canal, has already been challenged by Soviet naval activity, and it would be a serious psychological and political blow to the security of the area if the United States were to give up either its naval presence or its bases in the Caribbean. These forces and bases can serve a dual purpose: to provide a structure for training, and to make American interest in the area clear to all parties concerned. The objective is deterrence of conflict, but for the foreseeable future, the possibility of military interventions, limited in time and scope, is conceivable. Readiness for this contingency requires a small quick-reaction force based in CONUS, available for staging operations around the Caribbean.¹

¹See FPI, The Nixon Doctrine and Latin America, pp. 15-18

IV MILITARY AID AND OVERSEAS BASES IN THE NIXON DOCTRINE

A. INTRODUCTION

President Nixon, in his most recent report to the Congress, included the two statements pertaining to the philosophy of America's new foreign policy:

- The end of bipolarity requires that the structure must be built with the resources and concepts of many nations-- for only where nations participate in creating an international system do they contribute to its vitality and accept its validity.
- Our friendships are constant, but the means by which they are mutually expressed must be adjusted as world conditions change. The continuity and vigor of our alliance require that our friends assume greater responsibilities for our common endeavors.¹

These and other pronouncements which set forth the philosophy of U.S. policy are especially pertinent to America's role in areas of the world other than Europe, for it is in these "other" areas where the Nixon Doctrine implies the greatest change from the past. As the President said, there will be "further adjustments in U.S. deployments"² in Asia. The Nixon Doctrine Asian strategy is based upon what the President describes as a "thorough analysis" of "Asian strategy in this decade," leading to these "preliminary conclusions:"

- The U.S. nuclear shield will be maintained... .
- It will continue to be essential to maintain strong forward American deployments, while also providing appropriate military and economic assistance.
- Allied military capabilities, especially in ground forces, are expected to improve substantially, making possible some further adjustments in U.S. deployments.

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1972, p. 3

² Ibid., p. 165

-- Subversion and guerilla warfare remain a potent danger to our friends in Asia. While the threat should be dealt with primarily by indigenous forces, we must continue to provide military and economic assistance to supplement local efforts.¹

These conclusions apply specifically to Asia. But policy documents and official statements of the past three years indicate that the strategic philosophy from which these conclusions are derived applies to all the non-European areas of the world where the United States has important interests. The broad intent of the United States is to have "flexible general purpose forces which will permit us to respond as necessary to threats to those interests."²

Key elements in the "preliminary conclusions" quoted above appear to be wars of national liberation, military aid and overseas bases. "Wars of national liberation" are not mentioned by this name, but the terms "subversion" and "guerrilla warfare" are closely related. The need for overseas bases is implied in the requirement for "forward deployments," and the concept that "indigenous forces" will be expected to bear the burden of local defense is not viable without the provision of military (and economic) assistance. Thus the three topics discussed in this chapter, while susceptible to individual and separate analysis, are interrelated and are key elements of U.S. policies toward the developing countries.

B. WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

A great body of literature exists on the subject of wars of national liberation. A historical and analytical review of the subject is not appropriate here.³ As to the relevance of wars of national liberation to foreign and military planning problems, history supports the premise that the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China--and their communist allies and satellites--have philosophically supported the concept, and materially supported the prosecution, of wars of national liberation.

¹ Ibid., pp. 164, 165 (Emphasis added)

² Ibid.

³ Frank N. Trager, Wars of National Liberation in the 1970's, SSC-IN-71-109, 25 October 1971. This was prepared as background source for this subject.

It is possible that in this era of "transformation of American foreign relations with both our friends and adversaries,"¹ the Soviets and the Chinese, and other communist nations, may eventually modify their belief in and support of "liberation" movements. In the interim, however, the military planner needs practical guidelines for an adequate defense posture. Some connection, therefore, must be made between policy and the contingency of this kind of threat.

"Third World" is not a precise term, but it nevertheless serves better than any other to describe that part of the world characterized, generally, by being at the lower end of the economic and industrial development spectrum and the higher end of the instability scale. These two characteristics of the Third World nations connote fertile ground for wars of national liberation. Whatever ideological or policy stance the Soviets and Chinese may in the future take towards encouraging such wars, the possibility remains that the temptation to exploit situations of unrest or insurgency which may arise (with or without external meddling) in a "target country" would be too strong for them to resist. President Nixon, in an address to the United Nations in October 1970, has stated that he hopes it would be otherwise in the future:

...one of the paramount problems of our times is that we must transcend the old patterns of power politics in which nations sought to exploit every volatile situation for their own advantage or to squeeze the maximum advantage for themselves out of every negotiation.

...the profoundest national interest of our time--for every nation--is not immediate gain, but the preservation of peace.²

Therein, however, lies one of the dilemmas of the Nixon Doctrine for the military planner, because it cannot be known when, or whether, U.S. adversaries will forego the attempt for immediate gain from a "volatile situation," or will instead exercise the kind of restraint that will help preserve peace. The Nixon Doctrine does recognize, in spite of the hope that it be otherwise, that the threat of wars of

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1972, p. 2

² Ibid., p. 16

national liberation (or insurgency and guerrilla warfare, to use the President's language) continues to be real. But for the planner, discerning the "where" and the "how" of U.S. response is more difficult.

In President Nixon's February 1972 foreign policy report to the Congress, the specific concern over insurgency is stated as pertaining "to our friends in Asia."¹ In that region, although there are expected to be "further adjustments to U.S. deployments" (linked to expected improvements in "allied military capabilities"), it is also stated that "we will maintain our own peacetime land, sea and air deployments in Asia at a level which provides assurance to our allies of continuing U.S. support and demonstrates an ability and determination to meet our commitments."²

As to the other world regions, the policy guidance is less specific:

In addition to examining our continuing political and military requirements in Europe and Asia, we have made similar studies of other areas of the world. In the process we have assessed potential challenges to our interests. We are designing flexible general purpose forces which will permit us to respond as necessary to threats to those interests.³

For the military planner, these general inferences may be made from the policy guidelines:

- In Asia, it is the U.S. intent to maintain some--although reduced--forward deployments of U.S. "land, sea and air" forces.
- In other non-European regions, forward deployments are not specified, although neither are they ruled out.
- "Flexible general purpose forces" are to be ready to "respond as necessary" to threats to U.S. interests. This would seem to be applicable to all regions.

¹ Ibid., p. 165

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. (Emphasis added)

- To combat subversion, primary reliance would be placed on indigenous forces, especially indigenous land forces.
- Heavy emphasis is laid upon the provision of economic and military assistance to enhance the capabilities of Third World friends and allies to cope with internal and external threats.
- One key criterion for U.S. assistance or response is the existence of U.S. interests
- A second key criterion for U.S. prior assistance, or response in a crisis, is the demonstrated willingness of the affected nation to help itself.

The foregoing inferences answer some questions but raise others, insofar as where and how U.S. forces may be involved in coping with insurgency, guerrilla warfare, wars of national liberation, or whatever term is chosen to describe threats which manifest themselves primarily within a nation's boundaries. It does seem clear that there are certain situations which could involve U.S. forces. It would also seem clear that the U.S. capability for this kind of action must reside in U.S. general purpose forces, in all branches, land, sea and air. The Asian region would seem to be the place where "our ability and determination to meet our commitments" would cause the greatest likelihood of U.S. involvement in an insurgency situation. But because the United States may "respond as necessary" to threats in other regions, planning must account for those regions as well. Finally, in the interim before "another Vietnam" can arise, U.S. policy insists that "the best means of dealing with insurgencies is to preempt them through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, para-military and military action by the threatened government."¹ U.S. economic and military aid is important to this objective.

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1970, p. 127

A critical and unanswered question is what are the ground rules for making decisions on U.S. involvement in the interim period which lies ahead between existing volatile situations in many places and the day when "preemption" efforts will hopefully be successful in removing the causes of crisis, or in raising indigenous forces to the state of self-sufficiency for dealing with them.

It would perhaps be unfair to say that the framers of policy hope that "nothing will happen" in this interim period. In his 1970 foreign policy message, the President said that "a direct combat role for U.S. general purpose forces arises when insurgency has shaded into external aggression or where there is overt conventional attack."¹ This formulation is not repeated in subsequent messages, but neither is it superseded by an alternative concept. If this be the ground rule for U.S. action, one must raise the question whether it will not lead to a "too little, too late" situation? Suppose, for example, that an insurgency situation arises in the Philippines. Here would seem to be a place where American interests and commitments are such that U.S. action would have at least to be considered. In that island nation, the situation could become quite serious before "insurgency has shaded into external aggression." There are major U.S. military bases in the Philippines which could be endangered, either by physical threat, or the political threat of a new and unfriendly government. Indigenous force capability is limited. If the United States is to act at all, early rather than late would seem to be in accord with lessons learned about past insurgencies. Further, if instigators of insurgency are to be deterred, they should not be allowed to believe that they have a "grace period" free from U.S. response until the insurgency "has shaded into external aggression." In the Philippine example, it seems possible that the United States might act promptly.

Whether the policy guideline regarding intervention is for early action or at the later "external aggression" stage, the military planner must have a rapidly deployable U.S. force capability ready for either contingency. The President must have the assurance that his military planners have provided him with the capability to respond, whatever his decision may be as to whether to respond.

¹ Ibid.

This problem, the provision of a capability for dealing with insurgency, brings the military planner face to face with a difficult situation. First, the overall size of U.S. armed forces is shrinking. Second, the portion of U.S. forces with counterinsurgency skills, never large, is also shrinking, by attrition, and because there seems to be a waning interest in this area, especially at policy-making levels. Third, the organizational structure and the instructional system for dealing with the problem of counterinsurgency are not well-organized; they exist more as ad hoc appendages applied over the past decade than as integrated parts of a well-planned whole.

The planner, especially the Service planner, will not be able to get the support and guidance necessary to plan for a meaningful U.S. counter-insurgency capability unless there is an inter-Service recognition of the importance of this area of military capability. It may be necessary to begin at the level of the Department of Defense, and work downward through the Joint Staff and the Services, to design a structure for and assign responsibility for implementation of a U.S. capability in counter-insurgency. Up to now this has been primarily an individual Service program, at least insofar as operations in the field have been concerned. There was valuable inter-Service cooperation in Vietnam, especially in the Delta region, but the full benefit of these lessons could be lost unless there is a better mechanism in Washington and in the Unified Commands for adapting these experiences for possible future use. Consideration should be given to the potential for enhancing U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities by increasing the inter-Service aspects of school training.

Further, it is not sufficient to integrate Defense Department staff and operational structures. Because the underlying causes of intra-nation unrest span the spectrum of political, economic, social, cultural and military factors, other Executive Departments should be involved. It is true that there has been, and is yet, inter-Departmental effort in this area, but this has mainly occurred on an ad hoc basis, and would seem to require more permancy and organizational formality if future needs are adequately to be met.

Distasteful as it may be to contemplate, the kind of conflict which includes dealing with insurgency and guerrilla warfare may be the most likely contingency for future involvement of U.S. forces. The entire Third World abounds with volatile situations that could erupt into conflict of one kind or another. One has only to scan the many compilations of Third World insurgencies, coups d'etat, border incidents, student riots, and terrorist attacks, to see that only a miracle could end this trend. The Nixon Doctrine proposes to prevent and deter this violence if it affects U.S. interests. Military planning, therefore, will not be realistic unless it takes account of this important mode of conflict.

Total Force is the concept postulated for sharing the free world defense burden. The mechanisms exist for its implementation in the European NATO area. In the other world regions, however, it has a long way to go from concept to reality. In Asia in particular, and in other regions in a general way, Total Force is seen as the proper solution to the kinds of threats anticipated. To implement the Total Force concept the U.S. command structure has to be streamlined for the most effective joint response to the crisis situations. In addition, some form of international command structure will have to be created to carry out U.S. indigenous operations.

If the United States is serious about coping with the threat posed by wars of national liberation, a sustained preparatory effort will be necessary. The key to success will be knowledge; i.e., "know your enemy." Each of the Services, but especially the Army, could profit by training personnel as area specialists. Such persons would acquire a thorough understanding of Third World countries or areas, becoming familiar with local physical aspects, language, history and culture of the people, the political situation and the sources of unrest, the economy, and the kind of military capability best suited to local needs. This would be no small task. To implement such a plan seems counter to traditional career planning. To convince a junior or middle grade officer that his opportunity for promotion would not be jeopardized by becoming a Horn-of-Africa-Specialist would require some official assurance to the contrary. Such a program also seems counter to the American penchant for quick solutions. But the conditions in places subject to wars of national

liberation require what Sir Robert Thompson, British expert on guerrilla warfare, calls the long-haul policy. He goes so far as to say that in some parts of the world a "stable war" may be a more realistic objective than the search for a stable peace. He defines "stable war" as "a condition in which the country concerned can survive politically and make progress economically while containing the threat from its enemies."¹ The American military specialist and trainer of indigenous forces needs to study this kind of problem; it may be that situations will arise in the Third World where it is in the U.S. interest to take action to keep a "stable war" stable. To do so without adequate preparation; i.e., without trained personnel who thoroughly understand the problem, would certainly seem unwise.

C. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE FOR MILITARY AID POLICY

The Nixon Doctrine is concerned with overall international security policy, not military assistance per se. But there is little doubt that its implementation will have significant consequences for military aid policies in the 1970s, since the "Nixon Doctrine requires a strong program of security assistance."² While many of the details remain in doubt, certain changes in military assistance policy and consequences of those changes are gradually becoming visible. It is with these changes, their implications, and their consequences for overall American foreign policy that this discussion is concerned.

Because military assistance is an integral and important component of U.S. foreign policy, especially toward the developing nations, it is not surprising that the Nixon Doctrine has already affected and will continue to affect the military assistance program. Of course it must be kept in mind that the Nixon Administration may not be able to persuade Congress to agree to all of the various proposed organizational changes which the President believes are necessary to rationalize the foreign aid process. Nor was it to be expected in 1971 nor will it be anticipated in 1972, given the strong opposition in Congress, and especially in the Senate, to certain aspects of the foreign aid program, that the legislature

¹ Interview with Anthony Lejeune, reported in Omaha World Herald, 19 December 1971.

² Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1971, p. 183

will appropriate all of the sums requested for all of the countries and programs involved. But these domestic political constraints do not reduce the importance of analyzing the implications of the Nixon Doctrine for military aid policy.

1. Proposed Organizational Structure

On September 15, 1970, the first step in implementing the Nixon Doctrine was taken when the Administration proposed a major reorganization in the foreign assistance program, and stated that it would subsequently ask Congress for the necessary legislation.¹ Consistent with this, the President proposed to reorganize the aid program in a message to Congress on April 21, 1971. To achieve the organizational changes, the President transmitted two bills--an International Security Assistance Act and an International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act--and promised to coordinate these with administrative action. Taken together, these measures would be intended to:

- Distinguish clearly between our security, development, and humanitarian assistance programs and create separate organizational structures for each. This would enable us to define our own objectives more clearly... .
- Combine our various security assistance efforts (except for those in Southeast Asia which are now funded in the Defense Budget) into one coherent program, under the policy direction of the Department of State. This would enable security assistance to play more effectively its critical role in supporting the Nixon Doctrine... .
- Create a U.S. International Development Corporation and a U.S. International Development Institute to replace the Agency for International Development. This would enable us to reform our bilateral development assistance program...²

¹ Richard Nixon, Foreign Assistance for the Seventies (Washington, D.C.: AID, September 15, 1970)

² Richard Nixon, For a Generation of Peaceful Development (Washington, D.C.: AID, April 21, 1971), p. 1

Presumably such clarification will facilitate a "cost-effectiveness" approach to foreign aid decision-making, and improve program accountability.¹

The purposes of aid were also spelled out in the President's message:

-- First, we must help to strengthen the defense capabilities and economies of our friends and allies. This is necessary so that we can reduce our direct involvement abroad... .

-- Second, we must assist the lower income countries in their efforts to achieve economic and social development. Such development is...essential to the peaceful world order... .

-- Third, we must be able to provide prompt and effective assistance to countries struck by natural disaster or the human consequences of political upheaval. Our humanitarian concerns for mankind require that we be prepared to help... .²

Security assistance is a new budget category but the concept has existed in one form or another as a principal feature of U.S. foreign policy for a generation. What is different organizationally is that the security assistance category combines previously separated programs by purpose: enhancing the external and internal security of recipient nations.

Thus, if Congress agrees,³ the new International Security Act will include the following elements:

-- Military grant aid and foreign sales of military items. These two programs historically have been the nucleus of U.S. military assistance efforts.

1 In making these changes, the President was following the recommendation of the Task Force he had established (the Peterson Commission) to report on the foreign aid program. See U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970s: A New Approach, Report to the President from the Task Force on International Development (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 4, 1970).

2 Nixon, For a Generation of Peaceful Development, p. 2

3 Not surprisingly, Congress did not agree quickly to such extensive organizational changes. In 1971, it was decided to postpone detailed consideration of the proposed new arrangements until the 1972 Congressional session.

-- Supporting assistance. This program provides economic aid for militarily-related purposes. In recent years, supporting assistance has been used primarily to help South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand bear the cost of the war in Indochina. Previously part of the economic aid program, supporting assistance will now be part of the security assistance package.

-- Disposal of excess stocks of military equipment.

-- Public safety assistance. Like supporting assistance, this was formerly part of the economic aid program. It funds assistance to police and other internal security forces of recipient nations.

-- Concessional sales. This is a new category. Previously, countries received either grant military aid or sales on commercial credit terms. Concessional sales will ease credit terms for those countries who are unable to afford commercial credit terms. For example, payment terms may be expanded from ten to twenty years with interest rates as low as three percent.¹

Except for supporting assistance, which would be administered by the Department of State, programs included in the International Security Act would be administered by the Department of Defense. However, the State Department would provide foreign policy guidance. For the latter purpose, the Administration proposed to establish a new position in the Department of State called the Coordinator for Security Assistance. According to President Nixon, these organizational changes "would be a significant step in the direction of improving the management of our security assistance program."²

While certain aspects of the reorganization of the military aid program must await Congressional approval, the Administration has already given management of security assistance to the newest Department of


¹ It is interesting to note that the use of concessional sales would increase the similarity of the American and Soviet military aid programs. Most Soviet aid is in the form of concessional sales, usually for a loan period of twelve or more years and at interest rates of two to two-and-a-half percent. See Wynfred Joshua and Stephen P. Gibert, Aid for the Third World, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 104.

² Nixon, For a Generation of Peaceful Development, p. 8

Defense Agency: the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). Becoming operational in September 1971, it is intended that DSAA will put increased emphasis on military aid programs designed to foster greater self-sufficiency and self-reliance on the part of aid recipients. The Director of the Agency also serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Military Assistance and Sales) and Secretary to the Defense Security Assistance Council. The latter organization is chaired by the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs and is intended to serve as an advisory body to the Secretary of Defense on questions concerning international security assistance policies.

The new organizational arrangements may be of some help in clarifying objectives. They will also help to emphasize the central role accorded security assistance in implementing the Nixon Doctrine. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the significance of the changes has been exaggerated. Persistent problems will remain: the responsibility for aid decisions will still be fragmented; the conflict between those who prefer to tie aid directly to immediate policy versus those who think aid decisions should be independent of current events will remain; labeling all aid for military purposes "security assistance" is not a new approach but a new nomenclature; responsibility for economic aid for military purposes will continue to be diffused.

Several aspects of the new organizational arrangements do appear, however, to foreshadow different emphases in the future. The role of the Department of State would appear to be strengthened (See Figure 1). The proposed Coordinator would be at the Under Secretary level and will have a planning and Analysis staff to assist him. A new Bureau of Economic Supporting Assistance would be created. Its Director also would have jurisdiction over the Office for Public Safety. Thus AID would no longer have any role in providing policy guidance or administering any aspects of the security assistance program. It would seem likely that the new arrangements would result in greater emphasis being placed on coordinating aid with foreign policy. Phasing AID out in favor of State may also mean that short-run political considerations are given precedence in



* Only for purposes of military assistance and sales.
 Source: Foreign Assistance Act of 1971. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Part I, April–May 1971 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 108.

Figure 1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE

decision-making in contrast to AID's greater propensity to engage in future-oriented assistance.

2. Current Security Assistance Policies

The new security policy has already begun to affect certain political aspects of the military assistance program and will have further impact on security aid during the 1970s. These changes are both quantitative and qualitative in nature. They affect the total amount of funds

and the sizes of allocations to the various countries receiving security assistance, the means of funding, justifications for assistance, and program emphasis.

In terms of amounts of funds requested even prior to the adoption of the Nixon Doctrine, it was clear that there might be some increase in the funds allocated to security assistance. Such increases were linked by the Peterson Commission to reduction of U.S. forces abroad: "In some cases, reduction of U.S. military forces overseas will require temporary offsetting increases in such assistance."¹ Consistent with this trend, the total for all types of security assistance rose from approximately \$3.1 billion in FY 1970 to \$4.2 billion in FY 1971.² At this point, however, the total began to level off; the new obligational authority requested for FY 1972 was about \$4.2 billion,³ divided as follows:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Amount (in Thousands)</u>
Military Assistance Program Grants (MAPG)	\$ 705,000
Foreign Military Sales Credits (FMSC)	510,000
Economic Supporting Assistance (ESA)	778,000
Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)	<u>220,800</u>
	\$4223,800

As can be seen, over half of the requested security assistance was in the service-funded (MASF) category, directly related to the Indochina war.⁴ Service-funded aid goes to South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and Korea. South Vietnam's portion was about \$1.78 of the \$2.23 billions; the

¹ Nixon, U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's, p. 3

² Charles Schultze, et. al., Setting National Priorities, The 1972 Budget (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 121.

³ If to this sum is added \$73,500,000, chargeable to prior year appropriations, the total proposed FY 1972 program comes to \$4,297,300. Foreign Assistance Legislation, Fiscal Year 1972, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, June, 1971 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 373

⁴ The amounts actually appropriated for FY 1972 were: MAPG \$500 million; FMSC \$400 million; ESA \$550 million; MASF \$2335 million. Thus the MASF was a greater proportion of the actual than the requested total. (Information supplied by Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and House Armed Services Committee.)

remaining \$447 million was divided among Laos, Thailand and "Free World"
(Korean) Forces in Vietnam.¹

If to the MASF figure of \$2.23 billion is added South Vietnam's combined supporting assistance and Public Law 480 funds of approximately \$665 million and Cambodia's military aid and supporting assistance of \$321 million, then the Indochina war-related aid came to approximately \$3.2 billion or roughly three-fourths of the world total of security assistance. Of course, Vietnam aid, properly speaking, is a war-fighting measure, not "foreign aid" in the usual meaning of that term. Also, service-funded aid is not appropriated under the Foreign Assistance Act. It is probable that MASF programs will be terminated after all U.S. forces leave Vietnam and any future military assistance to the present four MASF recipients placed in the new International Security Assistance Act.

By far the greatest regional emphasis in security assistance has been on Southeast Asia. Not only did all of the \$2.23 billion MASF aid go to that region, but also almost all (over 93 percent) of the economic supporting assistance as well. Of the approximately \$778 million requested, \$565 million has been requested for South Vietnam, \$110 million for Cambodia, and \$50 million for Laos.² The remaining \$53 million (less than seven percent of the total) of economic supporting assistance was scattered among many recipients around the world with no country outside of Southeast Asia receiving consequential amounts.

MAP grant aid is also concentrated in Southeast Asia, but not to the same degree and less narrowly related to the Indochina war. Of the \$731.5 million requested, about 68 percent was allocated for Cambodia, Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines.¹ About 23 percent was intended for the Near East and South Asia region. Major recipients were to be Turkey, Jordan, and Greece. The remaining nine or so percent of MAP was scattered among many recipients.

¹The exact breakdown of the \$447 million among the three recipients is classified.

²Foreign Assistance Legislation, Fiscal Year 1972, op. cit., pp.184, 231.

³U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (March, 1971), p. 3-4, passim. The \$731.5 includes \$705

The final category consisted of credits for military sales. For FY 1972, the Administration requested \$510 million for this purpose. Most of this amount was to go to the Near East-South Asia region, with Israel receiving \$300 million. Latin America was to be the second largest recipient region, but the total for all of Latin America would be much less than that allocated to Israel alone. The three largest recipients in Latin America were to be Brazil with approximately \$20 million in credits and nearly \$1 million in grants, and Argentina and Venezuela, each of which was to receive about \$15 million in sales and \$1 million in grants.¹

Combining all types of assistance, it can be seen that three sets of countries, comprising a total of ten, would receive approximately \$4.1 billion of the requested world total of \$4.3 billion, or about 95 percent of all security assistance. The "Asian communist containment" set of six--South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Taiwan and Korea--would receive by far the largest share of all security aid. The two countries comprising the "Soviet communist containment" set--Greece and Turkey--would receive substantial amounts of aid, but much less than the Asian communist containment group. The remaining two countries--Israel and Jordan--who round out the "Big Ten" security assistance recipients, may be termed the "regional stability" set. Aid to these two countries, and lesser amounts to others in the region, is intended to give the United States political leverage in dealing with the explosive Arab-Israeli confrontation and to maintain a "balance of power" in the region.

The remaining five percent of security assistance funds was divided among some 36 countries, most of which were to receive only small amounts for training purposes. In essence, then, the international security assistance program is aid to the Big Ten; if the Nixon Doctrine is to result in significant changes in military assistance in the decade of the seventies, it is with regard to these ten countries that changes must occur.

million requested for FY 1972 plus \$26.5 million chargeable to prior year appropriations.

¹ Foreign Assistance Legislation, Fiscal Year 1972, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, June, 1971, op. cit., p. 384.

3. Political and Strategic Considerations

a. Influence of the Past and Prospects for Change

The overwhelming impression gathered from perusing the list comprising the Big Ten security assistance recipients is one of familiarity: the U.S. has been helping these countries for a long time. Aid to Korea dates from its occupation in 1945; Turkey and Greece were the original benefactors of the Truman Doctrine; Israel has been assisted in various ways since its independence; Taiwan received American aid during the Chinese Civil War and subsequently to the present. Even the more recent Southeast Asian recipients have obtained American military assistance for many years. Thus, while the Nixon Doctrine stresses the selective intervention of U.S. power abroad, insofar as the particular choice of recipients is concerned, there have been few if any changes from the past.

This appears somewhat contradictory to the alleged harder look the Administration intends to give U.S. security policy. And it certainly is not consistent with a cardinal point in the Peterson Report: "Second, the amount of military assistance allocated among countries should be related to a realistic assessment of needs, not to historical assistance levels."¹

Now it could be argued that the fact that the Big Ten historically have been major recipients does not mean that the Nixon Administration did not realistically assess their needs; the government simply came to the same conclusion regarding FY 1972 assistance that Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson came to in the past. While this reasoning cannot be altogether discounted, it seems likely that a better explanation is the great, not to say inordinate, emphasis the Nixon Doctrine puts on past commitments.

There are sound reasons for this emphasis on America's living up to its commitments and continuing to be concerned with its allies of long

¹ Nixon, U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's: A New Approach, p. 13

standing. United States withdrawal from Vietnam and its force reductions elsewhere in Asia might convince Asian allies that American guarantees have weakened. Especially since President Nixon's visit to China, Asians could hardly be faulted if they scrambled to reach accommodation with the communist giant--it would appear that there no longer exists a "balance among menaces"¹ in Indochina. The stress on commitments is intended, probably with private pessimism, to convince Asians that America has not and will not abandon them, and continuing large amounts of military aid to the six Asian communist containment countries is intended to give material evidence to Administration statements.

But the fact that the six Asian countries remain among the Big Ten security assistance recipients can be explained in still another way: Vietnamization. The Nixon Doctrine emphasizes that the U.S. defense role should be complementary to that of the aided recipients and not a substitute for their failure to participate in their own defense. What Vietnamization means, or more appropriately what "Asianization" means since the process is not limited to Vietnam, is that America will "do what it does best" and Asians will "do what they do best." America will supply the triggers; Asians will supply the fingers. Secretary Laird puts it less bluntly: "As we proceed with Vietnamization and implementing the Nixon Doctrine, we seek to replace some of our past military presence with stronger local capabilities..."² With regard to Korea, for example, the Secretary said that aid "... will strengthen their forces so that we can proceed with the planned reduction of U.S. troops without weakening the defense posture essential to deter North Korean aggression."³

¹ This phrase was used by Cambodia's former Chief-of-State Sihanouk to describe his foreign policies toward Thailand, Vietnam, and China.

² Laird, DOD Report FY 1972, p. 108.

³ Ibid., p. 109

As Asianization proceeds, it can be anticipated that aid amounts will probably begin to decline.¹ MASF aid, since it is related directly to the presence of American forces in Vietnam, will certainly drop substantially and may be phased out altogether. MAP grant aid may also decrease. And as U.S. force levels decrease in Asia, reiteration of the principle that the United States is a Pacific power probably will not avert some lessening of American commitments in Asia. Intensity of commitment, presence of troops, and level of aid are all intimately related. Earl Ravenal would seem to be correct in seeing a discrepancy between continuing U.S. commitments and reduced U.S. force levels in Asia.² It may be that this discrepancy will be resolved by reducing the commitment and aid as well as the troops. And in the meanwhile, the United States policy may cause some concern among America's Asian partners. As Professor Trager suggests, "We are encouraging and requiring our allies and friends to do more to defend themselves as the price of our doing less--a curious kind of bargain."³ The only solace is found in the fact that the Administration will proceed slowly and ease the way with substantial aid:

...we cannot move too fast without sapping the Asian sense of confidence and security... . And we cannot cut our own contributions to Asian security without providing for their assumption by our Asian friends. Thus, the decision to reduce our presence carries with it the obligation to help our allies create the capacity to carry the responsibilities we are transferring.⁴

¹ MAP aid has actually declined for many years, although the \$731.5 million requested for FY 1972 represents some increase over last year. MASF, in contrast, was only \$34 million in 1965, rising to \$2177 million in FY 1971 and to nearly \$2231 million for FY 1972. Sales and supporting assistance have also increased but not to the same extent as MASF. See Economic Issues in Military Assistance, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the United States, January-February, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 204.

² Earl C. Ravenal, "The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments," Foreign Affairs (January, 1971), p. 216.

³ Frank N. Trager, "Alternative Futures for Southeast Asia and United States," Orbis (Spring, 1971), p. 397.

⁴ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1971, p. 95

b. Reevaluation of the Threat

Intensity of commitment, presence of troops, and level of aid are also closely related to threat perception. The new U.S. foreign policy suggests a more deliberate approach to fulfillment and some withdrawal of forces; the effect of these developments could, even though not intended, eventually result in reduced security assistance. Policy toward Communist China is related to these developments; a political accommodation of some kind with China could affect the future of the military aid program. For many years, most MAP funds have gone to so-called Forward Defense countries. The concept of Forward Defense has been linked to the perception of China (and to a lesser degree the USSR) as a threat to the security of non-communist Asian states and indirectly to the United States. Thus any detente with China could tend to weaken the principal justification for MAP; i.e., a Forward Defense strategy may not be needed to confront a more peaceful China.

Similarly, improved relations with China should ease the American departure from Vietnam. The enormous investment in Vietnam, almost all critics agree, is disproportional to the contribution which that area of the world can make to American security. Still, as long as it could be argued that defending South Vietnam was part of a larger policy of containing China, some justification for defending South Vietnam could be advanced.

However, the decision to reduce U.S. force levels in Vietnam (and other Asian countries) has been less linked to a reduced Chinese threat than to increasing capabilities of the non-communist countries in Asia. These increased capabilities, in turn, have partly resulted from increased aid. Nevertheless, any future downgrading of the Chinese threat could weaken the justification for enormous amounts of aid flowing to the six Asian nations.

Changes in perception of China as a threat are not likely to affect the aid given to the non-Asian recipients. In fact, the increased attention given by the USSR to the Middle East and Indian Ocean areas in recent years might be an argument for stepping up aid to Greece, Turkey, Jordan, and Israel. But this line of reasoning is countered by the

widespread belief that an actual Soviet invasion of the area is not probable.¹ Rather, Soviet activities are more likely to take the form of increased political and economic penetration of the Middle East. Also, continuing hostility between Greece and Turkey reinforces the belief that the primary reason each of these two countries wishes military aid is to counter the threat of the other. This is a serious difficulty which the United States has often had to face in the history of the military assistance program: the purposes for which the U.S. gives military aid are frequently not the purposes for which the recipients desire the aid, nor the uses to which the recipients put the weapons. Unfortunately, there has been no satisfactory resolution of this problem, as events of late 1971 in East Pakistan attest. And in the Greek case, distaste in the United States for the present military dictatorship militates against increased aid.

In the Middle East, aid to Jordan and Israel is likely to be substantial, as the Administration attempts both to retain political influence in the area and to counter Soviet aid to the Arab countries. Israel, especially, is a barrier to Soviet influence in the Middle East. Barring an unexpected settlement of the Arab-Israeli confrontation, military assistance to Israel in the 1970s is likely to continue at a high or even higher level.² Aid to Jordan helps maintain that country as a viable political entity and reduces the risk that Palestinian guerrillas can force an Israeli-Jordanian clash.

c. The Concept of Self-Help

A fundamental precept of the Nixon Doctrine is that the United States should help those nations who help themselves. But self-help

¹ The Administration, of course, also accepts this view. "The most prevalent communist threats now are not massive military invasions, but a more subtle mixture of military, psychological, and political pressures." Ibid., p. 4.

² Senator Henry Jackson, for example, stating that Israel is "in the front line in resisting the historic imperial ambitions that lie behind Soviet policy," has said he will soon attempt to obtain \$500 million in new military credits for Israel. See the Washington Post, September 24, 1971.

has not been interpreted to mean just a willingness to share burdens. More importantly, the U.S., according to Administration policy pronouncements, should encourage, indeed insist, that the fundamental decisions on policy questions should be made by the people most affected rather than have made-in-America solutions imposed. Local initiative is considered central to the success of the Nixon Doctrine:

-- We Americans are a do-it-yourself people--an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. This trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

-- We devised strategies, and proposed them to our allies. We discovered dangers, and acted directly to combat them.

-- Its [Nixon Doctrine] central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense of allies and friends, but that America cannot--and will not--conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world.

-- I wish to communicate my Government's conviction that Asian hands must shape the Asian future.¹

While encouraging local initiative among aid recipients is a laudable goal, it would appear that the Nixon Doctrine cannot be fully implemented in this regard in all of the Big Ten aid recipient countries. Israel, of course, needs no military advice from the United States. This is also true, but to a much lesser extent, of Greece and Turkey and possibly of Korea and Taiwan. For the remaining five major military aid recipients, local efforts, however sincere, cannot replace American initiative. If these countries are to make their own defense decisions, in a sufficiently professional way to warrant U.S. aid contributions, then they must acquire some capability to do so. Their defense establishments must learn to manage their resources effectively. They must identify accurately the threats to their security and request appropriate rather than "showcase" aid from the United States. They need to engage in force structure planning and adopt optimizing force postures. For these developing

¹Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1970, pp. 5-6, 60. Emphasis in the original.

countries, the problems of modernization and improved capabilities relate primarily to ground force organization, training, command and control, mobility and firepower, logistic support and other aspects of what is generally referred to as the force and combat development process.

If a Nixon Doctrine objective is for Asian hands to shape Asian futures in the security sphere, then high priority should be given to improving the research and analysis capabilities of military aid recipients. As of the moment, most of the developing countries have practically no research capability in any area of human endeavor.¹ It has been estimated, for example, that expenditures for research in Latin America amount annually to only some 0.2 percent of the gross national product, while in Asia such expenditures range from 0.1 percent to 0.5 percent of GNP. In Africa, outlay for research is virtually non-existent. The figure for the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is about 4.2 percent and for the United States about 3.2 percent of GNP. Most European countries spend from one to two percent of their GNP on research. Asian countries, aware of their needs, have set a goal of one percent of their GNP to be devoted to research activities by 1980.²

In Southeast Asia, where the bulk of military assistance flows, there is no country currently capable of making rational military modernization efforts, with the possible exception of Thailand. Thus in the 1970s, the Nixon Doctrine notwithstanding, Americans will make most of the decisions which will affect military aid programs. If the past is indicative, many costly and tragic mistakes will be made. Having mastered the complexities of creating and maintaining a modern military

¹ Secretary of State Rogers said that the U.S. is "...attempting to engage the decision-making and budgetary process of recipient countries by encouraging their leaders to recognize the total costs of their forces and to make themselves the hard choices for the allocation of limited resources." See United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970, A Report of the Secretary of State (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March, 1971), p. 168. Unfortunately, Mr. Rogers does not explain how, lacking a research and analysis capability, they are to do this.

² Lester B. Pearson, Partners in Development (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 15.

establishment, the United States naturally, if somewhat naively, extended this experience to the developing areas. As a consequence, modernization in the military sphere has been and still is largely conceived of as an exercise in moulding the armed forces of the underdeveloped nations to an American image and likeness. This parochial approach has resulted in an uninterrupted flow of arms and men to nations whose security was allegedly threatened, and the large-scale training in the United States of military officers from those countries.¹ Modernization came to mean Americanization, as U.S. personnel, U.S. doctrine, U.S. equipment, U.S. organization and U.S. training procedures impacted on local security forces.

Results of these efforts have been mixed. Measured in terms of enhancing the security of recipients, many would agree that Korea represents a successful, if incomplete, case. While all the returns are not yet in, Vietnam must remain a question mark until the Saigon government demonstrates its ability to "go it alone." One could, of course, go around the world, and argue case by case. But the future is more important; the Nixon Doctrine professes to want to reduce Americanization in favor of self-determination in security endeavors. This surely makes sense, but unfortunately there have been no efforts yet to improve the research capabilities of the aided nations in order to enable them to make these important decisions. Unless this is done, and there is no indication in the FY 1972 program that the Administration has advanced beyond recognition that the problem exists, the self-help aspects of the Nixon Doctrine may result in more billions spent with little additional security achieved.²

¹ From FY 1950 through FY 1970 the United States trained under MAP 213,465 students in the United States, and 105,578 overseas for a grand total of 319,043. See Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts, op. cit., p. 15.

² The Peterson Report recognized this urgent need and made a strong recommendation: "The United States now makes the basic determination of the amount and kind of military equipment the receiving countries need... . More should be done to enable these receiving countries to estimate their own requirements...and to make their military decisions... ." Unfortunately, this recommendation has not been implemented

The United States, as well as the developing nations, would benefit if aid recipient nations could play a rational role in determining security requirements. Recipients might request more appropriate aid. Latin Americans, for example, might recognize and accept the fact that they have little role to play in global security and, accordingly, forego the more advanced weapons systems in favor of more economic and social assistance. Latin American and other recipients might do well to emulate the new regime in Indonesia, which is emphasizing the economic and social role of the Indonesian armed forces and abandoning the ridiculous emphasis on advanced weapons systems, such as long-range submarines, deemed necessary by Sukarno as he pursued confrontation politics.¹ At the same time, as the Cambodian case suggests, care must be taken that the emphasis on the social role of the armed forces is not pushed to the extent that they are unable to perform their primary mission of maintaining national security.

Perhaps the greatest benefit from establishing research and analysis capabilities in the aid recipient countries is that the "communist threat" might be put more in perspective. This is especially true if the research establishments were broadly-based, drawing on their universities as well as military establishments for research personnel, to provide more realistic threat assessments, vital to the structuring of armed forces. They would also be more likely to understand the limitations inherent in any less developed society in rationalizing its armed forces.

except by the usual and endless training of foreign officers. See U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970s, op. cit., p. 14. Mere training was certainly not the full implication of the Nixon Doctrine statement that the U.S. would give allies "...the technical assistance needed, to determine their own requirements and to make the hard decisions on resource allocation which a meaningful security posture demands." See Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1971, p. 185.

² Most of the weapons acquired by Indonesia in the 1960s came from the USSR. For discussion of Soviet military aid to the Sukarno government, see Joshua and Gibert, Arms for the Third World, op. cit., Chapter 4.

Finally, greater local initiative would occur in a setting which accepted as a fact of life, as Huntington has pointed out,¹ that the military are inextricably involved in the civil affairs of their respective societies. Local authorities would recognize this, and adapt to it, rather than unsuccessfully attempting to create apolitical armed forces on the American model.

Greater self-reliance on the part of aid recipients is likely to mean some diminution of U.S. political influence in those countries. But perhaps this is a liability the United States should willingly accept, for security, if it is to be achieved at tolerable human and financial cost in the non-communist developing world, must reflect an ongoing adjustment of indigenous needs to indigenous capabilities. That does not mean merely creating lighter and smaller rifles for small-stature Vietnamese. It means, as the Nixon Administration clearly intends, a greater decision-making role for the aid recipients themselves. But to date this commendable objective has not been fully implemented.

4. Security Assistance and U.S. Force Postures

a. A Lower U.S. Profile Through Security Assistance

The major elements in the defense budgets of the developing nations are expenses for purchasing local consumption goods and paying troops. The enormous costs of weapons development have not affected the aid recipients very much since the United States bears almost all of these costs. Precisely for this reason, as well as because the structure of American military forces results in high costs per combat soldier, and the need to pay American soldiers relatively well, it is clear that it is much cheaper to put an allied soldier in the field than an American. Furthermore, the Nixon Administration wishes to reduce U.S. general purpose forces, for a variety of reasons. Thus emerged the emphasis in policy pronouncements on the point that a MAP dollar could buy much more security for the United States than a dollar spent directly on U.S. forces. Carried to its logical extreme, such an argument would result in substantial

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), Chapter 4.

U.S. force withdrawals around the world.¹ Substituting for the departing U.S. troops would be improved local forces, created partly by increased U.S. security assistance, partly by greater self-help efforts by recipients, and partly by the assumption of greater defense burdens by other developed states, notably Japan in Asia and the NATO countries of western Europe.

To further these goals, the Nixon Administration has taken a number of steps, as well as adopting the now-famous Vietnamization strategy. Korea has received particular attention since, outside of Vietnam, the possibility that increased security assistance can result in reduced U.S. force levels and concomitant net budget savings perhaps has the best chance of being realized in Korea. Currently Korea is in the second year of its force modernization plan. U.S. aid is substantially underwriting this effort. Not only does Korea get a large proportion (the exact sum is classified) of the approximately \$447 million MASF funds to support its efforts in Vietnam, it also receives a substantial part of the MAP funds for Asia. Last year, an additional \$150 million was provided in supplemental legislation for Korea; this program is expected to continue for another four years.

In return, the United States has withdrawn one U.S. combat division from Korea at a projected saving of some \$250 million annually, and may eventually withdraw the remaining combat division as Korean force modernization matures. Secretary Laird claims that total U.S. net savings resulting from the differences in cost of security assistance and U.S. troop withdrawal and deactivation could amount to about \$450 million over a five-year period. Not only is this "good economy," but "a long stride in the direction of a key goal of the Nixon Doctrine--that of greater sharing of the defense burden with our allies."²

¹ A central argument of the Nixon Doctrine is that security assistance will enable the United States to withdraw troops and reduce the probability that American forces will engage in combat abroad: "An effective security assistance program will lessen the need for and the likelihood of the engagement of American forces in future local conflicts." See Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1971, p. 184.

² DOD Report FY 1972, p. 109

b. A Reduced Role for General Purpose Forces

In keeping with this policy of increasing U.S. aid and decreasing U.S. troop levels, the worldwide role of U.S. general purpose forces has been sharply reduced. Previously, the policy had been to maintain general purpose forces supposedly sufficient to fight a major war in both Europe and Asia and to cope with a lesser conflict elsewhere. Current doctrine has substituted the one-and-a-half war concept for the two-and-a-half. But a reduced role does not necessarily indicate "pro-rated" U.S. troop withdrawals from both Europe and Asia. In fact, current force reductions have all been in Asia. As Secretary Laird reported in March, 1971, the United States in the two prior years had reduced or planned to reduce American military strength in Asia by 325,000 men. This figure includes not only troops withdrawn from Vietnam, but reductions in Japan, Okinawa, Thailand, the Philippines, and Korea. Mr. Laird assured the Congress that "U.S. military presence in this [Asian] area is going down, not up. It is being replaced by improved capabilities of nations in this area, both through their own efforts and through the assistance which we are providing them."¹

The Administration has also stepped up its campaign to get Japan to undertake a share of the burden that America is relinquishing. But whether Secretary Laird has been able to persuade Japan to undertake a much greater role in the defense of the region is debatable; preliminary evidence is inconclusive. All the Secretary could report was that the "Japanese have announced plans for continuing qualitative improvements in their self-defense forces, thereby enabling them to provide for substantially all of their conventional defense requirements."² This seems to be a rather limited contribution from the world's third largest economy. Thus the new one-and-a-half war strategy, while theoretically meaning that the United States and its allies could resist an attack by either the USSR in Europe or China in Asia, actually indicates a security strategy that gives priority to Europe.

¹ Ibid., p. 108

² Ibid., p. 109

That America is in fact reducing its presence in Asia but remaining in Europe is further validated by the Nixon Government's resistance to the proposal by Senator Mansfield to sharply reduce American force levels in Europe. At the risk of oversimplification, it may be said that Europe will get American troops, Asia will get American dollars.

This is not to say that the Administration is not attempting in Europe also to get allied governments to pick up additional defense costs. Secretary of the Treasury Connally minced no words on this subject in his London talk of September 15, 1971:

...we again think we have a right to ask that there be a greater sharing of the defense burden among the nations of the world who can afford to do so. Now it is significant that 36 percent of the total United States budget is in the defense area and I submit to you that there's not any industrialized nation in the world that is even close to it.¹

c. Security Assistance and the Achievement of Security

It is not certain, although the Administration's policy assumes that it is so, that increased security assistance can substantially improve the military capabilities of the recipient nations, for there will be a diminishing rate of return for dollars spent. While it would be practically impossible to locate the asymptote, no easy assumptions about additional increments of security which additional increments of military aid can produce should be made.

Even more dubious is the assumption that improved local military capabilities, if attained by countries such as Korea, can actually compensate for the departed U.S. troops. It is frequently asserted--and this is one of the principal arguments of the Nixon Administration for increasing military aid--that "...as long as Washington can support eight or ten foreign soldiers for the cost of one U.S. soldier, American taxpayers are getting a bargain...."² While this may be true in a purely combat sense, it is a fatal flaw to assume that the sole purpose, or perhaps even the principal reason, for having American troops in Europe,

¹ Washington Post, September 26, 1971

² Robert J. Wood, "Military Assistance and the Nixon Doctrine," Orbis (Spring, 1971), p. 273.

Korea, and elsewhere is the contribution Americans make to the combat capability of military forces opposing communist countries. On the contrary, the presence of an American division or two means that no invader can attack that country without killing substantial numbers of Americans. It is this fact--not pronouncements about the United States keeping its commitments--that makes U.S. intervention credible and hence deters attack. This is not to say it is wise to keep a large number of Americans overseas, but that the Administration has to accept the fact that there is no such easy solution as substituting military assistance for American soldiers.

5. Future Role of Military Aid Under the Nixon Doctrine

The Nixon Doctrine is not one document but a series of policy pronouncements beginning with the famous Guam statement of 1969 and continuing to the present. These pronouncements were written by multiple authors and meant for multiple audiences and the particular objectives stressed naturally varied with the particular situation. And as the President himself stated, "We recognize that the Doctrine...is not a detailed design. In this case ambiguity is increased since it...involves other countries."¹ Because of these factors, it is to be expected that the Nixon Doctrine can at best provide policy parameters, not a specific guide to action in every case. The surprising aspect of the Nixon Doctrine is that it is as precise as it is, not that it contains some ambiguities and intellectual inconsistencies.

With regard to the future of the international security assistance program, some of the Doctrine's directions are easy to follow. It does not suggest an absolute decrease in the security forces of the non-communist world but instead the decrease in U.S. efforts is to be accompanied both by intensive efforts to use international security assistance to upgrade the forces of aid recipients and an expectation that allied--both aided and developed--countries assume a greater share of the large defense burden the Nixon Administration thinks it is necessary to maintain. This assumption is being challenged by Japan and by

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1971, p. 20

the European countries by their behavior if not by their statements. Both an absolute and relative decline in the security positions of the non-communist Asian states appears imminent. To date these developments have not affected the security of Europe since all troop reductions have so far been made in Asia. High levels of security assistance, if maintained, may slow but not arrest the decline of American power in the Pacific.

Whether high levels of security assistance can long be sustained by the Administration is debatable. It would appear likely, given the mood of the country and the resistance in Congress to such enormous security assistance, now exceeding four billion dollars annually, that sharp reductions may have to occur soon. This is especially true with regard to Vietnam, and Asia generally, for three reasons. First, when all the troops are finally out of Vietnam and Korea, it will no longer be necessary to placate them with large-scale aid for "agreeing" to the American departure. Second, large scale aid results from commitments which are reinforced by American participation in their defense forces. When participation declines, belief in the commitments will decline and aid will diminish. Finally, there does not seem to be a consensus--in the United States or abroad--that it is necessary to maintain the present high levels of military forces currently opposing the communist countries. On the contrary, there seems to be a growing belief that some reductions in non-communist military forces are not only feasible but desirable. This trend of opinion will cause increasing pressure to be brought for a reduction in both the U.S. military budget and in the international security assistance program.

The Nixon Administration has justified its troop withdrawals in Vietnam partly on the basis that Vietnamization is succeeding. And as the United States moves to normalize relations with China, a further justification to remove troops from Asia could be made. But this creates a paradox: if an important justification for reducing troops is the diminishing threat of China, it could then be difficult to justify billions in aid which in turn permits the removal of troops.

Analysis of the Doctrine also reveals another dilemma. On the one hand, it promises a more pragmatic, "non-ideological approach to U.S. security. On the other, it promises to live up to past commitments. So far the battle has been won by past commitments. It would be hard to imagine a self-interest policy that would put 95 percent of the total of security assistance in this particular ten of the world's 130-odd nations. The cruel dilemma is this: the countries which can most affect U.S. security do not need U.S. aid; the fate of the aided countries, with but few exceptions, can only marginally affect U.S. security.

The way out of this situation may be to define U.S. security broadly to include such things as "influence," "access," and the fostering of "friendly" relations. Thus, paradoxically, it will be necessary to restore the ideological element and ask what kind of world America wants to see in the year 2000, not what will affect U.S. security narrowly defined. It will then be possible to develop a rational resource allocation model to determine the recipients, amounts, kinds, and mixes with other aid and efforts for the international security assistance program. Present commitments should be an input, but only one factor, in determining aid allocations.

In both 1971 and 1972 the Congress reduced considerably the funds requested for international security assistance. It would appear, given this action, that the long-range continuance of the program at anything like the four billion dollar level is not probable. Congress, and especially the Senate, has too many grave misgivings over too many features of military assistance, especially the service-funded support going to South Vietnam. Increasingly, doubt is cast on the value of providing security assistance to Third World countries on the grounds, whether true or not, that it serves primarily to prop up unpopular regimes whose alliance with the U.S. contributes weakness rather than strength to American foreign policy. These arguments, previously advanced only by a small minority in Congress, are now being accepted

by many former supporters of the aid program, especially in the Democratic Party.¹

Such ideas are directly counter to the central role accorded military aid in implementing the Nixon Doctrine. Thus it is to be expected that 1972 will witness an intensifying of the battle between the Nixon Administration and many liberal Democratic senators over international security assistance policies. Hopefully, out of this clash will emerge some consensus which will permit a rationalized and selective aid program, at a much lower level of funding, to be a viable instrument of American foreign policy in the changed political climate of the 1970s.

¹ Interestingly enough, however, at the same time that belief in the utility of military aid for security, political and economic purposes is declining in the U.S., it appears to be rising in the USSR. In 1970, for example, the Soviets made new military aid commitments to Third World countries totaling \$800 million, the largest amount since 1964. See U.S. Department of State, Communist Governments and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1970, RECS-15 (Washington, D.C.: September 22, 1971), p. 16. For a discussion of Soviet-American military aid competition in the less developed countries, see Stephen P. Gibert, "Soviet-American Military Aid Competition in the Third World," Orbis (Winter, 1970), pp. 1117-1137.

D. THE ROLE OF U.S. OVERSEAS BASES UNDER THE NIXON DOCTRINE

1. Introduction

An overseas base structure supported by essential operating rights such as staging and overflights continues to be important to our ability to carry out our foreign obligations and support the foreign policy and security interests of the United States. It is, however, our desire to maintain such bases only where they are necessary for such purposes and to seek to eliminate those which are no longer needed. Since January 1969 the United States has closed several military installations abroad and has significantly reduced 61 others.¹

Implicit in the adoption of lowered profile by the United States is a shrinking of the U.S. overseas base structure. The question then is not whether we shall have fewer bases, but rather what shall be the form and scope of the residual base structure necessary to support the Nixon Doctrine foreign policy.

As Secretary of State William P. Rogers observed in a foreign policy speech at the end of the first year of the Nixon Administration, the Nixon Doctrine "is a mix of continuity and change."² This observation is particularly apt with respect to the subject of overseas bases. A high degree of continuity necessarily will be associated with the evolving U.S. base structure, because every major base we now have is a fixed, sizeable, expensive installation, whose existence is covered by treaty or other international agreement, and which is now in use by U.S.--and in many cases, allied--forces. Given today's international political climate, there is a reduced likelihood that the United States will be granted rights for establishing a new base in a country where none has existed, however logical an objective review of overseas base requirements might so indicate. In the practical world, then, we shall be constrained to holding on to as many of our existing bases as national policy requires and as

¹ United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970, A Report of the Secretary of State, Department of State, op. cit., p. 169.

² Remarks delivered before the Editors and Broadcasters Conference, Department of State, June 15, 1970. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 1.

relations with host countries permit. Change, as the other implication of the Nixon Doctrine, will take the forms of modification of base facilities and functions, consolidation of two or more bases into one, the probable closing of some, and perhaps modifications of base jurisdiction. The opening of a new base should not be ruled out, especially if the need is urgent and apparent to the United States and the host country, but, as noted above, the military planner should recognize that the prospect for this contingency is not bright.

2. Background

Prior to World War II, the United States had what now seems a weak and inadequate base structure, given the inevitable great power status which the United States was to acquire in the twentieth century. The few overseas bases which the United States had acquired by the early years of this century seem to have come into our hands more by accident than design. The series of events associated with the Spanish American War marked the beginning of America's overseas territorial expansion, and provided the nation with potential overseas base sites in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii, Wake, and American Samoa. (Alaska and Midway Island had been acquired in 1867). By 1903, when the United States acquired rights to perpetuity over a 10-mile-wide zone across the Isthmus of Panama, the territorial holdings had been acquired for what could have been an adequate basic overseas base structure. Yet America neither exploited its opportunities to the full in these territories nor took advantage of later opportunities after World War I to acquire additional strategically valuable islands in the Pacific.

The United States contented itself with no more than modest base facilities--generally unfortified for protection against seizure--in the acquired territories. The air age not yet having arrived, the early bases were mainly thought of as coaling stations for the fleet. One interesting exception--though apparently not conceived in advance as "contingency planning"--was the stationing of troops in the Philippines. Twenty-five hundred of these soldiers, who were in the Philippines to consolidate its capture, were sent as the American contribution to the international force which rescued the foreign legations in Peking in 1899 from attack by the

Chinese "Boxers"--an early example of the value of prepositioning of forces.

During World War II, a vast complex of U.S. and allied bases came into being to aid in the prosecution of the distant campaigns to defeat our European and Asian enemies. American ingenuity excelled in the creating of airfields and port facilities in times which would have seemed unbelievably short before the war. Because the United States was mobilized for a full--and popularly supported--war effort, manpower and dollar constraints did not act as serious policy constraints; the general approach was that whatever was needed was made available to the maximum degree that the country could provide it. Time was of the essence, in that the base facilities were built as rapidly as possible, so that the war campaigns could move forward, but nevertheless whatever time was needed was taken. The enemy was still there, and some delay in providing the facilities for carrying on war was frustrating, but did not much affect the eventual outcome. These conditions--almost unlimited resources, and time to apply them--are not likely to obtain in a future war. The forces and facilities to be utilized in future conflicts--from limited intervention to general war--will have in the main to be ready at the time the decision is made to use them. The main network of bases will need to exist before a contingency plan is implemented. Additional temporary bases will have their utility, but they must be capable of rapid construction, with readily transportable equipment. Forces in reserve must be ready forces, rapidly deployable. Money and manpower will be limited. In an age where deterrence is the objective--against all levels of conflict--the former reliance on the latent mobilization capability of a great industrial nation or group of nations is insufficient.

The necessity for having bases in being was temporarily downgraded at the close of World War II. In the wave of demobilization which swept away the military force built up during the war, many bases were closed. Ground and air support bases were kept for the occupation of Germany and Japan, and most of the naval bases were retained, at least in a reduced operating status. However, this downward trend was reversed in 1949 in Europe, upon the creation of NATO, and in the Pacific in 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War. The creation of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in 1946 led to the need for establishment of overseas bases. They began to be

built in the early 1950s to enable the bombers to reach targets in the Soviet Union, and for location of early warning radars. Additional ground forces were deployed to Europe, and at the close of the Korean War, substantial ground forces remained in the Far East. From that period to the mid-1960s, the trend in overseas bases was upward. At that point, however, the problem of the balance of payments deficit began to turn the trend downward again (except for the new bases being established in Southeast Asia). As the Vietnam War winds down, the trend continues downward, and the eventual level to be set by the Nixon Doctrine requirements is not yet clear.

3. Functions of Overseas Bases

Functionally overseas military bases may be described in two ways: the first is the identification of the basic justification for having overseas bases, and the second is the breakdown by types of military operations carried out at or from individual bases. The second category can be subdivided into a rather long list of functions, by military service, and by the separate roles performed by each service. These functional subdivisions tend to overlap; in this discussion the emphasis will be primarily on major bases; i.e., those which are most closely linked to foreign policy and defense postures.

a. General Functions

There are two basic reasons for having overseas bases: (1) to provide facilities for the support of military forces and military operations near the anticipated scene of force employment; and (2) to constitute a U.S. military presence, with forces in being, at locations which serve national policy. Nearly every base embodies both these general functions, but one is usually discernible as primary. The first function--provision of operational facilities--is usually primary for air and naval bases; for ground force bases, the second function--presence of a visible ready force--is normally most important.

This distinction as to primary purpose between air and naval bases on the one hand, and ground force bases on the other, is further sharpened by political considerations. The latter--ground force bases--are usually not a political problem. The real political question is whether or not troops

are to be stationed in a foreign country. If they are there to defend that country; e.g., as in Germany and Korea, as a part of the overall defense of U.S. national interests, the question of establishing the necessary base support facilities (including air and naval, as well as ground force support) will already have been politically solved, in that such facilities are obviously necessary for the extended presence of the troops. Naval and air bases, on the other hand, are not necessarily there primarily to defend the country in which they are located, and are therefore more vulnerable to adverse local political pressures. Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya was not there primarily to defend Libya, but to provide training facilities for U.S. air forces in Europe, and the base was therefore vulnerable to closure when a regime unfriendly to U.S. interests took over. Even where a base is located in a country with which we have a mutual defense treaty, as for example the naval base at Subic Bay in the Philippines, it is somewhat vulnerable politically, because it has other uses than the defense of the host country. U.S. Air Force bases in Japan similarly have roles other than the protection of Japan, a fact that gives rise to internal political conflict. In April 1969, after a U.S. reconnaissance plane based at Atsugi was shot down off North Korea, the Japanese Socialists, who have consistently opposed retention of U.S. bases in Japan, stated, "It has become clearer than ever through this incident that the U.S. intends to make its bases in Japan the nucleus of its entire Far Eastern strategy."¹ Thus air and naval bases especially, in fulfilling their primary function of providing U.S. operational facilities in an area, are politically vulnerable. It should also be noted that this problem can arise with respect to ground force bases. Such a problem can particularly develop where the forces are present not for defense of the host country, but for contingency deployment to other places. The opposition of the Okinawans to Army and Marine forces on that island illustrate this point.

One might conclude, therefore, that bases having the highest probability of successful retention are those whose primary function is the provision of a U.S. military presence--especially when that presence is in defense of the host country. Bases whose primary function is to provide operational facilities--exclusively or primarily for U.S. forces--will be more difficult to retain, even when located on the soil of an ally. This analysis can be

¹ Washington Post, April 17, 1969, p. A9.

taken one step further, the presence of ground forces appears to make the critical difference in the U.S.-host country relationship regarding bases. Ships and planes come and go; ground forces are a visible and sustained evidence of U.S. will to resist aggression. This consideration will become of particular importance as the Nixon Doctrine is implemented in the Asian theater; if there are no sizeable units of ground forces deployed in Asian countries, the retention of U.S. bases in that area will become politically more difficult.

b. Base Functions by Type

The kinds of functions performed at overseas bases can be differentiated according to the terms descriptive of the branches of the military services; i.e., land, sea and air. These terms, however, do not imply that functional types correspond with the service branches. Further, other functional terms; e.g., communications, must be used to describe differences among bases.

- Air. Air bases are utilized by all the military services, but functionally all air bases are similar, being facilities for the operation and support of aircraft. Naval air bases are normally placed at or near naval bases, to facilitate the support of carriers and their air groups. This is not a universal rule, however, for such functions as ASW and reconnaissance require locations oriented to the target areas rather than to bases for ships. U.S. Air Force bases have for the most part been specialized as to the type of operation--SAC, TAC, MAC, etc.--but insofar as the characteristics of the base itself are concerned, there has been, and should be, more interchangeability of operational types. With an austere national defense budget the most likely probability in the future, serious consideration should be given to consolidation of bases. There should be no overriding reason why aircraft of all four services--Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps--cannot operate from one base, if the necessary support facilities are provided.
Global mobility will be a requirement under any of the alternative strategies which may be chosen to implement the Nixon Doctrine. Such a need indicates that there should be a minimum network of air bases appropriately spaced, to enable the rapid

deployment of aircraft and troops to scenes of contingency operations. Because overflight rights will be uncertain in the future, the routes for deployment over water should be planned for. Even with the availability of the long-legged C5A transport, staging points in the Eastern Atlantic and Western Pacific should be retained, e.g., bases in the United Kingdom for the route to North and Central Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. For the routes to Asia, staging points in U.S. territory in Alaska, Hawaii and Guam, plus Japan (and/or Okinawa) and the Philippines would constitute a minimum network. Clark Field will be of special value for air access to the Indian Ocean area. These key staging points will have functions other than the deployment of troops and equipment in contingency situations. Their functions include the staging of combat aircraft, bases for SAC tanker aircraft, recovery bases for SAC aircraft, reconnaissance and ASW bases, and support of air routes used by the Navy in rotating Polaris/Poseidon crews.

It is obviously not feasible to have air bases in all the places where a future contingency may require tactical airpower. Yet when the requirement arises, the capability must be quickly available, or the great advantage of timely response will be lost. A concept to bridge the gap between these two considerations is the U.S. Air Force's bare base mobility project. Under this concept, now coming into being, any of the hundreds of existing airfields around the world can within about three days be transformed into an operating military air base, capable of supporting strike operations (or other types of mission, such as troop transport, logistic support or reconnaissance). Pre-packaged units designed for the shelter of personnel and the operational support of aircraft can be transported entirely by air, and set up by the personnel who will use them. Plans provide for selective loading, so that only those facilities will be taken which are missing at the airfield chosen. Even aircraft fuel can be flown in, to be stored in portable containers, although it would be

desirable that fuel be already available locally, or transportable by sea if sustained operations are in prospect.

Two distinct advantages are inherent in the bare base concept: the base need not be in operation until it is needed; and, when no longer required, the equipment can be removed for future use at another location. Savings of money and personnel and avoidance of touching political sensitivities are thus possible. The bare base sets remain in CONUS until needed. Specific air units are pre-designated for bare-base deployment, and training for this kind of contingency operation is conducted as a readiness measure. The concept has been conceived and designed for U.S. Air Force operations, but it has possibilities for adaptation to the needs of the other services. The personnel support facilities, for example, would have universal utility, being suitable for ranges of climate from minus 25° F to plus 125° F. Support units could, with some modification, be adapted to the equipment of the other services. Although designed for air transport (in a C-130 or larger aircraft), deployment by ship is also possible. Overall, the concept meets the "low profile" posture of the Nixon Doctrine foreign policy and defense posture guidelines.

- Naval. In the age of sail the range of ships was unlimited. A ship's endurance at sea was constrained only by the need for food and water--and in the case of ships of war, the resupply of ammunition. The advent of steam was a mixed blessing. Propulsion was no longer subject to the whims of weather, but two new problems arose: the reliability of the engines and their need for fuel. Thus it was, in the early days of steam propulsion, that the ships retained their sails. For a fleet to deploy to distant waters, coaling stations (and sources of food, water and repairs) became a necessity, preferably under the control of the parent nation, that its availability might be insured. Hawaii, Midway, Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and Guantanamo Bay in Cuba were originally thought of in these terms. The dependence of ships upon way-stations continued to the eve of World War II, when the U.S. Navy developed underway replenishment

techniques, a capability that was indispensable to the effective use of the fleet during that war. Underway replenishment makes it at least possible to deploy naval forces without the use of any overseas base. The advent of nuclear power further enhanced sustained mobility, although nuclear powered ships still require at-sea replenishment of ammunition, food and other consumable stores, and in the case of carriers, aviation fuel. As a basic factor, therefore, overseas naval bases cannot be considered an absolute requirement; their justification must be regarded as a tradeoff between operational and political advantage on the one hand and their costs (fiscal and political) on the other.

Functionally, a naval base provides, in the area where operations are anticipated, for the repair and replenishment of ships, and services for the health and welfare of shipboard personnel (medical care beyond on-board capabilities, recreation, training, etc.). Where naval air facilities are co-located, as is normal, shipboard aircraft can be serviced and ASW, reconnaissance, and other specialized air missions can be conducted from the advanced location. An airfield is important for the airlift of critical fleet items. Electronic detection and communications facilities can be provided and the base can serve as an area command center.

Two methods, or a combination of both, are available to provide for many of these support functions. They may be all shore-based (repair shops, warehouses, fuel tanks, magazines, radios, radars, dry docks, etc.) Or they may be afloat, in the form of tenders, repair ships fuel tankers or barges, ammunition ships, stores ships, communication and electronic ships, hospital ships, floating dry docks, etc. Most overseas bases utilize both methods. The obvious advantage of the afloat method is that it may be rather quickly brought into being--all that is needed is a suitable anchorage--and as quickly removed. The shore-based facilities will normally have the advantage of a greater variety and greater degree of sophistication of maintenance facilities, especially with respect to aircraft. Further, the shore base provides an important morale factor in recreation facilities (especially if there is a nearby city) and in providing quarters for dependents.

The Sixth and Seventh Fleets illustrate the choices available regarding the method of sustaining deployment. The Sixth Fleet is in the main supported by forces afloat; i.e., underway replenishment ships and by tenders in Mediterranean ports, although there are shore-base naval air facilities. Some use has been made of foreign shipyards, such as at Malta. Yet it can be said that the Sixth Fleet is based on the U.S. East Coast. The Seventh Fleet, on the other hand, has for many years placed a considerable reliance on Far East naval bases, especially Yokosuka and Subic Bay, and their associated naval air bases. Without these facilities, these problems of logistic support of sustained operations off the Asian land wars would be greatly magnified. The long distances across the Pacific make it a practical matter to utilize overseas bases.

- Ground Force Bases. Ground forces positioned in a foreign country require substantial support facilities. Barracks and mess halls, equipment maintenance and storage facilities, ammunition and fuel storages, hospitals, post exchanges, quarters and schools (if dependents are present), training areas, communications-electronics facilities, and certain other specialized facilities, depending upon the type of forces present, are basic requirements. Nearby air facilities for airlift of replacement personnel, or of entire units, and for receipt of critical materials, is essential. Access to sealift is also important.

Training areas are especially important, whether the forces are present for defense of the local country or for deployment to another location where they may be required for a preemptive occupation or for combat. For either mission, combat efficiency must be sustained through frequent training. For realistic training, combat units overseas should be kept at full strength, and fully equipped and the tendency towards imbalances of support personnel over combat personnel kept in check. The function that is most vital--and most difficult--at an overseas ground force base when troops

are deployed but not actually fighting is to sustain a sense of mission and a high state of readiness. If the ground-base functions can include the role of training of allied forces, or if U.S. combat units; e.g., an entire brigade, can be occasionally deployed to another location, morale and effectiveness may be enhanced. This would seem particularly applicable to the Asian area, when, after the Vietnam war is phased down, U.S. ground forces will probably be in far fewer Asian locations and in smaller numbers. The exercise deployment of a U.S. unit from Korea to Thailand or the Philippines, for example, could serve the dual purpose of maintaining readiness, and demonstrating U.S. will to respond, if necessary, to a contingency situation.

Ground force logistic support is worthy of separate mention with respect to overseas base functions. Although many logistic functions, such as those listed above, are integral with a ground force base, the overall logistic support function involves a system of organization and installations which needs to be semi-permanent, keyed to the world-wide scope of contingency operations of ground forces (and other U.S. forces). Even though troop deployments may vary as to place and time, each major area should have at least a minimum network of logistic installations. Okinawa would seem to be a key logistic anchor to be kept in the Asian area, around which troop deployments could be varied as the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine requires, but supportable through such a principal focus of logistic capability. Germany, as an anchor at the other end of U.S. ground force deployment, would seem also vital as the location of a logistic support complex.

- Strategic Forces. The broad functional categories of overseas bases discussed above include the kinds of support required by strategic forces. Of the triad of U.S. strategic offensive forces, two components (ballistic missile submarines and strategic bombers) have overseas base requirements.
 - Polaris/Poseidon/ULMs. The Navy's ballistic missile submarine force can, if necessary, be supported entirely from

CONUS bases. However, there is an obvious operational advantage in making use of overseas basing sites to reduce the transit time to and from the missile launching positions in the waters surrounding the Euro-Asian land mass. Thus the harbors at Holy Lock, Rota, and Guam fulfill the important functions of allowing the practical maximum of target coverage. Statements in the public media have indicated that some one-half to two-thirds of the ballistic missile submarine force is at sea at a given time (the remainder being in port for exchange of crews or undergoing overhaul). Thus it increases the credibility of deterrence to reduce the times the at-sea submarines spend in reaching their stations.

A Polaris/Poseidon "base" is essentially a submarine tender moored in port. Returning from patrol, the submarines come alongside for exchange of crews, and for access to the tender upkeep and maintenance facilities. A nearby air-field is essential to fly the relief crews to and from CONUS, where their dependents reside, and to fly in critical spare parts. A dry dock (floating or fixed) is desirable for possible hull repairs. By having the essential submarine support facility afloat, security of classified equipment is enhanced, and the "base" can be shifted if necessary with minimum cost and political complications.

If and when the ICBM-range ULMS becomes a reality, the need for overseas basing should be reduced, if not eliminated, since the missiles could be fired from nearly any portion of the ocean, or even from a U.S. harbor. However, if the Navy moves toward the ULMS concept in two stages (ULMS-1 and ULMS-2)¹ the intermediate ULMS-1 will, because of its missile range of 4500-5000 miles, still benefit from overseas basing.

- Strategic Bombers. Like the submarines, strategic bombers could, if necessary, all be based in CONUS, utilizing air

¹ As reported in Armed Forces Journal, December 1971, p. 21.

refueling to carry out their strategic bombing missions. As a practical matter, and especially because the bombers have an additional conventional war role, the use of overseas bases is desirable. The B-52's have effectively used bases in Guam and Thailand for non-nuclear missions in SE Asia. Overseas air bases are essential, for maximum flexibility of strategic air operations, for SAC tanker staging, and for alternate landing bases for the bombers returning from targets. To describe these requirements in detail would encroach upon classified matters, but the obvious operational advantages of a network of overseas air facilities should be apparent without elaboration. Such a network of bases, however, need not be exclusively for SAC use; the tactical and airlift base sites can also fulfill SAC support roles.

- Communications-Electronics (C-E) Functions. As the instruments of war have become increasingly complex, so have also the requirements and the methods involving the flow of information. A great power, with a world-wide military capability, requires a world-wide communications-sensing-navigation complex. Overseas installations are therefore essential.

The present world-wide communications system is not the result of some master plan conceived years ago to provide for the most efficient overall capability for meeting national defense needs; the system is a product of evolution, of meeting the needs as they arose. Until the creation of the Defense Communications Agency in 1960, each military service met its own needs; in retrospect, it is surprising that so many years went by after the National Security Act of 1947 before a formal attempt was made to integrate and coordinate defense communications systems. Considerable progress has been made, but as the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel pointed out in 1970, there is yet room for improvement. DOD accepted one of the key Panel recommendations, to appoint an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications, to coordinate this vastly complex problem from top policy levels.

Communications-electronics in its broadest sense requires optimum integration if the President and all commanders down the line are to have the technical possibility to relay messages, requests, and decisions in time. From the standpoint of overseas base requirements, communications-electronics generates requirements which--after careful overall system planning and evaluation--must be met if a world-wide response capability is to be maintained. The basic network of overseas installations should be independent of all but major changes in the size and deployment pattern of U.S. armed forces; i.e., so long as it remains U.S. policy to be able to deploy forces wherever needed, there should be a world-wide capability in being to control them. Of the many major and minor C-E installations now in existence, decisions on their future status must be made in the light of careful consideration of the role of each in the total C-E family of systems. Such decisions will be primarily technical rather than politico-military. It is fortunate, however, that C-E as a category of overseas facilities is not nearly as politically sensitive as such activities as tactical airfields or submarine bases. Diego Garcia, the Navy communications base being built in the Indian Ocean, was easier to "sell" to the Congress, and less provocative in the international arena than it would have been had it been planned as an Indian Ocean "Pearl Harbor." Similarly, when the Navy and Air Force closed out their tactical operational activities in Morocco, the local government was content to allow communications and training facilities to remain. In terms of host country sensitivity, it should therefore be relatively easy for the United States to retain an adequate complex of C-E installations for the foreseeable future.

- Other Functions. A variety of additional functions are performed at overseas bases. Some are co-located at bases performing basic roles. Research and testing when performed overseas, are generally small-scale operations, which do not generate much attention, and are therefore not politically sensitive. If the projects are unclassified (or in some cases, even if classified) collaboration

with host country personnel will ease the base retention problem. Conversely, however, classified projects are subject to exploitation by local political opposition, if the latter see advantage in so doing. Space and missile tracking and testing activities can be relocated from untenable foreign locations to locations at sea or under U.S. control in most cases, although at some loss of geographic advantage.

4. Effect of Technology on Overseas Bases

The advance of technology cuts two ways as far as base requirements are concerned. In one direction, the extended ranges of new aircraft and of nuclear powered ships has the effect of reducing the number of bases that are needed to support routes of deployment. Similarly, increasing reliance on satellites for collecting information and for facilitating world-wide communications reduces the requirements for surveillance bases and sites for communications stations. In the other direction, space technology creates the need for tracking stations, to monitor our own and enemy space vehicles. Base requirements for the latter, however, are in the category of quite small and inconspicuous installations, making them less of a political problem than the retention and operation of bases supporting ships, aircraft and troops, if demonstration of a U.S. presence is no objective. Thus, technology can be said to have on the whole the net effect of reducing overseas base requirements.

5. Balance of Payment Considerations

There is no escaping the fact that the maintenance of U.S. overseas bases contributes to the serious adverse U.S. balance of payments problem. In the early 1960s, a concerted effort was made to reduce the outflow of U.S. dollars by closing some bases, reducing personnel at others, by curtailing offshore procurement, and by negotiating with countries (e.g., Germany) where U.S. forces were stationed for the purchase by the host country of U.S. military equipment to "offset" U.S. expenditures. The Vietnam war is, of course, a special problem in the outflow of U.S. resources, but for future planning it is to be hoped that with the phasing down of that war, Vietnam will become merely part of the overall problem of overseas military expenditures. Steps which can be taken in the future

to reduce the overseas base portion of the balance of payments problem would seem to be similar to those used in the past: closing bases that are not essential; austere base manning; making all purchases possible from U.S. sources; and seeking host country compensation for U.S. expenditures. To facilitate the latter step, joint tenancy of bases should be useful in inducing the host country to contribute to base costs. Joint tenancy has the potential for cutting the U.S. costs, by utilizing indigenous forces for such tasks as base security, thus reducing the U.S. manpower requirements. It is already common practice to utilize foreign manpower for many base functions--maintenance and repair, food service and other housekeeping chores--but in general these personnel have been paid with U.S. funds. If the host country can be induced to pay all the indigenous military and civilian personnel utilized on the joint base, and if in addition the host country can be convinced that the presence of the U.S. base is vital to its national security (and therefore a justifiable local defense budget item), the overall reduction in U.S. expenditures can be sizeable. Local spending by the U.S. military personnel and their dependents will continue to be a source of dollar outflow, but there is no practical way to solve this problem except by the method of offset purchases; unfortunately most of our less affluent allies (especially in Asia) would be hard put to meet this demand. Overall, then, some balance of payments deficit must be anticipated in the retention of overseas bases.

6. Political Considerations

The matter of the basing of military forces almost always involves political problems, whether the forces are overseas or on home territory. Even under the best of circumstances, i.e., the existence of a mutual security treaty with the host country, and a perception of need by the host country for the presence of U.S. forces for protection against aggression, the simple fact of the presence of "foreigners" is a potential irritant in relations with the host country. Even in some of the developed countries, the visible affluence of American military personnel and their families contrasts to some degree with the living standards of the local people; in the underdeveloped countries the contrast is much more marked. The paying of wages to local personnel for performing work is a delicate problem: if the "U.S. rate" were to be paid, it would upset the local

wage scale; if "local rate" is paid, as is normal, a potential issue of "discrimination", or "exploitation" is raised, sometimes seized upon by political dissidents within the host nation. This problem remains, and may even be accentuated, when joint basing of local and U.S. forces is implemented. In a broader political sense, joint basing tends to mitigate the stigma of "foreign bases", but one then has the situation of two sharply different standards of living (and perhaps also marked cultural differences) existing side by side. The pay of a local colonel may be only one-fifth that of his American counterpart. The situation can be further aggravated by the extension overseas of America's own racial problems. Friction between American whites and blacks affects local U.S.-host country relationships. Probably the remarkable fact of the juxtaposition of economic, cultural and social contrasts is that they have created so few problems, a credit to the serious efforts made by both the Americans and the local people to achieve a maximum of compatibility. Nevertheless, the contrast of cultures and economic status will remain if U.S. forces are to be based overseas, a problem that cannot be entirely eliminated, but can, with good will and intelligent effort on both sides, be kept under control.

The more difficult political problems of overseas basing are at a higher and broader level. The trend among the developing nations--where many U.S. bases are to be found--is towards increased national awareness and a desire for independence in all areas, including national security. This trend is not new; it was evident during most of the Cold War era, but the Nixon Doctrine has given it greater impetus. As Mr. Nixon stated in his foreign policy message in 1971, "New nations have found identity and self-confidence and are acting autonomously on the world stage. They are able to shoulder more responsibility for their own security and well-being."¹ One of the consequences of more autonomy is a greater restiveness about the presence of foreign forces. In a world of change, marked by fundamental shifts in the structure of the balance of power, the lesser powers want "to keep their options open" to avoid being involved in the confrontations between the major powers. The granting of base rights to a major power inhibits a nation's freedom of political action: therefore

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1971, p. 4.

if such a nation is to tolerate foreign bases, it must be because of other overriding considerations, primarily fear of aggression. Thus, South Korea's fear of North Korea and China causes her to seek retention of U.S. forces on her soil. Japan, seeking her new role as a major power, is ambivalent about U.S. bases: she has long sought a reduction in the U.S. presence, but at the same time wants to remain behind the U.S. "shield". Japan is uniquely sensitive about nuclear forces. Under the agreement for the return of Okinawa to Japanese control, a key U.S. concession was removal of nuclear weapons. The U.S. Navy, considering the homeporting of carrier task forces in Japan, must overcome Japanese apprehension about the possibility that the carriers store tactical nuclear weapons in their magazines.¹

For the United States itself the political problem regarding overseas bases is a mixture of domestic and foreign considerations. Most of our bases are related to treaties of mutual security, i.e., they are part of the U.S. "commitment". Although the Nixon Doctrine reiterates the point that the United States will honor its commitments, analysis of foreign and U.S. domestic perceptions of this statement of principle reveal that U.S. action to fulfill military commitments will be considerably more cautious of over-involvement in the future than in the past. Since the continued presence of U.S. bases per se is not generally a treaty requirement, it is possible for U.S. bases to be closed without violating the treaty. The Secretary of State stated in his 1971 foreign policy report that the United States is pursuing the "objective of consolidating and reducing the overseas structure where this can be done without damage to our national security interests."² Domestically, such an objective appears to be acceptable. Among allies and friends, it meets with mixed reactions; there seems to be a resigned acceptance of the prospect of U.S. departures, even among those who deplore a U.S. overseas reduction. Our adversaries obviously welcome such a trend. The closing of an overseas base, even though it may not technically modify a commitment, has political overtones that transcend the significance of the departure of U.S. forces. Troops, ships and planes

¹ New York Times, December 16, 1971, p. 9.

² United States Foreign Policy, 1969-70, A Report of the Secretary of State, op. cit., p. 169.

can be returned, but once a base is closed it will, in the international milieu now emerging, be politically difficult to re-establish. Its very closure carries at least the political implication that U.S. interests in that area are diminishing.

Where bases exist without treaty arrangements, as in Spain, there is increasing concern by Americans, especially as voiced by some members of the Congress, that U.S. commitments (through the creation of overseas bases) have been extended by unconstitutional methods. The Congress is also concerned about the "commitments" implied in various Executive Branch statements regarding countries where we have overseas bases. There undoubtedly is some degree of U.S. "commitment" involved where a U.S. base exists, even though its presence is not provided for by a formal treaty. But the manner of the establishment of the base is a matter of events past. What is important now, politically and militarily, is whether the base continues to be vital to U.S. security, and if so, what are the political and other costs of retaining it. Where a base exists by executive agreement, it would be possible to undertake the negotiation of a treaty to make it "legal" in the eyes of the Congress, but in the reality of practical foreign policy, such a step would seem poorly conceived and in any case, not likely to be taken up by the President.

There is a further domestic consideration involved in the question of basing of military forces. If overseas forces are returned to the CONUS, as is now being done to some degree (and according to some policy advocates should be increased), two hazards arise. First, inasmuch as it may cost somewhat more to support the forces at home than overseas (although there will be a balance of payments saving), the pressure on the defense budget may force the reduction of overall military strength. Thus, the concept of ready redeployment will be weakened. Second, there is a basic apprehension among Americans, going back to the days of the founding of the republic, about having a large standing army. The argument will inevitably arise, that since this large standing force is not being used, it ought to be reduced. The necessary sealift and airlift may also be allowed to erode in size and effectiveness. The tactic of using frequent exercise deployment to contingency points overseas will be politically sensitive, both to domestic and foreign considerations. Thus, it should be a key consideration when

making decisions on retention of overseas bases, and the retention of forces at those bases, that our overall defense posture can be degraded by returning forces to CONUS.

7. Future Role of Overseas Bases Under the Nixon Doctrine

The military planner must begin his consideration of overseas bases by recognizing a definite policy trend towards some reduction in the overall base structure. The President, reporting in his 1971 foreign policy message on the record of implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, noted that "world-wide we cut back the U.S. official presence, civilian and military, for a more efficient and less conspicuous approach."¹ Reduced overall strength of U.S. forces, and a more austere defense budget, have already necessitated the closing of some bases and reduction of activity of others. During the calendar year 1971, the number of U.S. military personnel overseas was cut by 220,000, the "sharpest one-year drop in 16 years".² Support for overseas bases is made more difficult by the changing character of the U.S. defense budget. Each year a greater proportion of the defense dollar goes to personnel costs; this means relatively less money for material expenditures, including overseas base costs.

Nevertheless, the matter of overseas bases remains a special problem, not simply and directly related to the reduction of U.S. forces overseas. In fact, it is a plausible hypothesis that if the Nixon Doctrine "challenge is not merely to reduce our presence, or redistribute our burden, or change our approach, but to do so in a way that does not call into question our very objectives,"³ the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from overseas locations reinforces the need to retain bases in advanced positions. If the United States is to implement the policy objective of maintaining "balanced and mobile ground, sea, and air forces capable of meeting challenges to our world-wide interests,"⁴ the retention of positions to which and through which such forces may rapidly be deployed would seem to be

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1971, p. 18.

² U.S. News & World Report, January 3, 1972, p. 18.

³ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1971, p. 15.

⁴ Ibid., p. 181.

essential. The credibility of our will to respond to threats to vital interests of the United States and friends and allies will be enhanced if military bases are in being in the areas where threats may arise. Not every base in the existing overseas base structure will necessarily be required to implement the Nixon Doctrine; the need for each base must be examined against the Nixon Doctrine posture implications for three general criteria: military, political, and economic. The last criterion should not be weighted beyond its due. If there are valid military and political justifications for a base, the economic considerations should pertain not so much as to whether the United States can afford an overseas base, but rather how the costs of operating it might be kept to a minimum. Monetary costs of bases, although not to be ignored, are relatively minor compared to the costs of major weapons systems, or the overall defense burden. The military and political criteria should be the major determinants.

a. Military Criteria

Although more than one military function will normally be fulfilled by a given base, it is useful as an analytic step in military planning to delineate the base functions required to support U.S. defense postures. Within the broad guidelines to be inferred from the Nixon Doctrine, two general defense postures are possible: on the one hand, heavy emphasis on a deployed disposition of U.S. forces, with mainly reserves constituting the CONUS portion; on the other hand, a CONUS-based emphasis, with the bulk of overseas forces deployed to Europe, and nearly all the remainder in CONUS. The overseas base implications of these two alternative postures do not vary greatly; even with most of the ready forces in CONUS, outposts in areas of contingency deployment are essential to the feasibility and the credibility of U.S. response to crises affecting U.S. vital interests. U.S. flexibility of response should be judged against the availability of the following functional facilities:

- Air. A network of staging and contingency-areas operating points should be retained; the gaps between bases, and the locations of advance bases should be measured against aircraft operating ranges. Strategic, tactical and logistic air functions should be considered

in ensuring that a base network with no mission-degrading gaps is available. Because future overflight rights will be uncertain, planning should stress use of routes over water.

- Naval. Although the highly developed underway replenishment techniques enable fleets to operate worldwide from CONUS bases, the practicalities of conservation of total ship requirements and operating costs are best secured by use of overseas bases. Homeporting of ships in areas of concern to U.S. interests and commitments save transit times otherwise necessary to and from CONUS. Carrier task forces based in Japan, for example, enable West Pac missions to be carried out with fewer total ships in the U.S. inventory. The Nixon Doctrine implies the requirement for naval deployment capabilities to all the oceans, including the hitherto relatively neglected Indian Ocean area. In examining the advance base requirements, a balance must be struck between the benefits of non-dependence on overseas bases (relying heavily on underway replenishment techniques, as in the Sixth Fleet) and the convenience and economies effected by availability of advanced support bases (as for example in Japan, the Philippines, and--potentially--Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean). Ballistic missile submarines can effect a greater overall on-station deterrent posture by utilizing advance submarine bases. Economic savings, and flexibility for changing bases, can be enhanced by substituting afloat support units (tenders, hospital ships, etc.) for some of the functions otherwise performed by shore facilities. Shore-based naval missions (ASW, reconnaissance, communications), although generally duplicable by sea-based units, are a normal and economical part of the overall naval capability.
- Ground forces. The Nixon Doctrine can be implemented with either an emphasis on CONUS-based ground forces, or on the other hand, with an emphasis on forces deployed in advance positions. It must be recognized, however, that the emphasis so far applied by the United States is weighted towards a reduced deployment in the Asian

area, and the maintenance of existing strengths in the European area. So far as base requirements are effected, however, the Asian area redeployment capabilities cannot be retained unless ground force logistic and other support facilities are maintained in that region. Okinawa is geographically suited to the deployment support of ground forces which contingencies may require in the West Pac area. Korea, whether ground forces are retained there or not, is an "anchor" of U.S. commitments and interests, and is therefore a logical extension of the Okinawa focal point. A similar "anchor" in Southeast Asia is consistent with maintenance of U.S. response capabilities; Thailand is probably the logical location for maintenance of contingency ground support functions. At the other end of the arc of U.S. ground force deployment capabilities is the complex of support facilities in Germany. These facilities (and a staging route through Spain) will be important to deployment capabilities into the Middle East.

- Other Military Functions. Besides the basic overseas base functions in support of direct operations of air, sea and ground forces, a variety of ancillary functions must be considered in assessing the total base requirements, including communications, navigation aids, space tracking, and research and testing operations.

Many of the functions discussed above can be combined on a single base. In these times of reduced availability of defense funds, the military planner must give increased attention to possibilities for consolidation of bases, combining usage by more than one U.S. service, and to joint base operations with foreign forces.

b. Political Criteria

Moreso than at any prior time since the post World War II era began, military forces serve political roles. As the world balance of power becomes more complex and therefore more confusing to the principal players, nations are groping for the answers to their security problems. Force planners, who must project their requirements several years into the future

because of the longer lead times necessitated by complex technologies, are having to re-examine assumptions about the roles of forces. What will be a proper mix of strategic, tactical nuclear, and conventional forces several years hence--when one's opponents, and their future military capabilities, are not fully identifiable--is to a considerable degree a conjecture. Assurance of availability of overseas bases several years ahead is likewise an uncertain quantity. One observable political trend is towards a lessening acceptability of foreign bases, even by one's allies and friends. The planner can make an orderly analysis, along the functional guidelines described above, of a basic set of military requirements for foreign bases. At that point, however, it behooves the planner to give serious consideration to the fact that existing base holdings may be in future political jeopardy, and that the acquisition of new bases as replacements has a generally low probability of success.

Politically, two approaches are available to minimize the future impact of the difficulties inherent in retaining overseas bases considered vital to an adequate defense posture. Both have already been applied to some degree, but careful and coordinated long range planning can enhance their effectiveness, and anticipate future developments which may otherwise arise as crises. First, the United States can, through unilateral analysis and by consultation with allies, take the initiative to close bases which are not essential to future needs, and which do not seriously degrade--by their closure--the relationship with friends and allies. Consolidation of base functions is one way to accomplish this objective. Done with prudence, the closure of bases no longer needed can be expected to give some political dividends, or at least reduce future political problems. Where politically feasible, it will be advantageous to negotiate future re-entry rights, and/or to retain contingency visit or overflight rights. Second, the United States can take the initiative to make a definite shift towards joint occupancy of a base with host country forces, or to the designation of the base as a host country base, with U.S. usage privileges. Both these steps will be at some cost to the freedom of U.S. base utilization, and perhaps at the cost of some loss in overall efficiency. In terms of dollars, since the host country will assume responsibility for many base functions, the U.S. will generally benefit. But the greatest gain will be political, in that the host country will have joint or virtually full sovereignty,

which should postpone the day when the U.S. might be under pressure to depart.

In summary, the "low profile" postulated by the Nixon Doctrine does not significantly reduce the longer term requirement for overseas bases. It does however, in the new international milieu in which it must be implemented, require an imaginative approach to the problem of how best to ensure the availability of such bases for the several years ahead when they will be needed.

V. DEFENSE PLANNING IMPLICATIONS OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE

We are still engaged in the essential job of redefining our role in the world. It must do justice to our capacity and obligation for leadership. It must also recognize our limitations. Above all, it must be based on a solid consensus of American public understanding and support.¹

In his third and most recent report to the Congress on U.S. foreign policy, from which the quote above is taken, the President referred to 1971 as "the watershed year". Changes in U.S. foreign policy of "historic scope and significance" were symbolized by the beginnings of new relationships with China and the Soviet Union, steps toward a "healthier and more sustainable relationship with our European allies and Japan," and the creation of a new monetary and trade environment. These were positive and promising achievements. But, overall, the President's message had a more restrained and cautious cast than the messages of previous years; in the President's words, the report was "presented with a very sober awareness of how great a task still lies before the nation."

The concurrent report of the Secretary of Defense expressed a similar realism:

Obviously we have not fully reached many of the goals we set for ourselves. But we have made substantial progress. This Defense Report is an accounting to the American people of that progress, of shortcomings and of the challenges and changes ahead.²

When the Nixon Doctrine was first promulgated, many observers saw it as a holding action; i.e., buying time until a world in transition could be better understood, and to discern what America's new role could and should be. That

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1972, p. 13.

² DOD Report FY 1973, p. 1.

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early judgment would seem to be confirmed by the President's comment that we "are still engaged in the essential job of redefining our role in the world." If this be the case, then the military planner is faced with a similar task, of redefining the role of the military, and reshaping the forces to carry out that role.

A. NEW POLICIES FOR A WORLD IN TRANSITION

Simply stated, new circumstances require new policies. This appears to be a fundamental approach of the Nixon Doctrine. There are roughly five major new circumstances that must be recognized and given consideration in redefining the role of military forces and shaping new forces to fit this role.

First, the nuclear equation has passed through an irreversible transition. The era of U.S. nuclear superiority has been replaced by approximate parity in U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, at least in overall strength. Concurrent with the Soviet achievement of nuclear parity has been an across-the-board enhancement of Soviet conventional military strength.

Second, while on the strategic level the world is still dominated by a bipolar confrontation between the U.S. and USSR, new power centers have developed. There are at least three new centers of power: Japan, the Peoples Republic of China, and Western Europe. They are dissimilar in strength, characteristics and potential roles, but their new status has created a multipolar world beneath the strategic level and altered the international milieu.

Third, the nations of the Third World are taking on increasingly more importance as the U.S. and USSR stabilize the strategic level between them, and competition increases in the Third World area. This area has been characterized by numerous conflicts and chronic instability. Moreover, nations of the Third World, taking advantage of the nuclear stalemate, are able to confront the greater powers on a basis out of proportion to their size. Such characteristics add risks to superpower involvements here. The likely continuance of various levels and kinds of conflict in this area coupled with the growing involvement of the United States and Soviet Union in the Third World is a disquieting reality. To offset this instability,

Third World nations need to achieve a new sense of self-reliance and independence. Their economic growth and progress toward these objectives has been significant, but it has not been universally satisfactory.

Fourth, domestic attitudes within the United States have changed with respect to America's role in the world. The American people seem to want the United States to take a lower profile in its foreign policy, and to want the military burden formerly carried mainly by the United States to be shared by allies and friends around the world.

Fifth, the role of technology is being redefined; i.e., a need is being perceived to bring technology under control. It has dominated too much the military structure of the force-to-force confrontation of the major powers. It has also, in a broader sense, by its unquestioned and unchecked advance, polluted the human environment. A vigorous technological research effort is essential to U.S. and Free World survival--and to bring the benefits of technology to the developing nations--but now there is a need to find the proper role for technology in the larger political-military-economic program for peace

B. THE CHANGING NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP

Although there is no longer bipolar domination of the international political environment, the two nuclear giants continue to dominate the strategic situation in the world. It seems unlikely that either side can expect to get so far ahead of the other in strategic weaponry that it could achieve a first strike capability. It may be possible, however, for one side to gain a politically usable margin of strategic nuclear superiority.

In the 1950s and 1960s, this bipolar nuclear confrontation was seen as a force-to-force contest, with each side trying to offset the weapons developments of the other. As the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew, the United States sought the most cost-effective counter to it. This narrow construction of the bipolar nuclear confrontation, in terms of weapons only, led

the United States to adopt the strategy of assured destruction. From the American point of view, if both sides accepted this doctrine, that is, mutual assured destruction, the existence of a naked capability to destroy each other's society could stabilize the confrontation. There is no evidence, however, to show that the Soviet Union accepted this strategy.

In fact, it seems that the USSR is pushing beyond the "parity" necessary to implement the MAD (mutual assured destruction) concept, even while the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) continue. Presently it still remains within U.S. capability and will to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a clear margin of superiority. If SALT cannot curb the Soviet strategic drive, President Nixon has said that "under no circumstances will I permit the further erosion of the strategic balance with the USSR. I am confident that the Congress shares these sentiments."¹ In pursuit of this policy the President recently authorized acceleration of the Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS), and moving ahead in the B-1 bomber program.

The Nixon Doctrine, moreover, apparently rejects the mutual assured destruction strategy because it does not provide the United States with the flexibility the President has called for in his statements. Instead, the Administration has sought to base its new nuclear military policy on strategic sufficiency. The main aim of this policy has been to provide a U.S. force posture with sufficient flexibility for a wide array of options. It seeks to create a credible deterrent against different levels of aggression. The United States can then move from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation.

C. A NEW CONCEPT FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE

Military force traditionally has been used not only to fight wars, but also to discourage enemy attack. This latter characteristic has been called deterrence. Implicit in this characteristic, however, has been the recognition that deterrence may fail, and if it does, there must be adequate

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1972, p. 160.

forces for defense. It is this requirement of adequate forces for defense that has been placed farther and farther in the background of U.S. strategy over the last twenty years. The Nixon Doctrine seeks to realign these two aspects of deterrence and resolve the dilemma of what to do if deterrence fails.

In pursuit of deterrence, the Administration has formulated a "National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence." What this concept seeks to create--as a partnership effort among the United States and other Free World nations--is a continuum of force for deterrence of armed conflict at all levels.¹ Beginning at the strategic nuclear level with the doctrine of strategic sufficiency, and extending downward through theater nuclear and conventional forces, a "Total Force" is conceived "to meet the requirements of Free World security."²

The first problem for the military planners in implementing this concept is to strengthen the concept of the coupling of strategic forces to the rest of the military capability spectrum. The President has said that our strategic forces must, besides being able to retaliate after a surprise attack, "also be capable of flexible application."³

The second problem confronting military planners is the implementation of the defense concept for strategic forces. The President does not desire to "be left with only one strategic course of action, particularly that of ordering mass destruction of enemy civilians and facilities."⁴ Thus the implication for the military planner is to design contingency plans for the use of strategic weapons in situations other than those calling for an all-out retaliatory countervalue strike.

D. SOME REGIONAL MILITARY PLANNING IMPLICATIONS

1. Europe

The European theater is the logical locale for applying the full nuclear-to-conventional Total Force concept. Intensive planning towards this general objective has been a specific concern of the Nixon Administration as the Total Force concept has evolved. Crucial to the success of Total Force

¹ DOD Report FY 1972, p. 1

² Ibid., p. 21.

³ The Emerging Structure of Peace, op. cit., p. 158.

⁴ Ibid.

planning in Europe are: (a) the maintenance of U.S. ground and air forces in Europe at approximately existing levels, at least for the near future; (b) continued presence of the Sixth Fleet (with some flexibility in composition) in the Mediterranean; (c) modernization of U.S. and NATO conventional forces; (d) the continued presence of and a technological updating of the tactical nuclear capability in NATO; and (e) the maintenance of a strong political-military-psychological link across the Atlantic to undergird the concept that the U.S. strategic force is an inseparable element of the Alliance defense posture. The bilateral strategic arms talks with the Soviets, and the possible future negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on European security and mutual balanced force reductions, do not alter the primacy and importance of the above key Total Force planning guidelines. The main objective of the European Total Force is deterrence. But this, however, cannot be realized without providing for a defense capability if deterrence fails.

2. The Pacific Basin

Implementation of the Total Force concept in other regions is more difficult. In Asia the Nixon Doctrine prescribes the continuation of a U.S. military presence. The anomaly is that this requirement must be met with fewer U.S. forces. Nor is there anything comparable to the highly structured NATO alliance in Asia for planning and executing a Total Force concept.

Looking at the Pacific Basin area reveals many uncertainties. Japan, a U.S. ally, is becoming a major power, but its future military role is ambiguous. Other Pacific Basin nations with whom the United States has mutual security treaties seem to be moving towards military self-reliance, but will for some time yet look to the United States as their hope in a crisis. Australia, a modern nation with modern forces, is an obvious exception, and should be able to bear a greater part of the future responsibility for security in Asia. Taiwan is a question mark. Moreover, this region is mainly in the Third World category, which is the most likely to face insurgencies or wars of national liberation. These local conflicts remain likely events to face U.S. decision-makers with the question of whether or not to act militarily. However, the Total Force concept will be the most difficult to implement in these

same localities. Given time and the good fortune of no early Third World crises, the Nixon Doctrine plan to enhance indigenous self-sufficiency for national security by a vigorous military/economic aid program, may succeed in laying the groundwork for future peace.

Meanwhile, the military planner must prepare for the contingency of U.S. military involvement in Asian crises affecting vital U.S. interests. A credible U.S. deterrent to aggression in Asia would seem to require the presence of some U.S. land, sea and air forces. As the U.S. withdraws forces from Asia, it is consistent with the Nixon Doctrine guidelines to retain selected anchors of U.S. military presence. Ground forces, at least in unit sizes large enough to constitute a "visible" combat capability and capable of organizational self-sufficiency, seem necessary for the credibility of a sustained U.S. deterrent in Asia. Ships and aircraft are also necessary to balance out the overall capabilities of the deployed forces, but because ships and aircraft can rapidly be withdrawn from forward areas, their presence alone does not connote as firm a U.S. intention to deal with local aggression as does the stationing of troops on local soil.

The facts of geography and the existence of facilities point to where these anchors should be. Okinawa is a logical focal point for the advance positioning of ground and air units. In such a place, military units are a visible manifestation of U.S. resolve to protect interests and honor American commitments, and they are rapidly deployable for timely response to contingency situations. Beyond such a pre-deployment position as Okinawa, there is an important psychological value for deterrence in having at least some U.S. ground forces on the mainland of Asia in Korea and Thailand. Korea especially would seem to fit this requirement. These advance units should be large enough to be visible, operating entities--perhaps of brigade strength as a minimum--and suitable to the local operational environment, e.g., in Thailand, probably airmobile, accompanied by the necessary firepower. The advance deployment of ground forces should be accompanied by air units for close air firepower support, interdiction, intercept, transport, as the terrain and type of conflict require. Advance air bases in Okinawa, Japan and

the Philippines--and in Korea and Thailand if ground units are stationed there--would be appropriate for logistic and operational support of U.S. aircraft.

Sea-based military power, including air strike units and amphibious and anti-submarine capabilities, are necessary to round out a credible U.S. presence in the area. At least one advance naval base, in Japan or the Philippines, or preferably both as long as they can be retained, would be necessary to facilitate sustained naval deployment in the area. It is theoretically possible, using underway replenishment techniques, to sustain deployments from bases in Hawaii and the West Coast, but with a reduced overall naval strength, it is operationally and economically advantageous to have advance naval bases.

All the deployment units in Asia and especially the ground forces, should be trained for the full scope of combat modes anticipated. Combat training should include the training mission, if the Total Force concept is to be successfully implemented. Because the Third World is the likely locale of insurgency and guerrilla warfare, U.S. units should give special attention to this mode of conflict. Units should include personnel with specialized knowledge of the people and their environments. This is a difficult planning problem, for it requires high command level concern, and organized effort all the way down through the command structure to create the kinds of specialization necessary. The traditional career pattern tends to run counter to this need; for a young officer to dedicate the time and effort necessary to become thoroughly knowledgeable of the geography and the history, culture, economy, language, etc., of Thailand, for example, may seem to him as inhibiting his chances for future promotion, as he competes with other officers with more traditional career patterns. Yet without better knowledge of the Third World milieu--a need for all the Services--the Nixon Doctrine Total Force concept will be difficult to implement.

3. The Middle East

The highly volatile situation in this area of the world presents the United States with special problems. The United States has vital interests here and is necessarily involved in a search for some regional

stability. On the other hand, Soviet influence in the area depends upon continued instability and tension. One of the most significant factors affecting stability in the Middle East is the balance of arms between the Arabs and the Israelis.

The President has made it known that the United States will not allow the Arab-Israeli arms balance to be upset. But while the Soviet Union has deployed large numbers of military combat personnel and military equipment and advisors to Egypt, the United States has exercised restraint, seeking to find an eventual solution or at least accommodation of the crisis through negotiations and not military confrontation. This approach is more consonant with the Nixon Doctrine.

This does not mean, however, that military power has no role in this situation. The Sixth Fleet and U.S. air power are visible reminders that military power is available, should the situation require it. Furthermore, the presence of U.S. military power in the area emphasizes the strategic importance the United States places on the area and acts as support in its efforts to maintain a balance between the Arabs and Israelis. If anything, it is a visible sign to the Soviet Union to proceed cautiously.

U.S. military power also has an important deterrent role. For example, the positioning of the Sixth Fleet to intervene if necessary during the Syrian invasion of Jordan in 1970 underscored U.S. opposition to the Syrian move. This action appears to have been a factor in easing that crisis.

Considering that Soviet influence in the Middle East depends heavily upon tension, it is probable that the best the United States can achieve for a long period will be to find some means of controlling the tension. Maintenance of the Sixth Fleet and U.S. air striking power in the Middle East seems to be a minimum requirement, especially in light of the policy of restraint in providing Israel with weapons to counter Soviet and Arab moves. In the long run, moreover, this military presence may assist in transforming the present time of confrontation to an "era of negotiations".

4. Other Regions

The military planning problems in the Pacific Basin and the Middle East are relevant, in a general way, to the other world regions, which are also part of the Third World. In the Indian Ocean and African regions, the Nixon Doctrine does not imply the need for sustained deployment of forces, but rather to deploy as necessary, where and when U.S. interests dictate. The reduced overall strength of U.S. forces generally precludes deployment to these other regions on anything but a temporary basis.

The Indian Ocean, an area where the Soviets--and the Chinese to a lesser degree--are establishing a presence, does not seem to have a high priority in the Nixon Doctrine guidelines. At best, it would seem that an occasional naval visit to this area to augment the small U.S. Navy presence in the Persian Gulf, will be all that is possible or contemplated. Joint activities with other allied nations, especially Australia, might contribute to maintaining a U.S. presence. Australia has offered the United States the use of her Indian Ocean naval base at Cockburn Sound. Joint U.S.-Australian operations should be carried out in implementation of the Total Force concept.

The necessity for unilateral U.S. deployment to, or intervention in, Sub-Saharan Africa is given a low priority by the Nixon Doctrine. Rather, intervention or assistance in a crisis by former metropoles, or multi-national action under the aegis of the UN, would be preferable remedies to exhaust before the United States would act. The Nixon Doctrine does indicate, however, intentions to continue the limited U.S. military assistance program, perhaps with the addition of carefully selected countries. Further, the sealanes around Arica, especially the important concentration of shipping around the Cape of Good Hope, are of concern to the United States. Although it is not politically feasible

nor at the moment necessary, to conduct joint operations with South Africa in defense of the Cape route, it is in the U.S. interest to ensure that a pro-West regime remains in control of the southern tip of Africa.

In Latin America, the Caribbean is a vital area because of the close proximity to CONUS, and because of the Soviet ties to Cuba and the use of Cuban ports for Soviet naval deployments to the Caribbean. It is important to continue U.S. naval deployments to the Caribbean, to safeguard the Canal Zone, and to maintain a quick-reaction land-sea-air force in CONUS for deployment to a crisis situation in that area. Joint international action, under the aegis of the OAS, would be preferable where possible, but the necessity for unilateral U.S. action remains a possibility. In the whole of Latin America, continuation of a military assistance program, with stress on enhancing internal security capabilities, is necessary for the success of the Nixon Doctrine.

E. TECHNOLOGY AND DETERRENCE

Research and development effort continues as a key factor in free world capabilities to deter a wide spectrum of conflict.¹

The search for peace through the Total Force concept involves greater emphasis on qualitative competition in arms. The Soviet Union continues to allocate increasing levels of effort and funds in its drive to surpass the United States in military technological development. The United States still has the edge, and has no choice but to devote the necessary effort to retain it. This means more money and a search for better management. Even if the number of U.S. forces remained the same, the necessity for maintaining technological superiority would still be critical but with reduced force levels as the reality, qualitative superiority becomes even more important.

¹ DOD Report FY 1973, p. 106

The requirement for exploiting military applications of technological advances extends across the entire force spectrum. Strategic forces are themselves the products of technological breakthroughs, and the possibility always exists that some new breakthrough by one side could seriously alter the strategic balance. Proceeding from the strategic end of the warfare spectrum, the forces need the most modern equipment available for coping rapidly and effectively with a variety of contingencies. If U.S. forces are to be smaller, they must be better. Providing the soldier with the best technological battlefield aids is a vital part of his being a better fighter.

A heavy responsibility will continue to be with the United States to win the technological race. This necessity for technological superiority seems to be a vital element of the Total Force concept.

The Nixon Doctrine also calls for a new level of partnership in the Free World. Allied and friendly nations have a strong base of technological potential. The potential already contributes significantly to the total Free World military capabilities. Collectively, U.S. allies spend about \$3 billion per year on research and development in non-strategic weapons. Cooperation in making the most of the combined U.S. and allied potential is thus a fundamental part of implementing the Total Force concept. Two vital benefits accrue from this: (1) the Free World forces gain access to a much wider spectrum of new and better military systems; and (2) the overall costs are less, because research and development costs are generally lower in the allied countries. The pressure to keep the U.S. defense budget down will make it a necessity for the United States to look increasingly to foreign-developed systems for U.S. adoption; e.g., the British Harrier vertical lift fighter being used by the Marine Corps, and the French Thompson-CSF Crotale surface-to-air missile, being tested by the U.S. Army.¹ Many combinations of

¹ Aviation Week & Space Technology, 20 March 1972, p. 22

effort in technological development are possible, including U.S. manufacture of foreign innovations, and vice versa. A healthy balance of cooperation and competition in weapons development can be useful to encourage innovation.

As discussed in Chapter IV of this study, an important part of the security assistance program will be to promote the development of research capabilities in the developing countries. These nations should learn how to analyze their own force requirements for their own special local situations. They will need U.S. and/or allied assistance, in funds and advice; the key will be to give the help without using too heavy a hand, lest local initiative not be given a chance to develop.

F. U.S. DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY PLANNING

1. Consensus and the Allocation of Resources for Defense

No defense posture or foreign policy can long endure without public support. "...national defense, in the last analysis, is the responsibility of all the American people."¹ There must be a national consensus of support for either a domestic or foreign policy to be credible and viable. President Johnson lost consensual support of his Vietnam War policy in his last year of office, a fact well perceived in Hanoi, thereby making it virtually impossible for him to exercise effective national leadership. President Nixon took office in an environment of dissent and began to construct a new foreign policy which took account of the erosion of domestic support for the earlier Cold War policy. He has also sought to build the foundation for a new consensus.

¹ DOD Report FY 1973, p. 17

At a recent symposium¹ on national strategy, attended by representatives of the academic and research communities and by senior government officials, the degree of domestic support for foreign policy was examined in depth. Within such a group one does not expect full agreement on where the state of American will is, nor why. Nevertheless, there was an acceptance of the general premise that we do not have an adequate coalescence of popular opinion to undergird our foreign and military policy. The symposium participants were realistic, but not necessarily pessimistic. The task of building a new base for support of foreign and military policy may be more difficult than in the past, but the means exist.

The President and his Administration, and the "so-called opinion molders," can do much to build a new consensus. In a time when people are daily bombarded by an overwhelming volume of information as well as opinion from the mass media, and with the advent of a generation of young people who, more than any previous generation, challenge the established national values and practices, the building of a new consensus will require positive, perceptive, and persistent leadership. U.S. foreign and military policy must be plausible and forthright, so as to be able to survive critical examination at home, including the buffeting of some rather severe dissent.

Necessarily, the search for a consensus requires a centrist strategy, a strategy that has an appeal to a large enough section of the populace so that it may enjoy at least a majority in the Senate.

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National Strategy in a Decade of Change, a Symposium Co-sponsored by the Stanford Research Institute and the Foreign Policy Research Institute, held at Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia, 17-20 February 1972.

The American leadership, meanwhile, will need to have persistence and flexibility if this search for a stable relationship between the "possible" at home and the "necessary" overseas is to be successful.

The question of consensus affects the military planner in both a general and a specific way. In a broad sense, the absence of perceived public support for national security measures will inhibit his making the most effective military plans and degrade the acceptance and implementation of plans when written. The President and his military advisors can thwart the national will by pursuing unpopular military plans, but it will not be long before the power of dissent and the controlling effect of the public purse will bring policy and opinion together again. Sophisticated judgment will always be required to distinguish between volatility of current opinion and the changing of longer term attitudes toward national and foreign policy.

Consensus, or lack of it, affects the planner in a much more specific way. It is ultimately a decision of the people as to what resources--money and manpower--are to be allocated to national defense. These are the planner's tools. Further, the planner must discern from the expressions and impressions of the national will with what vigor and for what purposes these resources may be applied.

As stated by the Secretary of Defense, the goals for the allocation of resources; i.e., money and manpower, for the Nixon Doctrine peacetime defense forces, are simple and specific:

--No more than 2.5 million volunteers in the active military forces, backed by a strengthened National Guard and Reserve;

--An allocation of no more than 7% of the Gross National Product.¹

The rationale for these goals is indicated in the President's statement that "...We must harmonize our essential strategic objectives, our general defense posture, and our foreign policy requirements with the resources available...In this Administration, we have been able, for the

1. DOD Report FY 1973, p. 4

first time in twenty years, to spend more on domestic social programs than on defense."¹ Now obviously this nation can allocate--as it has done for twenty years--more of its resources for national security than the amounts indicated above. It seems clear, then, that the Administration, in a realistic evaluation of the consensual support that is possible for its policies, has chosen these present goals deliberately. A conscious shift has been made in priorities, with domestic concerns getting the higher place. This is a definite shift from the "traditional" method of arriving at the size and cost of defense forces; i.e., beginning with requirements--based on the threat and U.S. objectives--and ending with a force structure and budget for presentation to the Congress. But in the search for consensus on the defense effort, the problem has been approached from the other side; i.e., beginning with resource allocations and ending with the optimum utilization of these resources to meet security needs.

2. Implications of the Volunteer Force Concept

The concept of the all-volunteer force is closely related to the need for a better public acceptance of the military in America. The use of the draft to meet manpower needs in the Vietnam War was the coup d'grace for general support of conscription. The draft itself is not yet dead, and it remains to be seen whether the target date of 1 July 1973 can be met for eliminating need for it. Nevertheless, for the military planner, the prospect is that he will be dealing with a force composition that is at least largely composed of volunteers. Overall, given the ceiling on military personnel as a constraint, a volunteer force makes the planning task easier. Motivation should be higher, unit stability should be greater, and training can receive a greater emphasis on the enhancement of professionalism, as the prior heavy demands for training of recruits eases off. A smaller, more career-oriented military can make better use of technology. This would call for an increase in the educational levels for the armed forces; i.e., setting higher standards for entrance and retention.

¹ Nixon, Foreign Policy Report 1972, pp. 154-155

In this age of deterrence the all-volunteer force represents a shift in the philosophy of the use of military force, with international as well as national implications. Some of the NATO nations already have adopted the all-volunteer concept, and as the United States moves toward the end of conscription, it can be expected that NATO nations still using the draft may well be inclined to follow suit. This trend probably means smaller active forces, especially ground forces, because it is the ground forces that have the greatest difficulty in maintaining force levels by volunteer recruitment.

This downward trend would by itself mean facing the prospect of inadequate conventional forces for NATO and other theaters. Because the enemy does not have the same problem of being able to raise only that level of military strength which public opinion will support, the balance of opposing forces could be expected to shift toward an advantage for the enemy side. One solution to this problem for the free societies is to give greater emphasis to the citizen army concept.

Moreover, the doctrine of deterrence of conflict carries with it the concept of rapid termination of a small conflict with quickly deployable and fully flexible forces to prevent its growing into a war that could escalate to increasingly dangerous levels. To meet this challenge, within the limited force levels probably supportable in free societies, a truly ready reserve will be needed, provided with equipment to fight which is comparable to that held by the smaller active forces. The military would be essentially one force, with little difference between the active and reserve force components except that the latter would act only when needed.

In America the key to success of the all-volunteer force will be its close integration with a "citizens army" in reserve. Military planning will be needed to provide for immediate use of reserve augmentation in response

to even the lower levels of contingency response. The presently operating system of introducing reserves--as combat units--into active force operations should be continued and expanded. This provides the "citizens army" component a sense of mission now often lacking.

The all-volunteer force, and the newly conceived reserve force, should be able to restore one of the key benefits of an earlier day; i.e., the identification of a man with his unit, by allowing him to remain with that unit for an extended time, perhaps for a period of years. The lower overall turnover rate in both active and reserve units should greatly reduce the need for frequent rotation from one unit to another to fill vacancies. Combat effectiveness, morale, and compatibility of a military career with home life would all be enhanced by preservation of identity with a particular organizational unit.

While the combat operations role is primary for military forces, there are secondary peacetime roles that may be important. If the military is to regain a sense of identity with the people--now so frequently decried as lost in the trauma of the Vietnam War experience--there are peacetime opportunities which can be exploited for making the military a visible and valuable part of the national life. "Civic action," so strongly touted in the 1960s as a vital step for making armies in under-developed countries acceptable to the populace, could have a relevance within the United States. The U.S. Army has already begun some well-received projects of community assistance, but there may be other areas of activity possible. The massive problem of restoring the environment from the damage done by all kinds of pollution opens up opportunities for the military--active and reserve--to make itself welcome and appreciated in the country. This will take imaginative planning, keeping in mind that combat readiness training takes precedence over any such secondary roles.¹

¹ See also the U.S. Navy's program, "Military-Civilian Technology Transfer and Cooperative Development," OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5700.13, 17 March 1972.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, a force of a small active military and a ready reserve, to be credible and effective must reflect the national will to defend the nation and insure its survival. To achieve this will require a high level of esprit and a sense of accomplishment within the military ranks, reinforced by the confidence and support of the populace. Some of the measures mentioned above, such as combining military activities with other social programs; e.g., environmental activities, will assist in this. However, the problem is one complicated by the shifts in cultural and social patterns, and will require an awareness on the part of the military planner over a long period of time, until these changes stabilize. More importantly, the confidence and support of the populace in the military will need to be earned and cannot be taken for granted.

G. NIXON DOCTRINE FORCE POSTURE IMPLICATIONS

The military posture of the Nixon Doctrine is fundamentally defensive. But the old military adage that the best defense is a good offense remains valid even in this more complicated nuclear age. It is, however, important to distinguish between capabilities and intentions. One can have good offensive capabilities and still pursue defensive intentions. The essence of the Nixon Doctrine defense posture seems to be for the United States to join with its allies and friends in the Free World in providing adequate military strength--including offensive capabilities--deter aggression.

Specifically, the Nixon Doctrine calls for a new and more comprehensive concept of deterrence, or as the Secretary of Defense characterizes it, Realistic Deterrence. Heretofore the full potential of Free World strength

has not been realized to make deterrence credible and effective. America's massive nuclear strength has not been credibly linked with the remainder of its military capabilities. The synergistic potential for deterrence of welding together the separate military assets of the Free World has not been realized. The Nixon Doctrine attempts to remedy both of these shortcomings.

In the earlier years of the nuclear era the primary war threat seemed to be at the upper end of the force spectrum; i.e., the threat of a surprise nuclear attack. Now that neither side has a first strike capability, surprise attack seems a much less likely probability. The nuclear confrontation has become more subtle, with both quantitative and qualitative aspects. The danger in the Soviet Union's gaining quantitative superiority is not so much in the threat of an attempted first strike as in the political leverage obtainable in a margin of superiority. If SALT cannot curb the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal, America will have to reinforce its own, to retain political as well as military credibility. The Nixon

Doctrine posture provides for meeting this contingency. The qualitative aspect is a technological problem, and potentially more serious than the quantitative problem. A breakthrough in technology can seriously alter the present approximate balance in nuclear strengths, by negating the threat of an entire strategic system; e.g., an ASW breakthrough could seriously degrade the role of ballistic missile submarines. Compatible with the Nixon Doctrine is the heavy stress on technological research and development.

However, given the preservation of the American determination to prevent the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the nuclear confrontation from getting out of hand, one comes back to the problem of what is the most realistic kind of threat with which the U.S. defense posture must cope. Balancing the nuclear equation keeps the threat of surprise nuclear attack relatively less probable than the threat of small wars which begin at a non-nuclear level. The danger in these small conflicts is in the possibility

that unless terminated they may escalate, even to the level of general nuclear war. The need is for a realistic deterrent to small wars.

The Nixon Doctrine defense posture is based upon the concept of the indivisibility of deterrence. It postulates, therefore, a balanced force structure of strategic and theater nuclear weapons and adequate U.S. and allied conventional force capabilities.¹ Strategic, theater, and conventional capabilities must be coupled so that the role of strategic weapons is not limited to mass destruction. U.S. and allied forces must be linked in an operational sense, and not merely added up on a balance sheet of Free World forces. The goal is deterrence of conflict at all levels, but a readiness to act if deterrence fails.

Such a readiness and deterrent posture implies the intention to deal with incipient or actual conflict situations promptly, weighing the options available for preventing or quickly terminating conflict. Where there is a threat to U.S. interests, and especially where potential confrontation between the United States and a major communist power is involved, termination of conflict before escalation occurs is consistent with the Nixon Doctrine deterrent posture.

To implement such a defense posture, forces should be designed for flexibility of action to terminate conflict rapidly, to reach negotiating thresholds where there are options other than escalating to all-out nuclear conflict. This is consistent with the Nixon Doctrine rejection of mutual assured destruction (MAD) concept, and would be moving instead towards a doctrine of mutual assured survival (MAS).

Requirements for war termination if deterrence were to fail, would be force options short of massive destruction, notably tactical nuclear force options based upon the most advanced technology available for effecting target precision and minimizing of collateral damage. These general principles, while they relate primarily to conflict in Europe, also have a relevance to the Asian and other theaters. In every case, the timely, flexible response of U.S. and allied forces has the objective of preventing or quickly terminating conflict.

¹ DOD Report FY 1973, p. 24

Because of the highly integrated nature of the Atlantic Alliance, the Nixon Doctrine has force posture implications for European as well as U.S. forces. The U.S. Secretary of Defense has identified Four Realities which must be taken into account in U.S. security planning: Strategic, Political, Fiscal and Manpower. These are realities inherent in the concept of democratic governments, and therefore they are of as much general relevance to most of the European allies as to the United States. What these realities add up to is the fact that neither in Europe nor in America can there be found in the years ahead a sustained public will to support military forces as large as have been supported over the past decade or two. Instead, there is both a movement toward, and a logic for, some form of the citizens army concept.

The citizens army will vary in form from country to country. The concept is most often thought of with respect to ground forces, but it embraces air and naval elements as well. Its most familiar form is on the model of such neutral nations as Sweden and Switzerland. But its significance lies in its relationship to the populace. Being by definition "of the people," the citizens army has a rapport with and the broadly based support of the population that is not possible for a separate, professional military arm to have--except perhaps during the prosecution of a "just" war. The citizens army enhances the cohesiveness of the nation, counteracting tendencies toward fragmentation arising from political or ethnic cleavages.

West Germany is already moving toward this kind of force concept, with their reorganization of the Army into regular and territorial units.¹ Their concept involves placing regular active forces on the eastern frontier, and providing for rear area security by rapidly mobilizable territorial forces. Continuous coordination and readiness are effected by periodic rotation of regular officers to territorial cadre units.

Implied for the force posture in Europe would be French-British nuclear cooperation and coordinated strategy, but not necessarily a completely integrated European nuclear force.

¹ "German Army Reorganization," Military Revue, January 1972, pp. 75-82

Similarly, U.S. forces in Europe would continue to have advanced conventional technology, with maximum ground/air mobility, organized for rapid integration into a variety of task units as the situation dictates. American maneuver units should be equipped with tactical nuclear weapons designed to minimize collateral damage and maximize flexibility for use. Tactical air capabilities would be integral with the overall posture; and naval forces would guard the flanks of NATO. Augmentation (reserve) forces in the United States, ready for rapid deployment to Europe, would be similarly configured, and not organized for a long conventional war with the Soviets. The objective is war termination by rapid response leading to viable negotiating options.

The Nixon Doctrine implications for the U.S. force posture in Asia also stress small unit, advanced technology, high mobility forces, but with greater emphasis on sea and air forces. Nevertheless, as described in Chapters III and IV of this study, key positioning of ground forces is essential to maintaining U.S. credibility for the security of the region. Configuration of the ground forces would be appropriate to the terrain and the threat; e.g., airmobile forces in Thailand. Prepositioned forces in Okinawa should be composed of a variety of force-type units, capable of rapid integration and deployment to a crisis spot. Although the Nixon Doctrine stresses initial reliance on indigenous ground force response to internal or external aggression, U.S. ground units must be ready to respond where U.S. interests and urgency of the situation require. Close coordination is required among U.S. land, sea, and air forces, as well as cooperation with indigenous forces. The doctrine of rapid conflict termination requires early response. A small force applied in a timely fashion may be much more effective than a large force deployed after the situation has gotten out of control of indigenous defenses.

Overseas bases remain essential in the Asian area for forward deployment. The trend seems to be towards joint basing rights, for political purposes, and to encourage U.S.-allied cooperation. Regional security groupings of Free World nations should be encouraged to enhance a regional sense of security responsibility and capability. Japan, as

the emerging strongest Free World power in Asia, can and should play a greater role in Asian security if the United States and the other major Free World powers can judiciously and cooperatively plan with Japan for her taking a security role commensurate with her emerging status as one of the principals in the new multipolar world balance of power.

The military planning implications of the Nixon Doctrine must be interpreted with the understanding that it was designed to cope with a time of transition as well as with the longer term. The new doctrine recognizes that today's security requirements are much more complex than they were in the early cold war era. The Total Force concept adds, moreover, a new dimension to the cooperation for security among the United States and its allies. Its successful implementation depends heavily on U.S. inter-actions with allies in a new partnership framework.

This changing U.S.-allied security posture has to cope with a formidable threat. Indeed, in terms of the military capabilities of the communist nations, a realistic evaluation indicates a growing, rather than a receding threat. Force planning guidance inferred from the Nixon Doctrine calls for meeting this threat with smaller, more mobile and more versatile forces with a greatly enhanced capability as a result of the application of the most modern advances in technology. This posture provides for the capability to deploy forces quickly in sufficient strength when and where they are needed. Together with similarly qualitatively improved allied forces, the overall American-allied defense posture would provide for a broad spectrum of credible deterrence.

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